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The Forces o f History: American-Iranian Diplomacy, 1949-1953

Director: Dr. Mehrdad Kia

Some scholars who have studied the Iranian Oil Nationalization Crisis o f 19491953 have lamented the outcome and consequences o f this crisis. During this
period, some analysts assert that the U.S. government should have followed a
different course of action. They claim that, despite British objections, Iran’s
Musaddiq government should have been supported in order to hasten a new oil
agreement and attain a more democratic regime for Iran. This part o f the
revisionist school also claims that Western ignorance and prejudice was a key
sculptor o f the outcome o f the crisis, and a direct contributor to the subsequent 30
years of authoritarian rule under Mohammad Reza Shah.
However, this study will examine other, more pertinent causes o f the courses and
consequences of the crisis. It is true that Western officials, particularly British,
frequently exhibited ignorance and lack o f cultural sensitivity before, during, and
after the crisis. Yet these cultural causes were not the preeminent factors that
shaped the outcome. Rather, there were other, more significant sculptors o f the
crisis’ outcome.
First, the internal political situation inside Iran, coupled with Musaddiq’s
intransigence, combined to create a recalcitrant Iranian stance during oil
negotiations. Second, the British government and public were resistant to an oil
settlement that deprived Britain o f its historic economic interests in Iran. Third,
the effects of Cold War dynamics were strong. The American government
opposed Musaddiq and oil nationalization not due to bigotry, but due to their
assessment that continued instability in Iran could hasten a Communist takeover
in Tehran. Fourth, British prejudice and Iranian suspicion helped shape their
intransigent postures. Fifth, Musaddiq would have fallen from power even
without Anglo-American intervention, for opposition to his government was
strong by 1953.
In essence, there were several factors that shaped the crisis. Though ignorance
and prejudice were two o f these factors, they were by no means the most
influential. This study will analyze other, more powerful factors that affected
American-Iranian relations during this period.
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PARTI: NARRATIVE
1. A Diplomacy off Priority

As frequently occurs in the conduct of foreign relations, we tend to see the
full scope o f our mistakes, misunderstandings, and miscalculations after the
negative consequences o f our actions are revealed. In the case o f AmericanIranian relations, the Revolution o f 1979-1980 indeed has been viewed as a direct,
negative consequence o f misdirected U.S. foreign policy. For 30 years previous
to the ascension o f Iran’s religious right, the American government gave
economic, military and political support to the increasingly authoritarian
Mohammad Reza Shah. This policy was adopted due to die Shah’s virulent anti
communism, and to die perceived lack of any viable pro-Western political
alternative. Yet it was a policy fated for failure. The Shah’s violent suppression
o f political dissent and lack o f substantively successful economic and political
reforms throughout the 1970s, effectively galvanized otherwise-antithetical forces
within Iran against his rule. These forces eventually caused his fall.
In the past 20 years, several histories have sought to reevaluate AmericanIranian diplomatic relations using the clarity provided by the Iranian Revolution.
This revolution was a severe shock to the Carter Administration, as well as to the
American public. The deposing o f a loyal monarch-ally, the seizing o f American
hostages, the burning o f American flags, and infuriated students chanting o f
“Death to America!” were a bewildering spectacle to a constituency that was
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mainly ignorant o f the culture and politics of the Near East. It was this maelstrom
that prompted the self-evident question, “What went wrong in U.S.-Iranian
relations?” The authors o f such histories have reminded us that in the first half o f
the 20th century, the United States actually enjoyed the favor o f the majority of
Iranians.

They have

searched

for

mistakes,

misunderstandings

and

miscalculations in policy during the reign o f that staunch U.S. ally, Mohammad
Reza Shah.

The Revisionist School
In

these

evaluations

o f American-Iranian

diplomacy,

the

Oil

Nationalization Crisis o f 1949-1953 is often cited as the critical turning point in
relations between the two countries. This is a correct assessment. Previous to this
time, the U.S. enjoyed the favor o f the Iranian majority due mainly to America’s
lack o f geopolitical interest and subsequent interference in Iranian affairs.
Traditionally, it had been the British who had protected Western interests. The
United States thus was content to remain an aloof neutral in the region, supplying
Iran with only small-scale technical, economic, and military assistance programs
in the 1920s and 1930s. America’s military presence during the Second World
War, though substantial in comparison to previous interventions, was nonetheless
limited. The U.S. Army stationed some 30,000 personnel in Iran, and this only to
lend technical assistance for the shipment o f lend-lease materiel to Soviet Russia.
Therefore, given the previous warmth o f U.S.-Iranian relations, revisionists claim
that misguided American demeanor and actions during the Oil Nationalization
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Crisis embittered anti-Shah factions in Iran, and sowing the seeds for revolution
three decades later. These revisionists, if that is a just label, claim that the U.S.
Department o f State, during the pivotal year 1953, should have supported
nationalist Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Musaddiq as a more favorable
alternative to the pro-western, authoritarian monarch Reza Shah. Further, this line
o f argument contends the following:
1.

Musaddiq and other champions of oil nationalization had

legitimate grievances regarding past and extant agreements vis-avis the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).
2. American diplomats exhibited little knowledge o f Iran’s
complex social, political, and economic landscape.

Their

understanding o f Iran was limited mainly to the Shah’s inner
circle.

Little was known about the sufferings, aspirations, and

needs o f Iran’s poor majority.
3.

Further, British and American ignorance and cultural bias,

combined with Musaddiq’s own eccentricities, led to strong
personal prejudices against the Iranian prime minister.

These

biases prevented them from seeing Musaddiq’s favorable qualities,
such as his goals o f land reform and the installation o f a
consitutional monarchy, based on the British model, that would
limit the Shah’s powers.
4. The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations should have been
more forceful in replacing Britain as guardian o f Western interests
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in Iran. This criticism holds that the Americans were slow to act,
and so squandered valuable time and opportunities to solve the
British-Iranian impasse.
5. American officials overestimated the severity o f the Soviet
threat, mistakenly believing that Musaddiq’s premiership could be
hijacked by the leftist Tudeh Party.

By the summer o f 1953,

American officials were eager to embrace Reza Shah as the only
viable pro-western alternative to Musaddiq.

Yet the State

Department consistently overlooked Musaddiq’s qualities, and
instead supported Reza Shah, a virulently anti-Communist leader.
6. The U.S. government should have exchanged short-term for
long-term goals. The Soviet-American rivalry served as an
influence on U.S. policy, one that was not commensurate with the
realities o f Soviet intentions and actions. Rather, the long-term
economic, political, and social welfare o f the Iranian people should
have been o f paramount importance, and led to an embrace of
Musaddiq’s regime.1

Before addressing the inaccurate assertions listed above, it is important, in
the interests o f fairness, to first concede to the revisionist school their accurate
assertions. These analysts have contributed greatly to the field o f AmericanIranian relations.

They have been willing to reevaluate the conduct o f U.S.

1 See James F. Goode, The United States ami Iran, 1946-51: The Diplomacy o f Neglect (London:
MacMillan, 1989), and The United States and Iran: In the Shadow o f Musaddiq (New York: St.
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foreign policy in the entire Near East, not just in Iran, and in doing so are seeking
to chart a more productive American diplomacy, one loss inclined toward cultural
prejudice, ignorance, and ethnocentrism. Therefore, the revisionist school is
correct on the first three points listed above. First, the Iranian government, in its
oil agreements with AIOC, had historically received treatment and profits
incongruous with the resources being provided to Britain. Second, the majority o f
American officials in Washington and Teheran had scant knowledge of Iran.
Third, British and American cultural and personal prejudices clouded their
assessments o f Musaddiq, leading directly to their covert support o f the Shah
during the 1953 coup.
However, contentions four to six are not entirely accurate. These points
will be addressed in the order they appear above. Regarding point four, criticism
has been levied against American officials and diplomats for what has been
viewed as a lethargic response to the crisis.

This requires a more adequate

interpretation. U.S. involvement in Iran was minimal in the late 19th century, and
o f a predominantly private nature. American missionaries and soeial-aid workers
came to Iran during this period, so diplomatic relations were established with the
purpose o f representing and protecting U.S. citizens in Iran. In the first half o f the
20th century, as previously mentioned, U.S. involvement expanded to include
economic, military, and public works programs sponsored by the government.
Yet these programs were small in relation to the aid provided for other countries.
Until the Second World War the United States was a secondary player, for she
maintained no significant economic or military interests in Iran. Thus, the State
Martin’s Press, 1997) for good examples of the revisionist interpretation.
5

Department was content to allow Great Britain a free hand in the country.
Anyone, then, who criticizes die U.S. government for not getting involved earlier
in the Oil Nationalization Crisis o f 1949-1953 is missing the mark. The British
had been active in Iran for approximately 150 years. It was understandable, then,
that the Americans would be hesitant to intervene directly during the early months
o f the crisis. Further, contrary to revisionist thought, the United States
government was not entirely without interest or expertise in Iran. Given Iran’s
geopolitical, strategic, and resource value, Washington was eager to prevent the
Soviets from attaining dominion over the country, and so devoted more attention
to Iran in the postwar years. Iran was not being neglected. Rather, in the years
immediately following the war, the United States government was undergoing a
baptism by fire with regard to Iranian diplomacy.
Regarding points five and six, it has been said that American officials
overestimated both the strength o f the leftist faction within Iran, and the
seriousness o f the Soviet threat. Historian James F. Goode has been acutely
critical o f the U.S. government on this point, asserting that the Truman and
Eisenhower Administrations were irrationally obsessed with the Soviet Union’s
intentions and actions:
In the early years o f the cold war, the government o f the United
States found its time almost consumed with concerns about the
Soviet Union... such proved to be the case notably in relations with
Iran, where there was some Russian activity but not nearly as much
as Washington officialdom espied.2

Goode contends that the American government carried “a misguided policy bom

2 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. viii.
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o f ignorance and anticommunist ideology,” and that this mindset caused the State
Department to oppose Prime Minister Musaddiq out of an unjustified fear that his
nationalist movement would be co-opted by pro-Soviet elements within Iran.
Further, Goode believes that the U.S. should have possessed more foresight, and
supported Musaddiq during the Oil Nationalization Crisis, as he would have been
a more favorable long-term ruler than the oppressive Shah.

“Assuming that

stability would satisfy the Iranian people,” Goode continues, “Americans
augmented royal power and as the years passed abetted the Pahlavi dictatorship,
making straight the way for the explosion to come.”3 In short, Goode labels
American policy in Iran in the years previous to the May, 1951 nationalization o f
AIOC as a “diplomacy of neglect”:
Until the early 1950s, Britain was the principal western power at
Tehran. During those early postwar years then, as the Cold War
intensified, the Truman Administration neglected Iran, partly
because it assumed that the British, with their long experience in
the Middle East, would maintain the Western position, while
Washington concentrated on Europe and East Asia. It assumed too
much. Matters degenerated into die oil crisis of 1951, forcing the
United States to adopt a more active policy.4

In stating that American policy with regard to Iran constituted a
“diplomacy o f neglect,” Goode has overplayed his hand.

He is correct in

asserting that U.S. support of the Pahlavi regime during and after the Musaddiq
period contributed directly to the fiery Revolution o f 1979-80.

Yet even an

American embrace of Musaddiq’s nationalist movement would not have altered
Iran’s course. And we must remember that Goode wrote his two major works on

3 Goode, The Diplomacy o f Neglect, p. viii.
4 Ibid., p. viii, pp. 35-36, pp. 42-43.

7

the subject after Iran’s Revolution. Remember also that these two works were
published immediately before and after the close o f the Cold War, in 1989 and
1997, respectively. Goode is writing with the added luxury o f hindsight. Though
Goode’s suggestion of an alternative course for U.S. policy in Iran during the Oil
Nationalization Crisis is commendable, he has under-emphasized the influence
that the Soviet-American rivalry had upon the course o f U.S. diplomacy. The
bane o f revisionism is its disproportionate reliance upon the assessment o f the
consequences o f a course o f action, consequences often only visible in the
present. Historian John Lewis Gaddis recently touched on this inclination when
he penned an article on the Cold War in U.S. News & World Report. Gaddis
reminds us that what we see now with great clarity and wistful second-guessing,
was not what we saw then:
Our view o f the past is so much clearer than our vision o f the
future that we tend to forget that the past once had a future, and
that it was just as opaque to those who lived through it as our own
future is for us today.5

The revisionist school often overlooks the uncertainties that the actors
faced during the crisis. One easily criticizes the seeming slow American response;
the strong influence o f anticommunist ideology; the support given to a monarch
who proved to be an enemy of democracy, rather than a defender o f it,

A Diplomacy o f Priority & The Forces o f History
Yet we cannot forget that U.S. officials in Washington and Tehran made
decisions based upon their perceptions o f Soviet intrigue. Of all the factors that
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affected its outcome, the crisis was undoubtedly shaped most by the budding Cold
War and its accompanying American fears, some real, some imagined o f
Communist machinations in Iran. There were other significant influences, of
course, such as the internal factionalism that eroded Musaddiq’s power base, or
the intransigence o f the British and Iranian governments during oil negotiations.
However, it was Musaddiq’s perceived susceptibility to Communist subversion
that led the Eisenhower Administration to oppose actively the prime minister’s
government, and to help supplant it with a pro-Western regime more conducive to
an oil agreement. More than any other factor, the competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union proved to be most critical to the outcome of
Musaddiq’s drive for oil nationalization. Likewise, the positions o f the British
and Iranian governments were etched by enormous historical, domestic, political,
and economic forces that pushed their subjects into intransigent stances during the
crisis. Further, given the myriad o f trouble spots in the years after the close o f the
war, U.S. diplomats were forced to prioritize their foreign policy goals. Events in
Europe mid Asia, as Goode attests, took precedence over the row in Iran, even
after Musaddiq’s nationalization o f oil in mid-1951. Unfortunately, Goode does
not take this observation to its most logical conclusion, that Iran, though o f some
importance to American officials, was outranked in priority by several other
issues and trouble-spots.
To summarize, the following are key rebuttals to this revisionist school,
assertions that will provide a more accurate interpretation of the Oil
Nationalization Crisis o f 1949-1953. First, Musaddiq and other champions o f oil
5 John Lewis Gaddis, “Face-Off,” U.S. News & World Report (October 18, 1999), p. 39.
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nationalization had legitimate grievances regarding past and extant agreements
vis-a-vis the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), Great Britain’s sharp tool in its
influence over the Iranian government

Second, although many American

officials exhibited little knowledge o f Iran’s complex social, political, and
economic landscape, the direct impact this ignorance had upon the outcome o f the
crisis is less than some revisionist analysts would have us believe. There were
other, more significant factors that led to Iran’s nationalization o f AIOC in 1951,
and the subsequent fell o f Musaddiq in August, 1953.
discussed below.

These factors will be

Third, although many British and American officials held

prejudices against Musaddiq, these biases were not the central factor in their
eventual opposition to him in mid-1953. Given the recent replacement o f several
world governments by leftists, the Americans were most concerned about
Musaddiq’s ambiguous treatment o f the Tudeh party. Thus, the effects o f Cold
War dynamics caused American opposition to Musaddiq as the crisis reached a
boiling point. And even had Musaddiq’s cultural, character, and political nuances
been better understood, it is unlikely that the overall outcome o f the crisis would
have been altered. Fourth, British prestige and power was on the decline after
1945. However, we should not assume that Britain was forced to play the part o f
hapless sidekick to the United States. On the contrary, a crucible o f American
containment doctrine was the country’s need for allies in the fight against Soviet
expansionism. While London no longer maintained a global empire, she was still
a much-needed NATO ally, and the United States could not afford a permanent
estrangement. Thus, Washington opted to tread lightly in the early stages o f the
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crisis, for while the United States desired to gain influence in Iran, this desire was
carefully balanced with the need for continued good relations with London. The
Americans were not slow to act, but cautious. Fifth, the American government
did not overestimate the Soviet threat. Though some diplomats sounded the alarm
and warned o f a probable Soviet invasion, they were later shouted down by the
CIA.

During the final months o f Musaddiq’s premiership, the Central

Intelligence Agency reached the conclusion that a Soviet invasion of Iran, though
possible, was unlikely, and that the real Communist threat came from internal
subversion. This interpretation of Iran’s tumultuous political scene was a fateful
sculptor o f Eisenhower’s decision to proceed with an Anglo-American covert
operation to topple Musaddiq. Sixth, this type o f revisionism has asserted that the
U.S. government should have thrown its support to Musaddiq rather than Reza
Shah. This contention is made, however, using the clarity that the 1979 Iranian
Revolution provided. Cold war dynamics were too strong to have allowed this to
happen. This is not to say that Musaddiq was not a qualified and able leader. In
fact, Mohammad Musaddiq was a man o f vision, integrity, perseverance, and
sacrifice. Unfortunately, the forces o f history were conspiring against him. With
immense courage he faced obstacles o f time and circumstance which were
difficult to surmount, and for this he is to be admired. Seventh, another challenge
that Musaddiq faced was the charged, fractious arena o f Iranian domestic politics.
Even had the United States and Great Britain vigorously supported both
Musaddiq’s premiership and his nationalization o f AIOC, Musaddiq would have
likely remained extremely vulnerable to the domestic political forces arrayed

ll

against him.

Eighth, American diplomatic conduct toward Iran during the

postwar period, though faulty, does not merit the “diplomacy o f neglect” label
sometimes affixed to it. Rather, it is more accurate to call it a diplomacy o f
priority. The American government had a plethora o f other hot-spots that had to
be addressed during the height of the oil nationalization crisis in Iran. American
officials were forced to prioritize their foreign policy goals. Though a key focus
in the State Department’s recently-created Near Eastern and African Affairs
Division, Iran was outranked by other, more pressing matters. This conduct,
though repulsive given the vicious tyranny o f Reza Shah that followed
Musaddiq’s removal, is nonetheless an integral, if unfortunate, part o f every
country’s foreign policy process.

In international diplomacy, a short-term

solution usually overshadows long-term vision.
Therefore, American conduct in Iran after 1945 does not constitute a
“diplomacy o f neglect,” but rather a very conscious diplomacy o f priority. U.S.
policy-makers made decisions based on their unique circumstances, domestic
pressures, interests, and perceptions. Simultaneously, these officials also reacted
to the other actors involved: Iran, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. Each
player in the tragedy was driven from behind by fierce internal pressures, as well
as pressed from the front by equally intense external antagonisms. Given these
innumerable responsibilities and the plethora o f issues outside the Near East that
Washington had to face, it was understandable that Iran became a lower priority
during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Oil nationalization in Iran did not become
a crisis due to American negligence, as the revisionist school claims. Rather, the
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oil crisis became a crisis because o f British and Iranian intransigence.

U.S.

officials made their foreign policy decisions te e d on calculated assessments o f
the global diplomatic, economic, political, and military picture.

For the

Americans, Iran was simply not on the short list o f priorities. While the U.S.
government was extremely concerned about the ‘loss’ o f Iran and its resources to
the Soviet bloc, events in Europe and Asia ranked higher on die priority list
Even had Iran been placed a higher priority, it is doubtful that American
intervention earlier in the crisis would have altered its outcome. In essence, then,
American policy was a diplomacy o f priority.

13

2.. Landscape

Before commencing this argument regarding the causes and consequences
of Iran’s nationalization o f oil in the summer o f 1951, if is first necessary to
provide a summary o f the course of this crisis. First, a summation o f AIOC’s
birth and subsequent growth will be presented, for without an understanding o f
the troubled nature o f British-Iranian relations, from which the AIOC cannot be
separated, it is impossible to place the oil crisis in its proper historical context
Next, a short narrative o f American involvement in Iran will be given. Discussion
o f British-Iranian relations in this chapter will be limited to the confrontations
surrounding AIOC’s operations inside Iran, to political control o f the company,
and to the disagreements regarding the proper allocation o f oil revenues. Other
factors relevant to the Anglo-Iranian relationship will be examined in subsequent
chapters.

Early American Involvement
Before official diplomatic relations were established between Iran and the
United States in 1883, there had been a slight American presence in Iran for over
50 years. The first documented American incursions in Iran came in 1830, when
two missionaries, Harrison O.G. Dwight and Eli Smith, traveled through
N

northwest Iran.

Without exception, America’s presence throughout the 19th

century was confined to proselytism, aid, and education efforts such as these. The
establishment of diplomatic relations in order to protect and represent American

citizens in Iran followed. Though limited in scope, these independent missions
were viewed favorably by most Iranians, for much o f this early American
presence centered upon the establishment o f schools and health clinics for a
people plagued by illiteracy and frequent poor living conditions. While most
Shi’i Muslims reacted icily to the missionaries’ conversion attempts, they
nonetheless appreciated the Christians’ humanitarian efforts. Thus, from roughly
the 1860s to the 1940s, the U.S. enjoyed a mainly favorable image in Iran due in
particular to these altruistic works, and to the absence o f American political
interference in its internal affairs. In fact, some historians, including James Bill
and Barry Rubin, have lamented the downward spiral o f American-Iranian
relations in the 20th century. One must remember, however, that during the 18th
and 19th centuries it was these two juggernauts, and not incipient America, that
vied for hegemony in Iran. The United States had no motive for such intrigue, as
it held no vital strategic interests in die region, and was thus satisfied to allow
Russia and Great Britain to wrangle for dominion over the ancient kingdom in
their broader struggle for empire..

Oil and Anglo-Iranian Relations
Persia, as Iran was called until 1935, first granted an oil concession to the
British Empire in 1901, when Australian William Knox D ’Arcy received approval
for the exploration o f 480,000 square miles within Iran, excluding the five
northern provinces. D’Arcy and his colleagues purchased the concession for
£200,000, and were thus permitted to withdraw, transport, and process Persian
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oil.1 He subsequently attained the financial backing of Burmah Oil Company,
formed the Persian Petroleum Syndicate in 1908, and discovered large oil deposits
in the country the same year. In 1909 this syndicate was reorganized under the
name Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), and drilling operations commenced
shortly before the outbreak o f the First World War. In 1914, that ever-persuasive
First Lord o f the Admiralty, Winston S. Churchill, convinced the Crown to
purchase a 51% majority in APOC. Because the Royal Navy was converting
from coal to oil-burning vessels, a reliable source o f oil was required. In APOC,
Churchill found this reliable source, sweetened the deal by his arrangement to
purchase oil for the Royal Navy at a discount, and provided needed capital for an
expansion o f APOC operations.
In return, the Persian government received royalties at a fixed rate o f 16%.
Unfortunately, APOC profits proved insubstantial during the first decade of
operation, netting the Persian government an average of only £250,000 annually
between 1912 mid 1919.2 In 1920 production jumped to 1,385 long tons,
providing the government with royalties o f £590,000.3 By 1926, the year after a
young military officer named Reza Khan ascended to the Persian throne, oil
revenues topped £1.4 million, despite a severe two-year decline in 1922-23. (See
below, T a ble 2.1).

1 Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy o f Modem Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism,
1926-79 (New York: New York University Press, 1981), p. 67.
2 Ibid
3 Ibid., p. 93. The author has noticed some discrepancies in these figures during the research
stage. For figures regarding oil production and royalties, citations come from Homa Katouzian’s
The Political Economy o f Modem Iran.
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table

2.1 - Oil Revenues, Export Values, and Export Volume, 1919-19324

(A)
(B)
Year Oil Revenues

1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932

(C)
Oil Export Volume

(£ million)

(thousand long tons)

0.47
0.59
0.59
0.53
0.41
0.83
1.05
1.40
0.50
0.53
1.44
1.29
0.31
1.53

1,106
1,385
1,743
2,327
2,959
3,714
4,334
4,556
4,832
5,358
5,461
5,929
5,750
6,446

What is astonishing about the figures in column B is the degree o f profit
fluctuation for the Iranian government from year to year, despite the relatively
consistent, if gradual, growth in oil export volume (column C). If it is astonishing
for us, it was a source o f great exasperation for Teheran, as fluctuations in the
market price o f oil, bookkeeping mistakes, and creative accounting caused
irregular variations in the revenues paid to Persia.5

Unfortunately, the

government relied increasingly upon oil profits as a source o f revenue, this during
a period o f decidedly undependable profits. It was this last variable, the very real
possibility o f fraud, that most infuriated the government Yet because the 1919

4 Ibid., p.93, 117. For this data Katouzian has relied upon J. Bharier’s Economic Development in
Iran 1900-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
5 Ibid., p. 94.
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oil agreement did not permit Teheran access to the books, the government had no
evidence with which to prove the negligence or illegality o f APOC’s bookkeeping
practices. Hence, the demand for access to the company’s ledgers soon became
an integral demand during subsequent Anglo-Persian oil negotiations from the
1920s onward.
Another irritant to Teheran was the company’s unreasonable refusal to
provide the government royalties on APOC operations outside the country,
despite the fact that Persian oil was being used in such enterprises, and at a
substantial profit to the company. It was inevitable, then, that the Iranians would
demand a more just oil agreement with APOC.

In 1920 the British relented

slightly by way o f the Armitage-Smith Agreement, by which APOC grudgingly
consented to pay royalties on the company’s non-Persian operations. However,
there was a significant divergence o f opinion as to the fairness and permanence of
this 1920 compact, as Mary Ann Heiss observes:
This agreement met most o f Persia’s demands, notably its call for
the inclusion o f the company’s non-Persian operations in the
calculation o f royalty payments. In British eyes the agreement
constituted a permanent solution to Persia’s discontent with
APOC. To the Persians, however, it was merely a stopgap until
more advantageous terms could be arranged.6
Consequently, after he consummated his usurpation o f the Qajar Dynasty in 1926,
Reza Shah attempted to attain a better oil arrangement. He realized that Persia’s
drive toward modernization required immense financial resources, and that the
country’s oil profits were an important revenue source. In 1928 he commenced a
new round of negotiations with the British, negotiations that were soon
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complicated by the worldwide economic depression. Oil production and profits
dropped drastically, with 1931 ’s profit for Teheran tallying a paltry £310,000!7
This catastrophic decline came at the worst possible time, for the Shah’s
government had just initiated an ambitious seven-year economic plan, one that
relied heavily upon oil revenues for funding. Out of frustration with this crippling
drop in revenues, Reza Shah unilaterally cancelled the oil concession in
November, 1932, a move that forced the British to take Persia’s demands more
seriously.

The British government soon referred the matter to the inchoate

League o f Nations, and accused the Persians o f an illegal cancellation o f the oil
concession. The Persians countered by accusing the British o f meddling in what
they considered to be an internal affair, and then reminded the British that the
Armitage-Smith Agreement o f 1920 had not been formally ratified by the Majlis,
Persia’s parliamentary body. The League o f Nations, serving as mediator, helped
the two sides reach an oil agreement in 1933.
Once again, there were divergent opinions inside Persia regarding the
fairness o f this latest oil concession. The compact did satisfy some of Reza
Shah’s key demands. It reduced APOC’s concession area o f nearly one-half
million square miles by 80%; it permitted the hiring o f only Persians for the
company’s unskilled jobs; and it mandated the hiring o f more, qualified Persians
for APOC’s skilled positions. However, it was on the subject o f profits that Reza
6 Heiss, p. 6.
7 Again, some discrepancies exist among the extant sources on economic figures. Heiss puts
193 l’s profit figure at £307,000, while Katouzian and Bharier have £310,000 listed. Often,
figures have been rounded up, which accounts for most discrepancies. However, as Katouzian
reminds us, finding reliable sources of financial data regarding APOC (AIOC) is difficultparticularly during the company’s first 10-15 years of operation. In addition, finding reliable
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Shah was publicly and privately criticized for this submission to his British
masters. The 1933 Agreement did not appreciably increase Persia’s oil profits,
but did guarantee Teheran a minimum annual payment o f £975,000, a part o f the
agreement no doubt designed to provide the government with reliable income
during times o f economic depression or reduced market price for oil. Yet some of
Reza Shah’s opponents, both in 1933 and, increasingly, in years to come,
criticized this portion o f the oil concession as an assent to British imperialism and
economic exploitation, and charged him with conspiring with Great Britain in
order to bolster his power-bloc within Persia. They claimed, with good evidence,
that the country was not getting an equitable profit for its most valuable natural
resource.
Another component of the arrangement that irked the court’s growing
number o f opponents, and a component that was o f great benefit to APOC, was
the extension o f die oil concession by 30 years, from 1960 to 1990. Eventually,
Persians in virtually every category condemned this extension: leftists, religious
clerics, academics, traditional merchants, constitutionalists, and members o f the
moderate middle class. They viewed it as a blank check with which the British
could purchase hegemony in Persia until nearly the end o f the century. The battle
lines for future conflict with Great Britain were drawn with each passing day. As
Mary Ann Heiss pointed out, this oil dispute o f 1932-33 “foreshadowed in many
ways the crisis o f the 1950s.”8

economic information for the Persian government during the early 20th century has been an
equally daunting task.
8 Heiss, p. 7.
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Interestingly, the period between the 1933 Oil Agreement and the
outbreak o f the Second World War was a relatively calm one for Persia. There
were several reasons for this seemingly odd lull in internal tensions with regard to
the latest oil concession.

First, the oil agreement itself contained enough

redeeming points that the full scope o f its incongruities were not to be realized
until after the war.

Indeed, the guarantee o f a minimum annual payment to

Teheran was, at least initially, a source o f relief due to the fresh memory o f the
depression-driven decline in oil revenue in 1931. Second, Reza Shah was an
ambitious, determined, and formidable politician. During the years after his 1925
ascension to the Peacock Throne, he fortified his position as king and expanded
his power-base inside Persia, or Iran, as she became known in 1935.9 It therefore
became increasingly dangerous to malign publicly Reza Shah or to criticize
overtly his programs. Although it appeared that the 1933 agreement placated his
opposition and provided Teheran with an equitable oil agreement, dissenters still
murmured epithets against Reza Shah, and pined for the opportunity to give full
voice to their grievances and aspirations. This opportunity came in the form o f a
second, greater war.

9 In 1935 the shah resurrected Persia’s true name, Iran. The name Iran is derived from two old
Persian words; ir- (meaning “pure” or “noble”), and -an (meaning “land of’). The name Iran thus
means, literally, “land of the pure”, and finds an Indo-European cousin in the moniker Ireland.
The name Persia is derived from the Greek word perm , an appellation given after the Fars
region’s aggrandizement of power ca. 550 B.C. Future European labels for the country were thus
derived from this Greek designation.
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3. Prelude to Crisis: 1941-1949

As in other parts o f the world, the Second World War drastically altered
Iran’s socio-economic fabric and political institutions. Without an understanding
o f the effects of four years o f Allied occupation on the country, it is impossible to
discern the immediate causes o f Iran’s drive toward nationalization after the war.

Iran during the Second World War
Contrary to opposition accusations with regard to the 1933 Oil Agreement,
Reza Shah did not entertain strong pro-British sympathies. While he required oil
revenues to fund his economic exploits, Reza Shah resented his own reliance on
AIOC and was an averse ally o f London during the inter-war years. In reality, he
viewed the oil concession with the renamed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a
necessary evil. Indeed, he had been courted by several American oil companies
in the 1920s and 1930s, and even desired a concession with the United States to
counter AIOC’s dominance inside Iran. Unfortunately, the British held the high
ground in Iran, and American attempts to gain oil concessions in Iran proved
futile due chiefly to AIOC lobbying and threats. Reza Shah likewise held strong
antipathy toward Russia. In a series o f humiliating political and military defeats,
the Iranians had seen their territory whittled away by expansion-minded Moscow,
with its most significant loss coming during the Russo-Persian War o f 1825-
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1828.1 Though Russian expansionism briefly halted in the years after the rise o f
the Bolsheviks, in the late 1920s Soviet Russia resumed her aggrandizement
drive, one accompanied by a more complex ideology than that ever provided by
Tsarist Russia.
It was, therefore, Reza Shah’s resentment o f British and Russian
imperialism that inevitably led to his unofficial complicity with the Axis Powers
during the Second World War. With the monarch’s tacit approval, Nazi German
agents operated in Iran during the early years o f the conflict, a situation rather
unsettling to the British and Soviets. Allied consternation with regard to the Reza
Shah’s belligerence centered upon Iran’s geo-strategic value as a transportation
route for Lend-Lease supplies entering the Soviet Union. During the war, military
equipment and foodstuffs were transported to the Soviet Union via five main
routes. The Persian Corridor became a precious asset to the Allies, as it was less
vulnerable to Axis air and sea attacks, and was the only transportation route open
all four seasons o f the year. From 1941 to 1945, approximately 17.5 million long
tons o f war materiel were shipped to the Soviets. Of this amount, 7.9 million long
tons arrived via the Persian Corridor, thus illustrating Iran’s strategic worth to the
Allied cause.2
When threats from the Russians and British did not sway the Iranian
leader from his pro-German stance, the two countries invaded Iran on August 25,
1941, and then deposed Reza Shah the following month, replacing him with his
1 The troubled Russo-Iranian relationship will be more thoroughly discussed below. Heavyhanded Russian and British treatment of Iran led inevitably to deep animosity on the part of most
Iranians.
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son, Mohammed Reza Shah (b. 1919). The elder Pahlavi died while in exile in
1944. The two allies forced Tehran to sign die Tripartite Agreement in January,
1942, which allowed the Allies the “unrestricted right to use... all means of
communications” inside Iran.3 Soviet troops subsequently occupied the five
northern provinces: Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Astarabad, and Khorasan;
while British forces moved into the southern region, this being the area already
under heavy British influence due to AIOC operations.
In the occupation’s wake, various political organizations quickly surfaced
or reemerged following the removal o f the much-feared Reza Shah from power,
and his replacement by his 22-year-old son. Of course, Mohammad Reza Shah
was a son entirely reliant upon the good graces o f the British and Soviets for his
new position. James A Bill elaborated on this phenomenon:
Iran in the 1940s was an exploding cauldron o f political forces and
issues. After sixteen years o f repressive control, the country
erupted when the Allies removed the lid o f Reza Shah. Political
parties and publications representing all shades o f the ideological
spectrum proliferated, spreading their social ideas and political
messages. A large and vociferous group o f extreme nationalists
decried external imperial intervention in the affairs o f their
country. Within this coalition were committed groups who
demanded the destruction o f the old aristocracy and an end to
internal corruption and exploitation. On the other hand, strongly
entrenched landed and bazaar [merchant] interests sought to
protect their power and privilege. Some o f these forces were
willing to cooperate with external forces [British, Russian,

2 As cited in Michael Kahl Sheehan, Iran: The Impact o f United States Interests and Policies,
1941-1954 (Brooklyn, NY: Theo Gaus’ Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 7. See also John Donovan, ed., U.S.
& Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1949-56 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972).
3 As cited in Sheehan, p. 6. By “communications,” the Allies meant all roads, waterways, airports,
and railways, including the 865-mile Trans-Iranian Railway. This railroad ran from Bandar Shah,
on the Caspian Sea, through Tehran, and ended at Ahvaz near the Persian Gulf. The excerpt
quoted is from Article 3ii(b) of the agreement.
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American, German] in order to protect the domestic status quo in
which they thrived.
It was this occupation by Allied forces for the duration o f the war that gave rival
political groups breathing room. It also helped divide the country into spheres o f
influence, if not spheres o f hegemony, for the two occupying powers. In the
north, a variety o f nationalist and leftist groups sprang up under the protection and
tutelage o f the Soviet Union. In the south, a hodge-podge o f religious, traditional
parties likewise flourished under the auspices o f the British government.
Although the Tripartite Agreement decreed against it, both countries gained
virtual autonomy in their respective sectors, with the new, young Mohammad
Reza Shah unable to contravene the two domineering powers.

Increase in American Involvement
However, cracks soon appeared in Great Britain’s armor, and it was this
waning o f British hegemony that placed the United States in a position to increase
its heretofore scant presence in Iran. Because British forces were already thinly
spread between the European, North African, and Asian theaters, the Crown
requested that Franklin D. Roosevelt send U.S. troops to Iran to maintain the
Persian Corridor for Lend-Lease traffic to the Soviet Union. In December, 1943,
aid arrived in Iran in the form o f the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC)
under the initial leadership o f U.S. Army Colonel Raymond Wheeler. The PGSC
eventually numbered some 30,000 troops, and was charged with the maintenance

4 James A. Bill, The Eagle and die Lion: The Tragedy o f American-Iranian Relations (New
Haven, CT. Yale University Press, 1988), p. 25.
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of transportation and communication routes used to convey supplies to Soviet
Russia.5 Further, because the American mission was o f a purely technical nature,
neither Mohammad Reza Shah’s government nor the people had reason to resent
this foreign intrusion. In fact, many Iranians hoped that the ascendant American
Republic would serve as a counterweight to Britain and Russia in the future, and
so enable the country to chart a more independent course.
This period likewise witnessed deeper American involvement in Iran’s
financial and criminal institutions. There were several economic missions in Iran
during the first half of the 20th century, though only three o f key merit will be
mentioned here. The first large-scale, government-sponsored economic advisory
mission, that o f lawyer and financial advisor W. Morgan Shuster, came to Iran in
1910 to update the country’s chaotic public finance infrastructure. Unfortunately,
Shuster’s mission was beset by problems o f every variety. His mission first
encountered stiff resistance from Iran’s traditionalist, entrenched government
officials, those men who habitually helped themselves to the money allotted to
their respective departments. As if an early fulfillment o f de Tocqueville’s
prophecy, the Americans next encountered stiff resistance from future arch-rival
Russia, who viewed Shuster’s mission as a penetration into that country’s sphere
o f influence.6 In December, 1911, despite fierce opposition from the Majlis, the
cabinet and acting regent Naser al-Molk effectively terminated what was intended
5 John Donovan, ed., U.S. and Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1949-56 (New York: Facts on
File, Inc., 1972), pp. 27-30. Colonel Wheeler was later replaced by General D.H. Connolly, who
arrived in Iran in October, 1942. Sheehan, in pointing out the tactical importance of this Persian
Corridor, notes that approximately three of every five tons of war supplies sent to South Russia via
Iran came by way of the Iranian State Railway. See Sheehan, p. 10.
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to be a three-year assignment due to withering pressure from the two
aforementioned parties. Shuster returned to the United States in disgust.
The second pertinent economic mission, that o f Arthur Millspaugh, had
two parts. The first worked in Iran from 1922 to 1927, and the second was in the
country during the Second World War.7 As in the case o f Shuster, the two
Millspaugh missions encountered opposition. The two main objectives o f the first
mission were to improve the proficiency and revenue o f tax collection through
greater use o f the army in collection duties, Mid to increase foreign investment.8
Millspaugh dueled with well-fortified forces within Iran: wealthy landlords,
merchants (bazaaris), military officers, government bureaucrats, and members of
the court. These elements were hostile toward Millspaugh’s reform attempts, and
possessed the political and economic power necessary to defend their positions.
Yet there were other reasons for Millspaugh’s difficulties,

First,

Millspaugh’s reforms included taxes upon matches and tobacco, as well as
government control o f tea and sugar. While his mission did improve the overall
efficacy o f tax collection, these taxable commodities were mass-consumption
items. Consequently, Iran’s poor majority was hit especially hard by these added
tax burdens, causing widespread popular resentment toward the American
6 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots o f Revolution: An Interpretive History o f Modem Iran (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1981), p. 90. Keddie observes that “the British apparently felt that since
Iran would not allow British advisers, Americans would be next best ”
7 Ibid.
* Ibid. There was also an earlier failed attempt in 1921. Iranian diplomat Husain Ala was sent to
the United States that summer to open talks for an oil concession and for an economic advisory
mission. Though hesitant at first, Washington eventually commenced discussions and a
concession agreement was reached between Tehran and Standard Oil Company o f New Jersey.
However, British and Russian officials quickly derailed the arrangement, claiming the agreement
was in violation of the 1907 Treaty- to which Iran was a non-signatory. Though approved by
Iran’s Majlis (National Assembly), the concession soon lapsed due to vehement British and
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advisory group.

Second, the American economic mission’s search for new

foreign capital investment led logically to the United States. It naturally followed
that Great Britain took exception to the potential intrusion o f a new competitor in
its imperial playground, and the Empire exerted persistent diplomatic pressure
upon the American State Department to end any commercial designs for Iran. In
fact, an American company almost gained a major oil concession in the north
when, in 1923, Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation successfully completed
negotiations for an oil agreement that would be sweetened by a $10 million loan
to the Iranian government.

However, strong British and Russian diplomatic

protests, together with tense U.S.-Iranian relations due to the recent murder o f an
American vice-consul by an infuriated mob in Tehran, effectively terminated
Sinclair’s gains.9 The last two nails in the mission’s coffin were the decline o f
Russo-Iranian trade and growing hostility from Reza Khan, hostility due in part to
Millspaugh’s acute political influence. The decline in hade with Russia came as a
result o f Millspaugh’s refusal to come to terms with that country on the fate o f
Caspian Sea fisheries, for the former State Department oil advisor believed that
Iran held an exclusive claim to these fisheries. In 1927 Millspaugh finally, and
resentfully, resigned his position and returned to the United States.
Arthur Millspaugh’s next foray into Iranian economics and politics came
in November, 1942, when he was contracted as administrator general of finances
after Iran’s occupation by Russian and British forces during the Second World
War. This time, the American mission met with less success than Millspaugh’s
Russian protests. With regard to the killing of the vice-consul, it was apparently a case of
mistaken-identity.
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previous attempt. During the war the Iranian economy was in dire straits due to a
variety of financial, agricultural, political, and social causes. There was a poor
harvest in 1942, which led to grain shortages and food hoarding by greedy
speculators. The monopolization o f transportation routes by the Allies hindered
the conveyance o f the scant food supply Iranians did have To keep their troops
amply supplied the Allies devalued die rial, Iran’s monetary unit, by forcibly
increasing the money supply and thereby enhancing Allied purchasing power.
The removal o f Reza Khan from power in September, 1941 allowed sundry tribal
groups, such as the Kurds and Azerbaijanis in the north and the Bakhtiaris and
Baluchis in the south, to regain their autonomy, further weakening the authority o f
an already struggling central government. Because lesser civil servants lived on
fixed incomes during a period o f increased inflation, the demand for bribes to
augment their small salaries increased significantly. All in all, conditions in Iran
were miserable for the country’s impoverished rural majority, while the landed
aristocracy, urban bazaaris, and embedded traditional elite continued to live in
relative prosperity.
To deal with the plethora o f obstacles facing him, Millspaugh successfully
lobbied for sweeping powers with which to enact reforms. In May, 1943 the Full
Powers Law granted his advisory group authority over virtually all aspects o f the
government’s economic programs. As Nikki Keddie stated, this authority covered
everything: “finances, banking, government industry, commerce, and emergency
wartime controls.” “Americans,” Keddie summarized, “were put in charge o f all

9 Keddie, p. 115.
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key economic departments.”10 In putting this power to use, Millspaugh did
achieve some limited successes. He was able to improve the efficiency o f the
government’s grain-storage apparatus, and lobbied vigorously to end its
monopolization o f industry. However, most o f the mission’s reform efforts failed,
due in part to his refusal to assimilate Iranian experts into his American mission
team, and to opposition from a wide range o f Iranian officials. The final blow to
the mission came in 1944, when Millspaugh tried unsuccessfully to serve the
leader o f the National Bank o f Iran termination papers!19 It was this abuse o f his
advisory position that unified traditionalists and reformers in opposition against
him, for they viewed his attempt to fire an Iranian government official as an
arrogant interference into their domestic realm. Shortly thereafter, the American
group resigned and returned to the United States.
The third pertinent American economic mission, that o f Overseas
Consultants, Inc. (OCI), worked under contract with Tehran to develop the Shah’s
ambitious Seven-Year Plan for modernization and economic growth.11 Before
summarizing OCI’s work in Iran, the close o f the war and immediate postwar
Soviet involvement must be discussed.

Soviet Machinations in Postwar Iran
As stated above, Iran was invaded by British and Soviet forces in August,
1941, ostensibly to secure a transportation corridor that would be open year-round

10 Ibid., p. 116.
11 Technically, OCI was a consortium, as it included a mixture of private firms. However, the
majority of companies were American.
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and safe from Axis attack. In January, 1942, the Soviet Union, the United States,
and Great Britain signed the Tripartite Agreement, by which the three countries
generously granted themselves the right to monopolize “all means of
communications” inside Iran in order to transport Lend-Lease supplies to the
Soviets. Another provision o f this agreement stated that all Allied personnel had
to be evacuated from Iran within six months o f the war’s end.
During the war, the two main occupation zones became havens for
resurgent political parties. The zones also became reflections o f die political
ideologies of their respective occupying powers. (However, it must be noted that
the British and Soviets were not wholly dominant in their zones. Indeed, leftists
did make inroads in Britain’s southern sphere, as shown by several Communistinspired strikes in the southern oil fields). In the south, the British found willing
allies in the various tribal coalitions and political groups that were mainly
traditional in ideology. Because o f the complexity and variety o f their political
agendas, these parties will be more closely examined below, chapter five. For our
purposes, a brief synopsis o f the political landscape in the north is necessary.
In the five northern provinces that constituted their zone, the Soviets
obviously favored leftist political groups and trade unions, and were active in the
lending o f monetary, military, and political aid to them. James A. Bill provided a
concise description of the foremost leftist party, Tudeh, in his book The Eagle and
the Lion: The Tragedy o f American-lranian Relations. Bill points out that the
Tudeh party was relatively popular in the north, particularly in industrial areas
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such as the city o f Isfahan.12 After its formation in 1941, the party’s membership
and popularity gradually increased, reaching the height o f its influence in the
summer o f 1953, when its roster hit 25,000 and it boasted some 300,000
sympathizers.13 Soviet influence was also felt in eastern Azerbaijan, where, on
December 12, 1945, Tudeh rebels backed the establishment o f a new government
under the leadership o f Ja’far Pishevari. The coalition that organized die revolt,
the Democrats, was a mixture o f various political groups with a common goal of
self-government, and received its most substantial backing from both the Tudeh
party and Soviet occupation forces. Another breakaway government, the Kurdish
National Republic, was established on December 15 at Mahabad using a similar
political formula.
Given the success o f leftist political groups in their zone and their
dependence on their northern neighbor, it came as no surprise that the Soviets
were reluctant to withdraw their troops in accordance with the Tripartite
Agreement of 1942. The recognized date for the final withdrawal o f Allied troops
from Iran was March 2, 1946, six months after the cessation o f hostilities. The
last American troops evacuated Iran on December 31, 1945, and British forces
likewise exited Iran in compliance with the March 2 deadline. Moscow did not
reciprocate.

The Soviets were undoubtedly concerned that the two new

autonomous governments in northern Iran, both friendly to Moscow, would be
unable to withstand the inevitable assault from the Iranian army should Red Army
troops withdraw.

For the next three months, the situation in Iran became

12 Bill, p. 67.
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increasingly tense, as the two Western powers viewed Moscow’s decision to stay
in Iran as a potentially damaging loss o f north Iranian oil reserves to the Eastern
Bloc. London and Washington barraged Moscow with diplomatic notes that
protested the Soviet Union’s violation o f the Tripartite Agreement. Tehran filed a
grievance with the United Nations.
Then, on March 24, 1946, the Soviet Union unexpectedly pledged that
Red Army troops would be removed from Iran within six weeks i f the two
countries reached an agreement the following month.14

Given the threats

employed by Stalin, Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam was forced to make
several sweeping compromises to the Soviets, as described here by Mohammad
Reza Shah in Mission fo r My Country:
He agreed to recommend to Parliament the establishment o f a joint
Russian-Iranian oil company (the Soviets to hold 51 per cent o f the
stock) to exploit the oil resources o f northern Iran; to grant three
cabinet posts to Tudeh party members; to recognize the rebel
Azerbaijan Government; and, finally, to withdraw Iran’s complaint
against Russia before the United Nations.15

This agreement, signed on April 4, 1946, declared that Soviet troops would be
withdrawn from Iran on or before May 6 o f the same year, and that within seven
months o f the April compact Qavam was to place a proposal for the establi shment

13 Ibid., p. 67-8. Bill cites Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 321.
14 Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall o f the Shah (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980),
p. 34. See also Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Soviet-Iranian Relations: A Quarter-Century Of Freeze and
Thaw”, The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era, eds. Ivo J. Lederer
and Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 60. The reasons for
this sudden turnabout are still shrouded in mystery, though ongoing research in the Soviet
Archives will hopefully shed new light on the subject. The two most likely motivations for
Stalin’s decision to withdraw from Iran will be discussed below.
15 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission fo r My Country (London, 1961), p. 116. The three
leftist cabinet members appointed by Qavam were Dr. Fereydun Keshavarz, Dr. Morteza Yazdi,
and Iraj Eskandari.
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o f a Russo-Iranian oil company before the Majlis. For six months Qavam stalled
and feinted, but was finally and forcefully reminded by Moscow that the Majlis
needed to approve that portion of the April agreement. However, Qavam still
maintained some leverage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

A stipulation o f the

agreement called for tacit recognition by Tehran o f the rightful autonomy of
Iran’s two breakaway provinces, Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. Yet Qavam was also
aware that Moscow was eager for Iranian oil, and that Stalin and Molotov were
not willing to risk a diplomatic rift should the Shah opt to march the Iranian army
into the two rebellious states. The move worked. In December, 1946, the Shah
ordered three Iranian army columns to march on Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, with
no substantive resistance encountered by the rebels, and with barely a whimper
heard from the Soviet embassy.16 Finally, on October 22, 1947, Qavam brought
the proffer before the recently-elected Fifteenth Majlis, where, due to the passing
o f the threat o f Soviet intervention, it promptly failed by a vote o f 120-2.17 After
the failure o f the oil concession to pass the Majlis, the Soviets angrily railed
against the Iranians, but to no avail. American coercive diplomacy and Iranian
obstinacy combined to defeat Soviet designs. One storm had seemingly passed.
Another storm was still looming.

16 General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1965), p. 377.
General Arfa also pointed out that, for Qavam and Mohammad Reza Shah, the move could be
justified as an act of compliance with the April, 1946 agreement. Elections were necessary
throughout the country so that a new Majlis could be elected and the oil concession approved.
Arfa stated the following: “On the 3rd December Qavam issued a declaration, stating that in order
to implement the holding of elections in all the provinces of Iran the Imperial Army had received
orders to occupy all the regions where the elections would be held, including Azerbaijan.’'
17 Kazemzadeh, p. 65. See also Arfa, p. 386. The Majlis also passed a new law in November,
aided by the spirited support of Dr. Musaddiq, that 1) forebade all concessions to a foreign entity
without Majlis’ approval, and 2) instructed the central government to negotiate a new, more
favorable agreement with AIOC.
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U.S. Intrigue in Postwar Iran
It was evident to American officials during the war that U.S. involvement
in Iran would substantially increase after the war’s close, though the scope and
circumstances o f this involvement were yet to be determined. In the immediate
postwar years, American interest in Iran escalated due to four main reasons. Two
reasons can be categorized as initiatives taken by the American government or by
private commercial interests. Two reasons can be categorized as reactions by the
U.S. government to Iranian governmental policies or to the overarching effects o f
Soviet-American rivalry.
First, the traditional vanguards o f Westernism in the Near East, Britain
and France, had been severely decimated by the two long wars o f the century. In
the waning months o f the war and amid the first unnerving signs o f the impending
Soviet-American rivalry, U.S. analysts realized that although Britain and France
were still needed as part o f a strong anti-Communist treaty organization, the
United States would increasingly serve as the anchor in the East-West tug-of-war.
Given the weakened state of British military, material, and economic resources, as
well as the rising flame of anti-colonial sentiments worldwide, the Americans
realized that the United States would need to shoulder increased responsibilities in
Iran after the war.
Second, and contrary to later assertions by U.S. State Department officials,
Washington had for some time maintained commercial designs for Iran, with the
entrenched AIOC serving as a significant barrier to die signing o f multiple oil
concessions throughout the first half o f the 20th century.
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Though relative

newcomers to the Near East, Americans had made inroads in Saudi Arabia in the
1930s, and were eager to expand oil extraction operations to Iran. Thus, the two
previous reasons provided for increased U.S. entanglement in Iran constitute
divergences in policy.

These two divergences can be labeled as initiatives

launched by the American government and by private commercial interests.
(However, one could argue that American usurpation of traditional British
domination in the Near East after the war was a reaction to the decline o f British
power in the area.)
Third, the United States government became increasingly entangled in
Iran’s affairs as a reaction to Soviet machinations in Iran during 1945 and 1946.
It was the Soviet occupation o f northern Iran, a violation of the Tripartite
Agreement, which heightened simmering tensions between the U.S.S.R. and the
United States, hi this way, American involvement in Iran was hastened by the
dynamics o f the Cold War, a phenomenon that will be described more completely
in subsequent chapters. The obverse is also true. Hie Cold War was accelerated
on its course through the Soviet-American confrontation in Iran regarding the
delayed Russian withdrawal from Azerbaijan.
Fourth, the American government became increasingly involved in Iran’s
affairs as a reaction to invitations made by elements within that country’s central
government. Certain members o f the Shah’s government, including General Ali
Razmara, believed that a policy dubbed “positive equilibrium” best served Iranian
interests. This policy sought to grant economic and resource concessions to all
foreign parties so that Iran could maintain favorable relations with both sides o f
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the ideological-political rivalry.18 Iran’s invitations for military, humanitarian,
education, and economic missions from the United States increased noticeably in
the 1920s and 1930s, which was also, not coincidentally, a period o f increased
'j

expansionist rhetoric from incipient Communist Russia. These last two reasons
for increased American involvement in postwar Iran are, in reality, reactions to
policies pursued by elements within Iran’s ever-changing central government.
As previously mentioned, the final important American economic mission
to Iran was that o f Overseas Consultants, Inc. (OCI), under the leadership o f Max
W. Thornburg. Working at the behest o f the Shah, OCI developed an ambitious,
$650 million investment plan to improve the nation’s agricultural, transportation,
industrial, military, and economic infrastructure. It was an attempt by the young
Shah to launch a new Seven Year Plan in Iran19 Given the economic plan’s
immense cost, the American advisory group suggested that the plan be financed
through a combination o f loans via the World Bank, financial aid from the U.S.
government, and AIOC oil profits. Unfortunately, the Iranian central government
was in dire straits after the war, and Tehran could not raise the minimum $25
million start-up cost forecasted by OCI.20

The U.S. government, when

18M. Reza Ghods, “The Rise and Fall of General Razmara”, Middle Eastern Studies (Vol. 29, No.
1, January, 1993), p. 28. General Razmara would later distance himself from the Americans. In
the months immediately preceding his March, 1951 assassination, Razmara sought a closer
relationship with the Soviet Union and with the Tudeh Party as a means of offsetting British
domination in the south.
19Heiss, p. 16.
20 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day Publishers), p. 81.
Mohammad Reza Shah places the plan’s total at $656 million. OCI received $3 million for the
contract. He also provided a breakdown for how the funds were to be allocated:
For the general improvement of social conditions
28.6%
25.0%
Agriculture
23.7%
Transport
14.3%
Industry and mining
4.8%
Petroleum plants
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approached by Mohammad Reza Shah about the availability o f American loan
money, offered only token assistance. The aid offer was not enough to finance
the ostentatious development plan. On March 15,1951, the Majlis passed the bill
nationalizing AIOC, and soon after Iran lost access to needed oil revenues due to
British naval and legal blockades.21 It was the nationalization o f AIOC and
subsequent derailment of the new Seven Year Plan that, in part, prompted the
Shah’s opposition to Musaddiq.

The Rejection o f the 1949 Supplemental Oil Agreement
Events moved quickly in Iran after the failure o f die Soviet oil concession
to pass the Majlis. It is important that we view the oil nationalization period o f
1951-1953 as being directly linked to developments in Iran during and
immediately after the Second World War. Resentment toward foreign domination
had been present in Iran for centuries. Yet the wartime invasion o f the country by
British and Soviet forces deepened already embedded hostility toward the two
countries. It must be pointed out that this was not some nebulous, unfounded,
unwarranted xenophobia, but a heated defensive reaction toward real violations of
Iranian sovereignty. The forced entry into Iran, the Allied monopolization o f the
country’s goods and services, the devaluation o f the rial, the machinations of
Soviet and British agents in Iran, Mid die long stay by Red Army troops in the
Communications
3.6%
21 The upper house of parliament, the more conservative Senate, was provided for in the 1906
Constitution, but not officially formed until 1949. The Senate ratified the nationalization bill on
March 20, 1951. The Parliament (the Majlis, or lower house; and the Senate, or upper house)
urged Mohammad Reza Shah to appoint Majlis chairman Or. Mohammad Musaddiq as prime
minister. The monarch, unable to quiet Musaddiq’s cries for nationalization, reluctantly
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north all served to drastically increase popular resentment toward the Allies. This
animosity was particularly acute with regard to Britain’s Iranian bedrock, the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

In 1979; three decades o f internal oppression

galvanized onee-disparate political elements against the Shah. In the same way,
nearly two centuries o f British domination galvanized antithetical forces in Iran
against the AIOC, and these forces coalesced in postwar Iran to nationalize the
country’s oil resources in 1951.
An important landmark in the run toward nationalization was the
November, 1947 passing o f a new law prohibiting concessions to any foreign
power without the approval o f the M ajlis.22 The key proponent o f this new law
was, not surprisingly, Dr. Mohammad Musaddiq, a veteran politician who had
spent the better part o f his storied career fighting internal corruption and external
domination. At the same time, Musaddiq demanded that the 1933 Agreement
with AIOC be renegotiated, as it unfairly deprived Iran o f deserved oil profits.
Soon thereafter, a special committee was appointed by the Majlis to review the
government’s 1933 concession, draft recommendations for new government
demands, and open negotiations with AIOC. Over the next two years the central
government met with AIOC officials, and the two sides finally signed a compact

consented, and Musaddiq’s premiership was approved by the Majlis on April 30,1951. Musaddiq
formally executed the nationalization on May 1, 1951.
22 See Heiss, pp. 8-9: “If Qavam thus sought to close the door to a Soviet concession, it was
locked forever by a new law sponsored by future prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq and
passed by the Majlis in November, 1947. The law was both a direct descendant of the 1932
cancellation of APOC’s concession and a lineal ancestor of the 1951 nationalization laws... In a
single stroke the 1947 law thus delivered a-deathblow to Soviet designs in northern Iran and set
the stage for the Anglo-Iranian dispute of the 1950s.”
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on July 17, 1949, known alternately as the Gass-Golyashan, Sa’ed-Gass, or
Supplemental Oil Agreement.23
However, the Supplemental Oil Agreement was a source o f intense
controversy before the ink was dry. The agreement had been forcefully supported
by Prime Minister Mohammad Sa’id, whom many hostile critics charged was a
British stooge. The Shah favored the agreement, as it would have successfully
closed the long and labored negotiations and provided firm financial support for
his forthcoming Seven Year Plan. In fact, the Shah anticipated easy passage for
the agreement through the Majlis as that body, as well as the newly-formed
Senate, were dominated by pro-Shah elements he had helped place in power
during the last election.24
Yet opposition to the compact increased rapidly in late 1949, led
noticeably by Musaddiq. At the outset o f the negotiations in 1948, the Iranian
government delivered a list o f 25 “points,” or demands, to AIOC. Among the
grievances listed by the oil committee, there were a number o f points regarding
control o f die company, not just the unequal profits made by the Iranian
government.23 The Iranians pointed out that, though part o f the 1933 Agreement,
AIOC had made few concrete attempts to assimilate Iranian workers into its lower
ranks and management staff. Instead, the British had remained true to the practice
o f hiring unskilled Indian workers for lower positions and overlooking Iranians
the hiring for administrative and technical positions.

Tehran objected to the

23 Ibid., p. 13.
24 Katouzian, The Political Economy a f Modem iron, p. 158.
25 Heiss, p. 12. Company profits in the years 1945-50 were £250 million. Iran’s share for the
same period was a scant £90 million.
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selling of Iranian oil at a substantial discount to the Royal Navy while oil prices in
Iran remained high.

The Iranian list also cited the unfairness o f the former

agreement’s concession length, 60 years, and demanded periodic re-negotiation o f
any oil agreement so as to provide Tehran with flexibility and to blunt decadesold British political domination o f the country’s southern region. What the AIOC
had difficulty understanding was the decidedly political nature o f these Iranian
protests. While they demanded a 50-50 profit-sharing agreement similar to that
recently reached between Venezuela mid an American oil consortium, the Iranians
were also after increased control over AIOC operations. They wanted Iranians
seated on the company’s board o f directors, an increase in the country’s 20%
ownership share, complete access to the company’s ledgers, and influence over
the daily operations and future projects o f the company.26
What the opponents o f the compact desired and what the Supplemental Oil
Agreement actually promised were very different

First, AIOC remained

intransigent on the issue o f profit-sharing, and consistently refused during the
two-year negotiations to agree to a 50-50 division based on the U.S.-Venezuela
model. Instead, the agreement signed with AIOC’s Neville A Gass provided for
only a slight increase in Iran’s per-barrel- profit (from 22 to 33 cents), and a
guaranteed minimum annual payment o f £4 million.27 U.S. Policy Planning
Director Paul Nitze later observed that Iran’s proposed share fell far short of
Venezuela’s per-barrel-profit o f 80 cents, though at the time London believed the
26 For the full text of the Gass-Goishayan Agreement, see Sunil Kanti Ghosh, The Anglo-Iranian
Oil Dispute: A Study o f the Problems o f Foreign Investment and Their Impact on International
Law (Calcutta, India: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhjay, 1960).
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offer the best oil-profit deal extant in the Near East!28 Second, the political
aspects o f the Twenty-Five Point Protest went mostly unresolved, and so drew the
ire o f critics from very disparate political comers o f Iran, Although die Majlis
was at that time dominated by pro-agreement and/or pro-Shah deputies, the
opponents o f the agreement launched a well-coordinated filibuster on the floor,
and successfully tabled the issue for the remainder o f the Fifteenth Majlis. The
session expired July 28,1949, and thereby forced the agreement to be taken up by
the Sixteenth Majlis- to be elected and convened in early 1950. The agreement's
opponents had bought themselves valuable time.

27 Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Giasnost: A t the Center o f Decision (New York: Grpve
Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 129; Heiss, p. 13.
28 Ibid., p. 129.
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4. Nationalization Drive: 1950-1951

Between the close o f the Fifteenth Majlis and the 1950 elections for the
Sixteenth Majlis, a very broad coalition opposed to the Supplemental Oil
Agreement was organized behind the inspired leadership of, among others, Dr.
Mohammad Musaddiq. The life o f this towering figure and the fight for oil
nationalization are intertwined, so much so that they are inseparable and make a
brief sketch o f the man necessary.

Mohammad Musaddiq, the National Front & the Oil Nationalization Banner
Musaddiq was an intelligent, devoted, passionate, and honest political
leader with a long history of fighting foreign interference in Iran and resisting the
country’s despotic elements. Musaddiq was bom Mirza Mohammad Khan in
1882 to well-to-do family with ties to the ruling Qajar Dynasty. His mother,
Najm al-Saltaneh, was a woman o f prominence, a grand-daughter o f Prince
Regent Abbas Mirza.1 Musaddiq’s attachment to his mother was strong due to
her loss o f three husbands to the grave, including his father Mirza Hedayatullah.2
Her dictum, “The weight o f an individual in society is determined by the amount
o f hardship he endures for the sake o f the people,” remained Musaddiq’s adopted

1 Mohammad Musaddiq, Musaddiq’s Memoirs, ed. by Homa Katouzian, trans. by S.H. Amin and
H. Katouzian (London: JEBHE National Movement of Iran, 1988), p. 2.
2 Ibid., p. 133n. Najm al-Saltaneh outlived three husbands, the second of whom fathered
Musaddiq. Starting with the first marriage her husbands were: Murtiza Quli Khan Vakil al-Mulk
Kirmani (d. 1879); Mirza Hedayatullah Vazir-Daftar (d. 1892); Mirza Fazlullah Khan Vakil alMulk (no date of death given).
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maxim for his entire life, and greatly influenced his attitude toward civil service.3
At age 14 he commenced his career as a state treasury officer in Khurasan upon
the death of his father, and was quickly recognized as holding promise as a public
servant. At age 19 he married Zia’ al-Saltaneh, with whom he would have five
children. During the Constitutional Revolution o f 1906-11, the young Musaddiq
was involved in two reform organizations, an early sign o f his activist political
views.

In 1911 he went to Neuchatel University in Switzerland, where he

graduated with a doctorate in law in 1914 at age 32.4
Upon his return to Iran after his graduation from Neuchatel, Musaddiq
continued his illustrious career. He taught briefly at the School o f Law and
Political Science in Tehran, authored several works on legal and political issues,
and served as governor-general o f Fars Province during the years 1921 and 1922.5
He went on to serve in the Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Majlises, with
gaps between these stints usually caused by imprisonment by the Pahlavi regime
or temporary retirement from public life. He was an ever-present thorn in die side
o f Reza Shah, founder o f the Pahlavi dynasty, and vigorously opposed his
attempts to strengthen the monarchy. Musaddiq was dedicated to increasing the
vitality and durability o f representative government in Iran and never entered the
Pahlavi camp, though Reza Shah and his son tried repeatedly to make him their
ally.

Indeed, it was Musaddiq’s uncompromising stance toward despotism,

corruption, and foreign influence that would make him a myriad o f lifelong
enemies, both inside and outside Iran.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
4 Ibid.
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During the fall and early winter o f 1949-1950, opposition to the 1949
Supplemental Oil Agreement gathered itself around the ebullient personage o f Dr.
Musaddiq, and named itself the National Front (NF), or Popular Movement o f
Iran. The NF has sometimes been called a nationalist political party, though this
is a misnomer.

In reality, the National front was an umbrella group that

represented manifold political organizations with often contradictory views, yet
who were united on the issues o f opposition to the agreement and, later, oil
nationalization.

General Hassan Arfa, formerly the chief-of-staff during the

Iranian army’s reoccupation of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, and a strong ally o f the
Shah, later summarized the National Front’s organization:
...the progressive deputies o f the 16th Majles joined in a ‘National
Front’ Organisation, at the head o f which were Dr. Mosaddeq and
Kashani, each controlling a separate and politically widely
differing group temporarily allied for the struggle against die
A.I.O.C. issue, the group o f Mosaddeq chiefly comprising
intellectuals, students and university professors, and that o f
Kashani bazar merchants, artisans, small shopkeepers and
workers.6

Thus, the Front was, in essence, a coalition with a leadership comprised o f the
prominent members o f several distinct political parties, as well as many “non7
partisan figures.”

'
It was only their contempt for the Supplemental Oil

Agreement that brought them together in this forced marriage, and it is exactly
this superficial relationship that made NF’s splintering inevitable when pressures
mounted. For the moment, the well-educated Musaddiq served as the National
Front’s recognized leader in the Majlis, independent Shi’i cleric Ayatullah Sayyed
5 Ibid., pp. 209-227.
* Arfa, p. 392,
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Abulqasim Kashani drew support for the Front from the country’s more
traditional citizenry, such as merchants, artisans, and laborers. The Iran and PanIranist parties provided further help in rallying the country against the new
contract with AIOC.
Further, the National Front was not a nationalist party in the European
sense o f the word. During the Cold War that term was used rather flippantly to
describe every possible non-European political movement with anti-imperialist
and/or anti-Western sentiments. European nationalism was bom in the wake o f
the French Revolution, and spawned a flurry o f political disintegration and
amalgamation in Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

In reality,

European nationalism was, in part, a reaction to Ottoman incursions in the
Balkans. European socio-political theorists and statesmen, in order to reverse
centuries o f Ottoman political dominance in southeast Europe, encouraged the
identification o f die Balkan peoples by ethnicity, culture, language, and religion.
They emphasized that Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, etc. were Europeans and
Christians, and so should not be subject to an empire with a decidedly Islamic
flavor.

This form o f nationalism sought separation and autonomy.

Homa

Katouzian observed that Iranian nationalism “has been the ideology of despotism:
the ideology o f Reza Shah, his son, and their clientele.”8 The term should be used
with more discretion. To say that the National Front was a nationalist party is
nebulous and does not paint an accurate portrait o f its organization and unifying
causes. Also, one cannot even label the Front a party per se, as a hue political

7 Musaddiq, pp. 26-28.
8 Katouzian, p. 171.
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party must possess a unifying platform, or an ideology. The National Front was a
coalition with a small number o f common goals, and in this way was similar to
die Progressive Movements' in America o f the early 20th century.

Both

movements had rather short lists o f common objectives. Beneath the •surface
lurked disunity due to contradictory ideologies, personal rivalries, and crosspurposes among the members.
Despite the Shah’s attempts to rig the elections, Musaddiq and six other
National Front deputies were seated in the Sixteenth Majlis on February 9 ,1950.9
The showdown between the Shah’s circle and the agreement’s opponents was set.
Although die coalition only had seven deputies in the Majlis, they had the asset of
an aroused public. It soon became obvious to the Shah’s bloc that it was futile to
resist the rising tide o f anti-agreement feeling, and Prime Minister Mohammad
Sa’id, after receiving sharp criticism for his role in the Supplemental Oil
Agreement, was fired from his post by the Shah the following month and replaced
by Ali Mansur. By June it was obvious that Mansur would be an ineffective
block to the opposition, and the Shah, under pressure from die British and
Americans, appointed General Ali Razmara as his replacement bn June 26. It was
common knowledge that former chief-of-staff Razmara had lofty political
ambitions. However, the Shah was also aware that Razmara was more conducive
to an agreement with AIOC, and possessed the political determination to hammer
the compact through National Front opposition.

9 Ibid., p. 28. The other six deputies were Sayyed Abulhassan Hayerizadeh, Husain Makki,
Muzaffar Baqa’i, Abdulqadir Azad, Mahmud Nariman, and Aii 'Shaigan.
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The reasons for Razmara’s willingness to deal with AIOC are worthy of
discussion. Both Razmara and the Shah, though otherwise heated political rivals,
agreed to oppose the National Front’s cries for nationalization for practical
reasons. Both had reservations about nationalizing AIOC because they did not
believe Iran possessed the transportation infrastructure, communications,
marketing organs, and trained personnel necessary to operate the monstrous
company. In an interview with the Shah in early 1951, journalist Mohammad
Heikal noticed the consternation with which the monarch viewed nationalization:
I had my first meeting with the Shah in the early spring o f 1951...
he did not hide his misgivings about nationalization. He pointed
out that the AIOC had 53,000 employees. How were their salaries
going to be paid if nationalization went through? Where could
Iran get the money needed to pay compensation? If this was
borrowed it would take as long as the repudiated concession would
have lasted (to 1993) to pay off die debt. And how was Iran going
to be able to transport and market the oil, even if it could go on
producing it? Many o f these were quite legitimate questions to
ask, as events were to show.10

Although the Shah and Razmara agreed on these fiscal reasons for the support of
the Supplemental Oil Agreement, they disagreed on the diplomatic motives for its
approval. Though the Shah supported the passage of the agreement through the
Majlis, and had tried to stymie the National Front’s efforts, he did not do so
because o f fond feelings for the British. True, the fate o f the Qajar and Pahlavi
Dynasties had historically been tied directly to British support, but this does not
mean the Shah was an eager, or even willing, English dependent. Both the Shah
and his father were extremely resentful o f British interference in Iran, and the

10 Mohamed Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), p. 57.
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younger Shah may have supported nationalization had Iran’s geopolitical,
economic, technical, and military position been stronger.

Positive Equilibrium vs. Passive Balance
In contrast* Ra^nara had further, diplomatic reasons for his support o f the
Supplemental Oil Agreement. Unlike the Shah, Razmara favored passage o f the
AIOC compact in addition to new trade concessions with the Soviet Union. This
policy, often called “positive equilibrium” or “positive balance,” involved the
granting o f equal concessions to all the prominent foreign powers in order to pit
the powers against themselves, and so retain some freedom o f movement. M.
Reza Ghods interviewed the prime minister’s deputy, Dr Ali Akhbar Mohtadi,
and questioned him about this policy and about Razmara’s attempts to reach a
trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. in the summer o f 1950:
...Razmara thought, after the events in Azerbaijan, Iran’s
traditional policy of equilibrium [between Britain and Russia] had
become dangerously one-sided. As Commander-in-Chief o f the
Iranian Army during the Azerbaijan crisis, he had realized that if
the Soviets had wanted to use force, the Iranian army would never
have been able to recover Azerbaijan... In the dangerous era o f the
Korean War and the Cold War, it was vital for Iran to maintain
equilibrium between all three powers [the United States, Great
Britain, and the Soviet Union], He believed that positive
equilibrium was the only way for Iran to maintain its
independence. This was the real motive behind the trade
agreement.11

Razmara viewed an agreement with AIOC and new concessions to the Soviets as
the means o f balancing the imperialist powers against each other, and reasserting
Iranian independence. Mohammad Reza Shah was a vigilant anti-Communist,
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and was not amused by Razmara’s cozy attitude toward the Soviets. However, he
dared not opposed Razmara, as the prime minister was integral to his crusade to
have the oil compact approved, and the Shah could ill afford the loss o f his Seven
Year Plan, a plan that partially depended on oil profits for its start.
It was this positive equilibrium policy that inevitably brought Razmara
into a confrontation with the chief proponent o f nationalization, Dr. Mohammad
Musaddiq. Musaddiq was a champion o f a policy that has become popularly
known as “negative equilibrium,” or the refusal to grant major concessions to any
foreign power.

However, as Homa Katouzian noted in his introduction to

M usaddiq’s Memoirs, this English translation is incomplete. The Persian term for
this policy, Siyasat-i muvazeneh-yi manft, is better translated “passive balance,”
and was a foreign policy articulated, if not invented, by Musaddiq.12 Simply put,
this policy declared that Iranian internal affairs had been dominated for nearly two
centuries due to the government’s bad habit o f giving favorable trade concessions
to the Russians and British. So long as the AIOC remained entrenched in the
south, and i f the Soviets were given new concessions in the north, Iran’s
subservience would be perpetuated indefinitely.

Musaddiq’s first formal

evocation o f this policy came after Qavam’s agreement with Moscow in April,
1946.

During subsequent deliberations in the Fourteenth Majlis, Musaddiq

declared himself willing to ink a deal with the Soviets if Iran sold oil to them. But
he was opposed to a joint Russo-Iranian oil company because Tehran would be
the minority shareholder (49%), and because this arrangement was guaranteed for

11 Excerpted from Ghods, “The Rise and Fall of General Razmara”, p. 28.
12 Musaddiq, p. 19; 19n.

50

the first 25 years o f the concession. If Iran signed the agreement, Musaddiq
argued, Soviet domination o f northern Iran and profound influence over the
central government would be guaranteed

The Destruction of Ali Razmara
After die Supplemental Oil Agreement floundered in the Majlis during the
summer of 1950, the National Front was able to steal momentum from the
agreement’s supporters, aid Musaddiq’s “passive balance” slogan ignited an
already smoldering public. On November 25, the eighteen-member Majlis oil
commission recommended the agreement’s rejection.

The following month

Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) announced a new agreement
reached with the Saudi Arabian government, one that divided profits 50-50. This
was a severe blow to the Supplemental Oil Agreement, as any economic measure
o f an AIOC concession was bound to employ the American example as its
standard. To U.S. Secretary o f State Dean Acheson, the ARAMCO profit-sharing
stipulation made Iran’s Supplemental Oil Agreement “obsolete.”13 The Majlis
maintained similar sentiments, and formally rejected the deal, in its current form,
on January 11,1951. The Majlis was still willing to consider an oil compact with
AIOC, but not until more concessions were proffered by the British. In February,
the oil commission asked the government to study the feasibility of
nationalization. This marked a crucial turning point in the oil discussions, as

13 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W.
Norton & Co., 1969), p. 503.

51

nationalization was now considered a viable option in the ongoing confrontation
with AIOC.
Razmara, however, was not finished. The durable prime minister still
believed that an arrangement with the company was possible if the British
attached certain compromises to a new offer. In early 1951 he pressured the
British to provide loan money for his ailing government, which was running a
monthly deficit of £1.5 million. Razmara claimed that if the economic situation
in Iran were allowed to deteriorate, nationalization o f the oil industry would be
inevitable.14 On the other hand, if AIOC could guarantee loan money, or provide
advances on oil reserves to be sold later, Razmara could gain the time necessary
to defeat the nationalization drive. At the same time Razmara informed AIOC
that, unless more compromises were made by them in a new offer, he could not
guarantee the passage o f a new oil agreement.

On February 8, the AIOC

consented to Razmara’s request, and a secret advance o f £5 million was
transferred to the Iranian government. On February 10, the AIOC made Razmara
a counteroffer that included profit-sharing using a formula similar to ARAMCO’s
50-50 arrangement.

Although this new offer did not address Iran’s political

grievances, such as increased Iranianization o f the workforce and accessibility to
AIOC’s ledgers, it did include a concession on a previously contentious financial
issue. If the offer could be brought to the oil commission, maybe a counteroffer
could be made and, over time, a mutually-beneficial agreement reached.
Unfortunately, Razmara kept the offer a secret Some analysts have surmised that
the prime minister’s government wanted to keep negotiations out o f the public eye
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until a better offer could be announced. Others asserted that Razmara had more
selfish designs, and hoped to pull out a new offer in a publicized stunt that would
crush his opposition and bolster his own political stock. Regardless, he would
never get an opportunity to play his last card.
In late February, the prime minister went on the offensive.

General

Hassan Arfa stated that
General Razmara ordered his Finance Minister, Gholam Hoseyn
Fruhar, to read in the Majles a declaration purporting to show in
great detail that the nationalisation o f the oil industry was not in
the interests o f Iran. The technical arguments and the style o f this
declaration, although written in Persian, led to a belief that it had
been prepared by the AIOC and translated from English. It was
refuted point by point by the National Front deputies, and attacked
in the progressive press, which had got completely out o f hand,
accusing the ministers o f being traitors, sold to foreigners, etc. It
was afterwards said that for the purpose o f bargaining the
Government had not made them public.15

Though a source o f hope for the British, the speech by Fruhar was met with
hostility from the NF and the public. As expected, Razmara was harangued in the
populist press, accused o f complicity with the English by the Front’s deputies, and
harshly criticized by Musaddiq ally Ayatullah Kashani and other members o f the
religious right.
On March 7 Razmara was assassinated at a religious ceremony outside
Shah Mosque. Only three days before, he had delivered a message to the oil
commission emphasizing British opposition to nationalization, and simultaneous
eagerness on AIOC’s part to find an equitable solution. The assassin was alleged
to be Khalil Tahmasibi, a member o f the rightist group Fada’iyan-i Islam
14Heiss, p. 49.
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(Devotees o f Islam) who was infuriated by the prime minister’s complicity with
foreign elements. It has since been asserted, with only slight evidence, that an
Iranian army officer fired the fatal shots that killed Razmara In fact, the non
commissioned officer in question was a personal guard for Asadullah Alam, a
longtime ally o f the Shah.16 It is possible that the Shah was aware o f the plot, if
not directly involved in its development, and that Alam conspired to assassinate
Razmara to mute his political ambitions. In this scenario, Tahmasibi was the
assassination’s public scapegoat, but the Shah’s forces actually pulled the trigger.
This line of reasoning is questionable. Razmara seemed the only man in
Iran brave enough to argue publicly against nationalization, and the Shah, though
opposed to the premier’s political designs, may have wanted to keep Razmara as a
battering ram against the National Front.

Another interpretation holds that

Razmara was assassinated with the Shah’s consent to clear the path for a more
loyal prime minister, one who would continue the anti-nationalization campaign
and maintain a close alliance with the Shah. Unfortunately, we may never know
the answers to these questions.
Upon the death o f Razmara, the Shah appointed longtime family friend
Hosain Ala to the premiership on March 11. The outcome o f his short tenure was
predictable. A favorite of the British, Ala had spent years in Iran’s diplomatic
service, and had worked both in Europe and the United States.

Though deeply

opposed to nationalization, particularly for practical reasons, he sought to use the
threat of nationalization to force AIOC to negotiate a more favorable contract.

15 Arfa, p. 392-393.
16 Musaddiq, p. 30.
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After the loss o f Razmara, the British became more eager to strike a deal
with his replacement. But Ala’s fight was a futile one. On March 15, the Majlis
voted unanimously to approve the oil commission’s document supporting, if only
in principle, nationalization. (The Senate ratified the legislation five days later).
The Majlis also granted the commission 60 days to assemble a written plan
detailing nationalization’s actual implementation.
The British were alarmed, and after a flurry o f threatening diplomatic
notes, finally approached Ala on April 26 in an attempt to reopen negotiations.
By this time, however, it was too late.

Musaddiq had been serving on the

eighteen-member oil commission, and the commission had been working on the
resolution, known as the Nine-Point Bill, that would implement nationalization o f
AIOC. Seeing that nationalization was now inevitable given the oil commission's
continued recalcitrance, Ala resigned his post on April 28, 1951.

Musaddiq Ascends
After accepting Ala’s resignation, the Shah hoped to install Sayyed Zia alDin as prime minister in the hope that he would dissolve the Majlis and broker a
new agreement with AIOC. (Mohammad Reza Shah and the Majlis had to agree
on the choice). However, on the day o f Ala’s resignation the Majlis clamored for
Musaddiq’s appointment to the premiership, believing that possession o f the
position would tip the scales in favor o f nationalization. The Shah’s forces seem
to have been taken off guard, for they unwittingly offered Musaddiq the job
during an ensuing Majlis session. They thought that, as on previous occasions,
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Musaddiq would angrily decline to work with his loathed enemy. His Memoirs
will be quoted here at length:
On Saturday, 28 April, 1951, I was asked to go to the
Majlis, although this was not a regular business day. Most o f the
other deputies were also present to hold discussions in a closed
session, and duly convey to the shah-in-shah the deputies’ broad
consensus on their nominee for premiership. I was surprised to
learn about Mr Husain Ala's resignation from premiership...
Most deputies believed that, as in the 1921 coup [by Reza
Khan, the Shah’s father], Sayyed Zia al-Din’s premiership would
result in wholesale arrests and persecutions. But they neither dared
to put someone else up, nor did the circumstances permit the
nomination o f the candidate o f foreign powers...
The discussion got under way, and the exchange o f views
went on for quite some time. Then, in order to speed up matters
[in Sayyed’s favor], a deputy [Jamal Imami] who- a few days
before the assassination o f former premier Razmara- had met me at
my house to bring me the shah’s offer o f premiership, suggested
my name, being certain that I would turn it down. I agreed
instantly. This relieved the deputies from their predicament, and
they all clapped and congratulated me.
I agreed to serve so that the bill for the repossession o f the
oil industry would not be lost, but would be passed by the Majlis
and become law. If Sayyed Zia al-Din had become prime minister
there would have been no Majlis left for me to be able to pursue
the matter. He would have had me arrested or sent into exile along
with others, and, in one word, fenced up the country so there
would not be the slightest noise from anyone or anywhere to
distract him from finishing his task.17

The Shah’s camp, in offering the premiership to Musaddiq, had hoped to silence
those who were calling for the wily deputy’s nomination, and fully expected the
fiery NF kingpin to decline the offer.

Yet Musaddiq, an experienced and

formidable politician, correctly gauged the dangers of refusing the offer. Given
al-Din’s political allegiance and the position’s usefulness as a means o f realizing

17 Ibid., pp. 264-265.
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nationalization, Musaddiq quickly consented.

Upon his acceptance of the

nomination, 79 o f 100 votes cast in the Majlis favored Musaddiq.18

Nationalization Realized
On April 30, 1951, the Nine-Point Bill was passed by the Majlis.19 The
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was to be nationalized by the Iranian government.
Musaddiq, however, had still not received official confirmation from the Shah.
Musaddiq feared that if the Shah issued the notice (farmari) formalizing his
premiership, the Shah’s forces would filibuster during confirmations for
Musaddiq’s cabinet and shelve discussion of the Nine-Point Bill indefinitely.

0(\

The appointee forced the Shah to delay his investiture until after the Nine-Point
Bill was passed by the Majlis in order to avoid opposition roadblocks to his
cabinet appointments and nationalization legislation.

The next day, May 1,

Musaddiq was officially declared prime minister by the irritated Shah, and the
former named his cabinet on May 2.

On June 19, AIOC operations and

installations were formally taken over by the Iranian government The National
Front’s dream o f nationalization had been realized.

Whether or not

nationalization could endure withering British pressure remained unclear.

18 Heiss, p. 62.
19 Again, for the text o f this law see below, APPENDIX A.

20 Musaddiq, pp. 266-267.
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5. Musaddiq’s Fall: 1951-1953

Nationalization o f the oil industry was, at best, only a temporary unifier o f
disparate political forces in Iran. On other issues, it would soon be revealed that
most members of the National Front were nothing more than political transients,
and had little in common save a thirst for what Musaddiq called “repossession of
the oil industry.”1 This internal disunity, opposition from the Shah, and AngloAmerican covert operations later converged to topple the Musaddiq government
and bring an abrupt end to nationalization.

Motivesfor Iran’s Nationalization
Although the Nine-Point Bill had been passed, and AIOC operations were
to be ceded to Iran, Musaddiq was aware that treacherous ground lay ahead. The
company’s British employees were less than enthusiastic about working under
Iranian supervision, and so resisted the nationalization. AIOC officials were
anxious about the prospect o f losing expensive equipment and installations,
potentially without compensation.

Granted, Musaddiq had promised that

nationalization would be accompanied by compensation payments to AIOC,
vowing to “set aside” 25% o f net oil profits “to meet all the legitimate claims of
the country.”2 Yet Musaddiq, like many o f his compatriots, viewed Iran’s

1Musaddiq, p. 265.
2 Saikal, p. 39. The quote is excerpted from a message (dated June 21, 1951) by Musaddiq.
Saikal, in turn, excerpted Musaddiq’s quote from a Persian language source, M. Fateh, Panjeh Sale Nctft-e Iran [Fifty Years of Iranian Oil] (Tehran, 1956), p. 525. The stipulation Musaddiq
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nationalization as a right, not as a crime. As the crisis slipped into August, it also
became uncertain whether or not AIOC would receive compensation for lost
revenues, both present and future, should Britain be forced to acknowledge
nationalization.

Some supporters o f nationalization argued that, given Great

Britain’s historic machinations in the country’s internal affairs, the move was
justified, and no compensation was due AIOC save for lost materials. For them,
nationalization constituted the attempt o f a sovereign nation to reassert its
independence o f movement by the removal o f an instrument o f foreign influence,
namely, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Moreover, Iranian pro-nationalization elements were not motivated
primarily by fiscal concerns, though the British often believed So. True, the 50-50
agreement between ARAMCO and the Saudi government in late 1950 did serve
as the new standard for any settlement short o f nationalization. In reality, the
desire for increased and equitable income was not the overriding impetus for the
nationalization drive, as Musaddiq testified during the early stages o f the push:
I believe more in the moral than economic aspect o f nationalization
o f the oil industry. Assuming that we could not extract and sell as
much oil as the company, we should be able under any
circumstances to satisfy domestic consumption and secure the
equivalent o f the current revenues received from the company; the
remaining oil should stay in the ground until the future generation
could better benefit from it.3

Many analysts have argued that Western officials, particularly the British, often
had difficulty discerning the moral and political underpinnings of the Popular
mentioned was from Article 2 of the Oil Nationalization Act. For the text of the Nine-Point Bill
[Oil Nationalization Act], which included this provision, see below Appendix A.
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Movement’s nationalization agenda. This is a correct interpretation. Sheer profit
was not the National Front’s cornerstone, though a fair division o f revenue was
important to Musaddiq.

Rather, pro-nationalization forces viewed the

“repossession” o f the oil industry as a means o f both assuaging past grievances
and guaranteeing the country sovereignty over its own destiny in the future. The
nationalization drive was a struggle for control over Iran’s future, a future not to
be left to the tender mercies of British dominion.
Further, many National Front members considered Iran’s seized assets as a
deposit guaranteeing stability to later generations. Musaddiq viewed oil profits
generated by the new National Iranian Oil Company as a resource that would fund
improvements in the social, economic, medical, and educational conditions within
the country. In June, 1951, Musaddiq justified nationalization in a response to
British condemnations o f the act:
Our long years o f negotiations with foreign countries
concerning the legitimacy o f our claims to ownership of the
industry, which no power in the world can deny us, have yielded
no results this far. With the oil revenues we could meet our entire
budget and combat poverty, disease, and backwardness among our
people. Another important consideration is that by the elimination
o f die power of the British company [AIOC], we would also
eliminate corruption and intrigue, by means o f which the internal
affairs o f our company have been influenced Once this tutelage
has ceased, Iran will have achieved its economic and political
independence...4

Nowhere are the moral and political dimensions o f Musaddiq’s thought
more evident than in his address to the International Court at The Hague in June,

3 This Musaddiq quote is excerpted from R.K. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941-1973
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1975), pp. 192-193.
Saikal, p. 39. Again, this is a Musaddiq quote.

1952. Great Britain, as in the case o f Reza Khan’s 1932 unilateral abrogation of
the Anglo-Iranian oil concession, had appealed to the Court in May after
nationalization was implemented. Musaddiq quoted extensively from this address
in his Memoirs, and the following is an excerpt from his address at The Hague:
The history of Anglo-Iranian relations is much too long for
me to try and present it here in full detail. Suffice it to say that in
the nineteenth century Iran was a scene o f rivalry between the
imperialist policies o f Britain and Russia... Being a victor o f the
First World War and virtually without a rival in the Middle East,
Britain then seized the opportunity to conclude the 1919 [Oil]
Agreement which, by putting the Iranian civil and military
administration in the hands o f British officers and civil servants,
would have brought Iran exclusively under Britain’s political and
economic domination. When the agreement was met with the
strong resistance o f freedom-loving and patriotic Iranians, British
diplomacy decided to impose its strategy via a different route, and
imposed the dictatorial regime [of Reza Shah], which it continued
to support for twenty years. The main purpose behind this strategy
was Britain’s exclusive monopolistic appropriation o f our oil
resources. Therefore, that which was supposed to enhance and
increase our national wealth became the source o f our insufferable
ills and misfortunes. This dominion was achieved by using the
concessionaire company [AIOC]...5

These ethical and political motives for nationalization were also evident in
Articles 1, 4, and 6 o f the Nine-Point Bill (dated April 30), which provided a
schedule for implementation:
Article 1. With a view to arranging the enforcement o f the
Law of 24 and 29 Isfand 1329 (15th and 20th March, 1951)
concerning the nationalisation o f the oil industry throughout
Persia, a mixed Board composed offive Senators and five Deputies
[of the Majlis] elected by each o f the two Houses and o f the
Minister o f Finance or his Deputy shall be formed...
Article 4. Whereas, with effect from 29th Isfand 1329 (20th
March, 1951), when nationalisation o f the oil industry was
sanctioned also by the Senate, the entire revenue derived from oil
and its products is indisputably due to the Persian nation, the
3 Musaddiq, pp. 323-324.
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Government is bound to audit the Company’s accounts under the
supervision o f the mixed Board which must also closely supervise
exploitation as from the date o f the implementation o f this law
until the appointment o f an executive body...
Article 6. For the gradual replacement o f foreign experts
by Persian experts the mixed Board is bound to draw up
regulations fo r sending, after competitive examinations a number
o f students each year to foreign coimtries to undertake study in the
various branches o f required knowledge and gain experience in oil
industries, the said regulations to be carried out by the Ministry o f
Education, after the approval o f the Council o f Ministers. The
expenses connected with the study o f such students shall be met out
o f oil revenues,6 [Italics added]
The italicized portion of Article 1 illustrates the oil commission’s intention
to wrest control o f the company’s board from the British, and replace it with a
new board comprised of elected Iranian officials. This was also an attempt by
anti-Shah forces to check the power o f the monarchy by granting jurisdiction over
NIOC to the Iranian Parliament. (A successful arrangement only if the king did
not manipulate elections!)

Only one Board member, from the Ministry of

Finance, was to be an appointee chosen by the monarch and confirmed by
Parliament.
Article 4 highlighted the Iranians’ belief that they were justified in their
nationalization o f British property and operations. This Article also echoed pre
nationalization demands that AIOC open its books to Iranian eyes.
Article 6 emphasized the need for the integration o f Iranians into all levels
o f NIOC. In fact, as a fulfillment o f Musaddiq’s vision, oil revenues were to be
used to educate talented young Iranians in all aspects o f company operations.

6 Excerpted from the English translation in Parliamentary Debates, 1950-1951, June 11 1951,
H.C. 488, deb. 5s, (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1951), pp.1665-1666.
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Unfortunately, AIOC negotiators and British Foreign Office officials
frequently underestimated these moral and political motives o f the nationalization
movement, and instead dismissed them as examples o f Persian ‘emotionalism. ’
To the British, it seemed that the center o f the dispute was a fair division o f oil
profits. Though this was a critical demand by the Iranians in negotiations before
and after nationalization, it was, in Musaddiq’s mind, superceded by the political
goal o f self-determination. To Musaddiq, an Iran free o f foreign machinations,
with its natural resources at its dispatch, was an Iran free to chart its own course.

The British Position
London was, not surprisingly, infuriated by the Iranian commercial coup.
However,/their objections to nationalization lacked the moral and political
rationalizations common in Musaddiq’s arguments. The objections posed by the
British government and AIOC were predominantly legal, mechanical, and
financial in nature. First, they perceived the seizure o f AIOC equipment and
operations as a violation o f the 1933 Agreement, which specifically prohibited
unilateral nationalization under Articles 21 and 26.7 Foreign Secretary Herbert
Morrison addressed the House o f Commons on May 1, 1951, the day after
nationalization became law in Iran, and the same day Musaddiq was proclaimed
prime minister by the Shah. In his message, Morrison decried the Iranian action
as, basically, a breach of contract.

The foreign secretary cited the 1933

Agreement, and asserted that the unilateral abrogation o f AIOC was a violation of
proper business conduct.

If a conflict arose between AIOC and the Iranian
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government, and the two parties could not reach a satisfactory compact, then the

parties were obliged to submit the disagreement to an arbitrator:
Article 21 o f this concession provides that no change may be made
in the position o f the Company under the concession, even by
legislation, except by agreement between the Persian Government.
Article 22 provides for recourse to arbitration in the event o f a
dispute between the Government and the Company8... we cannot
admit that the contractual obligations under which the Company
has operated and has made this great investment in Persia can be
abrogated unilaterally9...the [British] Government cannot accept a
situation in which one party to an agreement acts unilaterally
without discussion.10

In reply, the Iranians argued that the 1933 Agreement, and every agreement dating
back to the D’Arcy Concession, was void because'it had been signed under
duress.

As the Shah commented in Answer to History, British and Russian

pressure on Iran in the 19th and early 20th centuries was immense. When the
Iranian central government’s policies conflicted with the foreign policy objectives
o f the two great powers, economic, political, and military coercion were utilized
in order to restrain Iranian ambitions.
Morrison also reminded his compatriots that AIOC had been engaged in
negotiations with Tehran for several years before nationalization, and had put
forth several offers that, to the British, were fair. During Razmara’s premiership,
the Company advanced Tehran £5 million to buttress the treasury, hoping that
time could be bought for the premier’s faltering anti-nationalization campaign.
Perhaps, the British had speculated, Razmara could gather his forces, launch an

7 Heiss, p. 52.
8 Parliamentary Debates, 1950-1951, May 1 1951, H.C. 487, deb. 5s, p. 1008.
9 Ibid., p. 1012.
10 Ibid., p. 1014.
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assault, and push the Popular Movement back on its heels. During Ala’s short
tenure, AIOC made another offer with the Crown's support, one that took into
account ARAMCO’s recent 50-50 profit split with Saudi Arabia.11 Morrison
pointed this out to his colleagues, and, o f course, to Tehran. Unfortunately, by
early 1951 anti-British sentiment in Iran ran so high that any agreement short of
nationalization suffered a good chance o f defeat in the Majlis. The National Front
and its allies had arched their backs and sunk their heels. Compromise was no
longer an option.
Moreover, Morrison contended that Iran had benefited substantially from
AIOC’s presence, and questioned the new company’s ability to operate without
British expertise and resources:
It [AIOC] has provided employment for many tens o f thousands of
Persians... Its record as an employer o f labour has been a good
one, and the conditions under which its employees live and work
are not only far in advance o f ordinary Persian standards, but as the
International Labour Office have bome witness, compare
favourably with those existing in any part o f the Middle East...It
would clearly be a matter o f the greatest difficulty for the Persians,
even if they were unilaterally to take over production themselves,
to acquire die ability to operate and maintain installations.12
While it is true that living conditions for AIOC’s Iranian workers were
improved by their employment, and that, generally, their condition was better than
that o f their fellow citizens, the British had shut their eyes to the Company’s
sinister side. AIOC received little direct supervision from the Crown, and so was
permitted a free hand in southern Iran. Over time, AIOC became a de facto
autonomous state within Iran’s borders. The Company bribed local tribal and
11 Ibid., p. 1012.
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government officials, manipulated southern elections, applied political pressure
when Tehran ran afoul o f the Crown, and consistently refused to submit to Iranian
rule o f law. At no point during the crisis did British officials concede that their
commercial bastion in Iran had been habitually employed as a tool to undermine
Iranian sovereignty.

Instead, AIOC had been a useful instrument for the

advancement o f British interests in Iran, as well as the hindrance o f initiatives that
contravened British policy. In fact, in Morrison’s biased view, he argued quite the
opposite:
The United Kingdom has a longstanding friendship with Persia,
whose political independence and territorial integrity we have
consistently helped to preserve and which remain a matter of deep
concern to us. Persia’s economic life is intimately linked with our
own, as her Government well realise. Our only desire is to see
Persia, strong, prosperous and independent, and to cooperate with
her to these ends in so far as she may desire such co-operation.13

(After the Second World War, the shrinking British Empire was also not in a
mood to cede needed resources and revenues. Further explanation of this aspect
o f British resistance will be provided below, chapter seven).

The Jackson Mission
Given the divergent, entrenched opinions held by Great Britain and Iran, it
was feared that an unbreakable stalemate would soon set in. In order to keep the
two sides talking, the Americans pushed AIOC to reopen negotiations with the
Iranian government.

The British consented, and AIOC vice-chairman Basil

Jackson arrived in Tehran on June 10 to present the Musaddiq government with a
12 Ibid., pp. 1010-1011.
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new series o f offers. To the dismay o f the Americans, however, the talks ended in
fruitlessness. The Iranian delegation first demanded that AIOC turn over its
accounts and receipts, except for 25% to be retained as compensation by the
company for nationalization, as per the Nine-Point Bill. Jackson, accompanied by
U.S. Ambassador to Iran Henry Grady and British Ambassador Sir Francis
Shepherd, immediately rejected this demand for obvious reasons. The company
offered Tehran a payment o f £10 million to ease Musaddiq’s economic stress.14
Jackson also offered to form a neutral, subsidiary company, separate from AIOC
and the phantom NIOC, to resume oil operations until an agreement could be
reached.

Once again the offers were quickly rejected, as the Iranian prime

minister opposed any agreement, even a temporary stopgap to continue the flow
o f oil and revenue, that did not provide tacit admission o f Iran’s unilateral
nationalization. Negotiations were also not helped when, as James F. Goode
contends, Jackson violated his instructions by announcing that NIOC would be
unable to find tankers willing to distribute Iranian oil due to the forthcoming
British boycott.15
During the meetings Shepherd, Grady, and Jackson urged Musaddiq to
forge a temporary arrangement short o f full-fledged nationalization that would
permit British employees to continue oil production and export. If not, they
warned, Iran’s paper tiger, NIOC, would be logistically unable to remain in

13 ibid.,p. to il.

14 Heiss, p. 72.
15 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 32.
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operation and the company would be required to shut down.16 Musaddiq was
recalcitrant, and the AIOC delegation soon departed Iran.
Before their departure, Musaddiq commanded that the company's
installations be seized nationwide: The British were infuriated, and dispatched
H.M.S. Mauritius to the mammoth refinery-port of Abadan on the Persian Gulf.
The company’s British employees threatened to withdraw entirely if the Iranian
government took over operations. Many government officials, particularly in the
opposition Conservative Party, demanded that AIOC’s British employees remain
in Iran for fear that, if they left, they would never be permitted to return. Further,
some officials in London called for direct military intervention, arguing that
British lives and interests were in jeopardy.
U.S. Secretary o f State Dean Acheson was alarmed at the prospect o f
escalation, and sought to diffuse the matter by arranging a meeting between the
American and British governments. On July 4, Acheson, British Ambassador Sir
Oliver Franks, U.S. policy planning director Paul Nitze, Doc Matthews, and
George McGhee met together on W. Averell Harriman’s veranda to discuss the
rising tensions. Two hours later, the participants concluded that direct British
military intervention in southern Iran would be a move most unwise, as Acheson
summarized:
Armed intervention by Britain at Abadan in the would, in all
probability, lead to armed intervention by the Soviet Union in
Azerbaijan in support o f their oil concession [the failed April, 1946
concession], which the Iranian Government had negotiated and the
Majlis rejected. Even though some in London might not be
shocked at a partition o f Iran into spheres o f influence, it would
both fail to gain control o f the oil fields for Britain- a more
16Heiss, p. 73.
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difficult assignment than seizing the refinery- and create an uproar
in the United Nations. In this battle it seemed inevitable that
Washington, in view o f its leadership o f the 1946 fight to get
Russian troops out o f Iran, would end up at loggerheads with
London. Finally, if Mosadeq or an even more extreme government
invited Russian intervention in the hope o f forcing withdrawal of
both foreign forces, we might end up with the British out and the
Russians in. In short, armed intervention offered nothing except
great trouble.17

For the British, overt military action was later ruled out due both to lack of
American support and fear o f Soviet retaliation. During the meeting, Acheson
also suggested that, should the Iranians accept, Harriman be dispatched to Tehran
“not as a mediator, but, in the interest of peace and stability, to urge the
■'*

JO

resumption o f direct talks” between the two intransigent parties.

The Harriman Mission
U.S. President Harry Truman approved Aeheson’s suggestion, and
included the offer in a reply to a letter from Musaddiq that explained Iran’s
perception o f events. In Truman’s reply, dated July 8, 1951, the president played
the part o f neutral, and encouraged the two parties to find a transitory agreement
that would maintain company operations and permit the two sides ample time to
enter protracted negotiations. In his message, Truman reminded Musaddiq o f the
recent International Court o f Justice (ICJ) ruling that suggested the two sides
return the situation to its state before nationalization, this to afford time for an
equitable solution:

17 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1969), p. 507.
18 Ibid., p. 508.
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Recently I have come to believe that the complexity of the
problems involved in a broad settlement and the shortness of the
time available before the refinery [at Abadan] must shut down [due
to the successful British boycott and diminished workforce]- if the
present situation continues- require a simple and practicable modus
vivendi under which operations can continue and under which the
interests of neither side will be prejudiced... The International
Court of Justice, which your Government, the British Government
and our own all joined with other nations to establish as the
guardian o f impartial justice and equity has made a suggestion for
a modus vivendi...Therefore, I earnestly commend to you a most
careful consideration of its suggestion...I have discussed this
matter at length with Mr. W. Averell Harriman... Should you be
willing to receive him I should be happy to have him go to Tehran
as my personal representative...19

Thus, early on in the oil nationalization crisis, the U.S. government hoped
to remain neutral.

The Truman Administration’s initial response was rather

restrained. Truman urged Musaddiq to submit to the Court’s preliminary finding,
reach a temporary solution that would keep oil flowing out o f Iran, and pressed
the venerable premier to accept Harriman’s assistance. Both London and Tehran
were initially resistant to the proposal, yet after some gentle nudging o f the
English by the Americans and a change o f heart by Musaddiq, Harriman flew to
Tehran with Britain’s obligatory blessing. Harriman arrived in Tehran on July 15,
bringing with him an experienced team that included William Rountree from the
Department o f State and oil expert Walter Levy.20

19 Harry S. Truman, Public Papers o f the Presidents c f the United States, no. 150, (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 381-382.
20 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 37. On the day of Harriman’s arrival, a Tudeh-sponsored
protest against American involvement turned violent. A clash broke out between the leftists and
members of the National Front coalition, which left at least 20dead and several hundred injured.
Events such as these contributed a shift in American policy toward active opposition of
Musaddiq’s government. The Americans, as will be discussed below, feared that prolonged
upheaval in Iran increased the likelihood of a leftist coup.
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After his arrival in Tehran, Harriman held a series of meetings with
Musaddiq, former premier Husain Ala, and several parliamentary officials.
Unfortunately, the two parties remained obstinate on several pertinent points.
Harriman had suggested to the British that they reiterate their tacit recognition to
the March 20 Majlis law, one which sanctioned the nationalization in principle,
yet did not implement it. Harriman did so to permit an endorsement o f the
Iranians’ moral and political claims that nationalization was justified.

Yet

Harriman also hoped that, by conceding the legality o f only the March 20 law,
British officials could retain the domestic image that they were standing firm
against Iran’s unilateral nationalization.

The British agreed to Harriman’s

proposition. Harriman then persuaded the Iranians to withdraw their demand that
the British recognize the Nine-Point Bill o f April 30, which established a
timetable for nationalization’s actual execution.21
Unfortunately, this breakthrough was one o f only two substantive
advances made during the sessions, the other being his agreement to entertain yet
another English delegation. On virtually every other issue there was disagreement
between Harriman’s mission and the Iranian negotiators. Acheson stated later
that
[t]he [Harriman] mission succeeded in its immediate purpose o f
turning back Britain and Iran from the brink o f hostilities. It failed
in its more ambitious purpose o f finding a solution to the oil
dispute, though often seeming close to a breakthrough. It failed, I
believe, for the same reason that the Marshall mission to China "in
1946 failed, because neither party to the dispute wanted a solution;
each wanted to defeat the other on a central nonnegotiable issue22
[Italics added]
21 Heiss, p. 85.
22 Acheson, p. 508.
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It was this recalcitrance on both sides o f the dispute that proved fatal to all future
negotiations.

The Stokes Mission
On July 30, as a fulfillment of its pledge to continue negotiations, the
British government announced that Sir Richard Stokes would go to Iran on
August 4.

The Americans were less than enthusiastic about the Labour

government’s choice, as Harriman had preferred Hugh Gaitskell.

Stokes, as

Goode observed, “was wrong for these delicate negotiations. He was a bluff,
hearty, slap-on-the-back kind o f fellow” with a temperament ill-suited to the
often-tedious meetings with Musaddiq.23 Some analysts, including Goode and
Heiss, have commented that the choice o f Stokes was a grave miscalculation.
However, one could also argue that Foreign Office officials knew what they were
doing, and chose the flinty Stokes by design, believing his indelicate,
uncompromising manner might rattle Musaddiq into an agreement. Further, the
British had little desire to work with Musaddiq. Whitehall was already curious
about other options, which emphasized closer Anglo-American opposition to
Musaddiq, and cooperation with a more malleable Iranian regime after
Musaddiq’s fall.
Regardless, the Stokes mission was destined for failure. First, Musaddiq
made an about-face on his earlier commitment to permit new negotiations to be
based on the March 20 law. Instead, Musaddiq returned to his earlier position,

23 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 40.
Ambassador Shepherd’s description.

72

Goode based his sketch, in part, on British

that any talks must be preceded by British recognition o f the Nine-Point Bill for
the implementation o f nationalization.

Should the Crown not make this

concession, Musaddiq believed, it still did not change what he felt to be a new
reality. Musaddiq later explained his stance in his Memoirs:
Even if the British government had not accepted the oil
nationalisation, it would not have altered the fact o f its
nationalisation, for every country can nationalise an industry for
the sake o f the public good, and realise the benefits which
individuals or concessionaire companies reap from it. The
difference here though is that when a powerful government or her
subjects are the concessionaires, the recognition o f the
nationalisation would have an impact on the determination o f the
terms o f compensation. In this case, the British acceptance o f the
principle o f the oil nationalisation throughout Iran meant that if the
dispute was referred to arbitration, that company could not demand
compensation for loss of future profits, only for its property.24

Again, Musaddiq returned to his earlier contention that Iran, as a sovereign state,
could legally nationalize an industry within its borders.25 Further, Musaddiq
argued that, even if Great Britain refused to agree to the April 30 law,
nationalization was a fact. Musaddiq also maintained that any compensation for
nationalization did not extend to the deprivation o f future profits as the British
lobbied, but only to property losses.
Stokes, predictably, played the part o f a street-tough.

He informed

Musaddiq that, contrary to the prime minister’s assessment, the West could afford
the loss o f Iranian oil. In saying this, Stokes sought to dispel Musaddiq’s false
perception that Great Britain must reach a solution because the demand for
Iranian oil was so high. Stokes was correct on this account, for already Western

24 Musaddiq, p. 314.
25 Again, notice the ethical and political flavor of his argument.
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companies were boosting oil production to cover the gap left by AIOC’s drop in
exports. But Musaddiq would hear none o f this, and instead believed that this was
yet another British bluff designed to force Iranian concessions.
While in Tehran, Stokes also issued a proposition to Musaddiq which
provided a semblance o f nationalization, but preserved actual control o f oil
production for the British.

The Eight-Point Proposal, as it became known,
/

provided for the cession o f oil accouterments and installations to Iran, and
established a new British company to ran the daily operations. The Iranians were
not fooled. Musaddiq could endure British control o f the company’s marketing
apparatus, but could not stomach the continued presence o f British officials and
technicians in positions o f power.26 Again, Musaddiq wanted political control of
the company, not a mere facade of nationalization.

On August 22, Stokes

temporarily suspended the talks, and departed for home the next day. Averell
Harriman, who had accompanied Stokes to Tehran to assist, left on August 24.
On September 25, the Iranian army entered Abadan and ordered the British
citizens therein to leave the country.27 On September 6, 1951, Great Britain
formally ended all negotiations with Iran, and stalemate settled over the crisis.

Anglo-Iranian Deadlock
For simplicity’s sake, the following two years o f the crisis, from
September, 1951 to August, 1953, will be briefly outlined here, with only
developments influential to the crisis’ Outcome being highlighted.

26 Heiss, p. 90.
27 Katouzian, p. 174. See also Musaddiq, p. 315.
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With a general election swiftly approaching on October 25, 1951, Britain’s
Labour government sought new avenues that might shake Iran’s will and restart
negotiations. The party’s leadership was well aware that the Conservatives had
made Labour’s soft policy in Iran an issue in the forthcoming elections.
Nonetheless, it had been decided in a September 27 cabinet meeting that, given
the circumstances, direct military intervention in Iran was inadvisable. Instead,
Clement Attlee’s government opted to appeal to the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC). The Crown sought a resolution that declared the International
Court o f Justice (ICJ) competent to issue a verdict on the Anglo-Iranian oil
dispute.

The previous July, the International Court had issued a ruling that

supported AIOC’s claim that Iran’s unilateral seizure o f the company was illegal,
and that the situation in Iran should be returned status quo ante.2* The Court had
decided that, once AIOC resumed interim control, negotiations could proceed and
a mutual agreement reached.

Iran had argued, to no avail, that ICJ had no

jurisdiction in the case. If UNSC passed a resolution that upheld the Court’s
decision, the British could further isolate Iran, and Labour’s soft policy would be
made firm in time for the October elections.
The move proved to be a serious blunder. The Americans had warned
Whitehall that an appeal to the U.N. would only stir-up anti-Western feeling, and
that Britain was unlikely to get the seven votes needed to pass the resolution.
Further, Musaddiq flew to New York to defend personally Iran before the
Security Council, providing Iran with free publicity for its cause. Musaddiq’s
two-day defense consisted mainly of impassioned denunciations o f British
28 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 37.
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colonialism, objections to the 1933 Agreement, and appeals to the Council’s
moral sensitivities. Great Britain’s representative during the four-day discussion,
Sir Gladwynn Jebb, selected a more logical approach, basing British support for
the resolution on Iran’s violation of established business practices, etc. On
October 18, The Iranians won the case.

Musaddiq later summarized the

encounter:
... [T]he council decided that its standing orders required it to leave
the case in abeyance until the International Court had adjudicated
on Iran’s objection to its competence to hear the British
government’s complaint... Let it be said that the exposition before
the council of the original as well as translations o f the evidence
about the corruption- resulting from Reza [Khan] Shah’s
dictatorship- o f the Ninth Majlis elections, which had led to the
enactment of the 1933 Agreement, had a favourable impact on the
council’s attitude.29

In the end, Musaddiq’s assertion that the 1933 Agreement had been signed under
duress, moral arguments regarding Great Britain’s historic undermining o f Iranian
sovereignty, and his contention that the Security Council did not have the right to
intervene in an internal Iranian affair combined to table the British proposition.
Only two countries, the United States and Brazil, voted in favor of Great Britain,
while four countries voted for Iran and seven abstained. On October 25, the
Conservatives took control o f Parliament by a count o f 321 to 295 seats.30 This
change in government was to have a significant influence on the direction o f
British policy toward Iran, for the Conservatives had been brought to office in
part because of their promise to adopt a tougher line with Musaddiq than had the
Labourites.
29 Musaddiq, p. 323.
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Meanwhile, economic conditions in Iran declined as 1952 progressed. Oil
exports were severely curtailed due to the departure o f trained oil technicians, and
to the success o f the British-led boycott o f Iranian oil. On the former point, the
Iranians had difficulty managing such a gargantuan oil operation not for lack of
intelligence, but for lack of experience. There were some trained Iranian workers
in middle and upper level technical and administrative positions in AIOC, yet the
number was slight given the enormity o f the company. After AIOC formally
withdrew its staff from Abadan in early October, 1951, NIOC was left to its own
devices. Indeed, the oil commission exhibited its concern about the need for
qualified Iranian employees by including Article 6 in the Nine-Point Bill. Article
6 called for the selection of Iranian students, a function o f the Ministry of
Education, for study-abroad programs specifically geared to the oil industry (See
APPENDIX A). During the nationalization drive Musaddiq was aware that it could

take years for a trained cadre o f Iranians to supplant the new oil company’s
Western employees. However, he naively clung to the hope that, in the interim,
the nationalized company’s British employees would be willing to work for the
Iranian government, so long as their salaries were paid. Musaddiq underestimated
the loyalty and prejudice o f AIOC’s British workforce, which stubbornly refused
to submit to Iranian stewardship.
Regarding the latter point, the British blockade, the majority of
international oil companies were supportive o f the AIOC boycott. They believed
that if they violated British sanctions by purchasing or transporting Iranian oil,
other countries would also be encouraged to abrogate unilaterally their
30 Heiss, p. 99.
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agreements. If these oil companies honored the British sanctions and made Iran
suffer for its nationalization, then other nations would be deterred from taking
similar action.

In addition, a major shareholder in the company, the British

Crown, strictly enforced the naval blockade of Iran, which further discouraged
‘carpetbaggers’ who desired to capitalize on AIOC’s misfortunes. When a
renegade company did try to run the blockade, as in the case o f the Panamanianregistered freighter Rose Mary, the Royal Navy merely forced the ship in question
into a British port and brought charges against those involved. For instance, the
Rose Mary had been contracted to onload 1,000 tons o f Iranian oil in mid-June,
1952 for an Italian oil firm, Ente Petrolifero Italia Medio-oriente (EPIM). If the
British did not oppose the shipment, the Iranians and EPIM officals planned, the
company would sign a ten-year agreement with NIOC.31 Again, Musaddiq
miscalculated British resolve. Royal Navy vessels instead drove the Rose Mary
into Aden and confiscated what it still believed to be AIOC oil.
The successful British boycott was to have dire consequences for Iran’s
nationalization. Musaddiq had calculated that the large multinational companies,
particularly the American cartels, would be eager to profit-from Iranian oil, and so
would be willing to violate the British boycott. He was wrong. EPIM’s shotgun
attitude was the exception, not the rule. Most oil companies believed that the
sanctity o f business contracts had to be preserved, and so refused to concede
Tehran’s unilateral cancellation o f the 1933 Agreement. And even had a handful
o f bold companies ignored the British sanctions, the lack o f trained personnel at

31 Ibid., p. 130.
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Abadan would have made full production,and export difficult, and a failed
boycott irrelevant.
As it was, oil exports from Iran dropped drastically in 1952. The last oil
tanker left Iran in early July, and the Abadan refinery was only running at 12% of
capacity.

Musaddiq, due to a combination o f poor advice and naivete, thought

that the West could not do without Iranian oil, and so expected to both retain
qualified employees and remain at or near full production. However, British,
American, and other Western oil companies merely increased production to cover
for decreased Iranian exports. The Americans had initially been nervous about
the prospect o f losing AIOC oil, and had estimated in a secret January, 1951
report that Europe’s “extra annual dollar charge” to attain oil elsewhere could
reach $700 million.33 The same report, entitled National Intelligence Estimate 14
(NIE-14), stated the following:
[The] loss o f Iranian oil production and o f the refinery at Abadan
would temporarily have an adverse effect upon Western European
economic activity, and would impose severe financial losses
particularly upon the British, who control all the oil production o f
the country. Although the effect o f the loss o f Iran on the volume
o f petroleum which could be made available to Western Europe
might be overcome in a relatively short time by developing
reserves and building refineries elsewhere, the financial effects
would be overcome slowly, if at all.34

Contrary to these bleak warnings, however, Western companies closed ranks after
nationalization, and successfully compensated for the 660,000 barrels o f oil Iran

32 Ibid., p. 85.
33 State Department, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1951. vol. 5, (Washington, DC,
1982), p. 269.
34 Ibid.
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had produced each day.33 While it is true that the British economy was shaken by
the loss o f AIOC revenues, Conservative Prime Minister Anthony Eden observed
that the loss was blunted because “the oil industry closed the gap in production,”
and so lessened Great Britain’s plight.36
Britain’s opponent faired worse.

The Musaddiq government struggled

courageously to mute the country’s economic suffering due to the loss o f critical
oil revenues, though as the months passed economic woes and, with them,
criticism, increased. The central government traditionally had received 40% o f its
revenue from oil revenues, so Musaddiq and his advisors increased exports in
non-oil commodities to make up the difference. At the same time, they toughened
regulations on imports in order to achieve a favorable balance-of-trade. To their
credit, the Musaddiq government performed superbly under the harsh
circumstances, and even brought non-oil exports into the positive in their final
two years in office. (See below, T able 5 .1).37 Unfortunately, the severe cutback
in oil revenues, the comprehensive failure o f nationalization, the lack of an
alternate oil agreement, and growing internal dissatisfaction combined to cement
Musaddiq’s fall in mid-1953. Regardless, Musaddiq is to be commended for
these valiant, if futile, efforts.

35 Heiss, p. 85.

36 Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs o f Anthony Eden (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1960), p. 219.
37 The Musaddiq government increased exports of such items as textiles, sheep, tobacco, etc.
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T a b le 5.1 - The non-oil balance o f trade, 1948-1953. (million rials)38

(A)
Year

1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953

(C)
(B)
Imports
Exports
(excluding oil)
1867
1785
3563
4391
5832
8426

5480
9320
7109
7405
5206
5756

(D)
Balance (E

-3613
-7535
-3546
-3014
626
2670

In early 1952 another mission visited Tehran which, though unsuccessful,
was to foreshadow the agreement made with the Shah-Zahedi government in 1954
after the removal o f Musaddiq from power. In late 1951, Musaddiq had discussed
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) the
possibility of an IBRD take-over o f Iranian oil operations.39 In this formula,
EBRD would run the country’s oil installations until a permanent agreement could
be reached between Iran and Great Britain. In die interim, profits would be
divided three ways, with one-third going to Iran, one-third going to a fund for
future compensation o f AIOC, and one-third going to a subcontractor-agent
responsible for the marketing of Iranian oil.40
Despite lofty American hopes, however, the EBRD propositions ran
aground due to a combination of British recalcitrance and Iranian idealism. The
British were still contesting the legality o f nationalization, and deliberately stalled
38 Katouzian, p. 184. Katouzian’s table has been excerpted in its entirety.
HisPersian-language
source comes from Iran’s Ministry of the Economy.
39 This IBRD was the exception, not the rule. Given the tenuous situation in Iran, most lending
institutions considered Iran a high-risk investment, and refused to cooperate.
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the LBRD-Musaddiq negotiations because they believed Musaddiq’s days were
numbered.

If they could weather the storm, the British hoped, domestic

opposition to the prime minister would cause his ouster, and with a little help
from London a more malleable government would replace him. If the pieces fell
as Whitehall planned, British commercial interests would remain in Iran, albeit on
a lesser scale. The Iranians had more complex reasons for vetoing the IBRD
proffer.

First, Musaddiq’s oil advisor, Kazim Hasibi, objected to IBRD’s

stewardship because he felt it provoked questions regarding Iran’s claims to its oil
resources.41 Second, the proposal permitted the return o f British technicians to
Iran, something Musaddiq would not tolerate.

Finally, the proposition was

ambiguous about the price for which Iranian oil would be sold.

Musaddiq

persistently demanded $1.75 per barrel throughout the crisis, though the
wholesale market allowed a maximum o f approximately $1.1.0.42 Iran eventually
rejected IBRD’s offer, yet this same offer provided a paradigm for future AngloIranian negotiations.

The Americans later modified this example, replacing

IBRD’s subcontractor with an international oil consortium consisting o f the
Iranian government and British, Dutch, French, and American companies.
In early 1953, Iran’s position became increasingly untenable. Again, the
Musaddiq Administration fought mightily to keep the government financed by
limiting imports and increasing non-oil exports. Yet at its heart, 20th century Iran
was oil-driven, and without the accompanying income, the country foundered.
40 Goode, p. 72. In addition, this subcontractor was to be responsible for daily operations and
transportation.
41 Ibid.
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Given the deterioration in Iran, the premier redoubled his efforts to attain both
financial aid and American political pressure upon the British.

In January,

Musaddiq contacted President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower while Eisenhower was
still at Columbia University. Musaddiq hoped that a change o f administration in
Washington, coupled with an early appeal to the incoming president, would lead
to an increase in much-needed American economic aid. The Iranian premier also
sought to dispel any myths about the crisis that had reached the president-elect’s
ears, and seasoned his letter with appeals to Eisenhower’s patriotism:
It is my hope that the new administration which you will head will
obtain at the outset a true understanding of the significance o f the
vital struggle in which the Iranian people have been engaging and
assist in removing the obstacles which are preventing them from
realizing their aspirations for the attainment of... life as a
politically and economically independent nation. For almost two
years the Iranian people have suffered acute distress and much
miseiy merely because a company inspired by covetousness and a
desire for profit supported by the British government has been
endeavoring to prevent them from obtaining their natural and
elementary rights.43

Musaddiq then pointed to British defiance o f recent decisions in Japanese and
Italian courts that “declared Iranian oil to be free and unencumbered.”44 Finally,
in late May, 1953, Musaddiq requested emergency economic aid and hinted
strongly that if the “situation” continued on its course he would join the Soviet
camp:
There can be serious consequences, from an international
viewpoint as well, if this situation is permitted to continue. If
42 George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1983), p. 397.
43 Musaddiq, as cited in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday & Co:, Inc., 1963), pp. 160-161.
“ Ibid.
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prompt and effective aid is not given this country now, any steps
that might be taken tomorrow to compensate for the negligence of
today might well be too late.45 [Italics added]

Eisenhower was not stirred.

On the contrary, he laid blame for the

deadlock entirely on Musaddiq’s shoulders, this despite the State Department’s
conviction that British intransigence was equally to blame.

In Mandate fo r

Change, Eisenhower remarked that Musaddiq’s “troubles [were] rooted in his
refusal to work out an agreement with the British.”46 In his reply, dated June 29,
1953, Eisenhower countered that
it would not be fair to the American taxpayers for the United States
government to extend any considerable amount o f economic aid to
Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the
sale o f its oil and oil products if a reasonable agreement were
reached with regard to compensation whereby the large-scale
marketing of Iranian oil would be resumed... In case Iran should
so desire, the United States government hopes to be able to
continue to extend technical assistance and military aid on a basis
comparable to that given during the past year.47

Any remaining hope stored in Musaddiq’s heart that die United States would
serve as a counterweight to British power evaporated. While the Americans had
for some time doubted Musaddiq’s leadership abilities and criticized his
recalcitrance, they had not adopted Britain’s desire to oppose him. However, the
change in U.S. administrations, coupled with Musaddiq’s perceived flirtation with

45 Ibid., p. 161.
46 Ibid.,p. 162.
47 Ibid.
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leftism, led to a common Anglo-American strategy, if from different motives.48
The stalemate would soon be broken.
Deadlock remained throughout early 1953.

The intricacies o f Anglo-

Iranian offers and counteroffers will not be detailed here. Rather, we will proceed
to a short narrative of the developments surrounding the fall o f Musaddiq’s
government in late summer 1953.

August, 19S3
It was during these fateful months that the National Front coalition
manifested renewed signs o f internal disunity. Again, it must be reiterated that
the National Front was not unified political party with a set platform and mutually
cooperative leadership.

In reality, it was an extremely loose coalition o f

incongruous political groupings and individual freelancers temporarily affiliated
through the nationalization drive. For instance, minister o f education and NF
leader Karim Sanjabi observed that “[t]he greatest flaw o f the National Front was
the lack o f a coherent ideology and organizational structure.”49 As the economic
conditions in Iran worsened with little prospect o f adequate resolution, and as
Musaddiq attempted the implementation o f other portions o f his own political
agenda, the NF coalition fell apart. Many groups and individuals who had once
carried Musaddiq’s banner sought his downfall during the summer o f 1953.

48 Eisenhower claimed that Musaddiq was courting a $20 million Soviet aid program avert
bankruptcy. See Mandate for Change, p. 163. In fairness, it must be said that a reassessment of
America’s oil crisis policy was initiated by Truman at the end of his term, in October, 1952.
Eisenhower’s administration would complete this policy adjustment.
49 M. Reza Ghods, Iran in the I f f 1Century: A Political History (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1989), p. 179.
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During the oil crisis, Musaddiq’s primary support came from an odd
amalgamation consisting o f leftist, moderate, and extreme rightist elements. On
the left, Musaddiq’s NF found support mainly from Tudeh, the Soviet-sponsored
Communist organization. In late 1950 and early 1951, Tudeh had actually allied
itself against Musaddiq, particularly for his vehement opposition to the Soviet oil
concession after the Second World War. Yet they soon shifted their support to
Musaddiq as the nationalization drive gathered steam, partly out o f political
opportunism and partly due to flexibility derived from utilitarian Marxist-Leninist
doctrine, which will be examined below. It is possible that, as the Americans
claimed, these same leftist elements in Iran could have usurped Musaddiq. The
outcome o f an attempted leftist coup would have been in doubt, however, as the
Tudeh members were outnumbered by pro-Shah forces in the army.
The second bloc that bolstered Musaddiq’s government was gathered
around the person o f Sayyed Abulqasim Kashani, die renowned, independent, and
extremely popular cleric.

Initially, Kashani’s traditional middle class and

merchant followers rallied to the cause o f anti-imperialism- due especially to this
group’s disdain for European-style modernization and corruptive Western
influences. But as Musaddiq’s political platform was unveiled, a platform that
included an increase in the peasants’ harvest share and support for women’s
rights, Kashani turned against his former colleague.50 In February, 1953, Kashani
cited these moves as un-Islamic and pro-Soviet and withdrew from the National
Front coalition. In losing the support o f Kashani’s bloc, Musaddiq’s power base
was significantly weakened. On the fringe o f this traditional-rightist power-bloc
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were small cells o f violent fundamental Muslims, the Devotees o f Islam and the
Society o f Muslim Warriors. Though sometimes able to influence drastically the
direction of Iranian politics, as possibly in the case of Razmara’s assassination,
their small membership made large-scale political impact difficult. On the other
hand, threats levied by these fringe elements were unnerving for Musaddiq’s
government during the first year o f the oil crisis.

No doubt, Musaddiq was

pushed toward intransigence on the nationalization issue out o f fear o f retribution
should he make one concession too many during negotiations with the British.
The third grouping o f Musaddiq supporters is more difficult to label. This
centrist faction, if that is an adequate moniker, included Zahmatkishan-i Mellat-i
Iran (Toiling Masses o f Iran), led by ex-Tudeh leader Khalil Maleki and Dr.
Muzaffar Baqa’i. The word ‘centrist’ applies to a limited extent because the
Toiling Masses were neither o f the extreme left, nor were they a liberal
democratic in ideology. Katouzian observes that Maleki’s portion o f the party
were originally Tudeh members, but broke off on a course independent from
Soviet doctrinal dogma. In doing so, this group developed a leftism that was
applicable to Iran’s cultural, social, and economic nuances. Later, however, the
ambitious Baqa’i opposed the Musaddiq government, and the Toiling Masses o f
Iran split into two factions, with Maleki assembling a new party called Third
Force.51
Thus, as summer progressed, Musaddiq found a large army arrayed
against him. The Shah’s circle, o f course, had been opposed to Musaddiq since

50 Ibid., pp. 186-187.
51 Katouzian, p. 170.

87

the latter’s militant opposition to the Shah’s father, Reza Khan.

The Shah

pretended later that he was not intimidated by Musaddiq, calling him a “theatrical
performer” and commenting on the prime minister’s “sudden changes o f mood.”
In reality, the Shah was terrified of Musaddiq’s impassioned, boisterous coalition,
and was unwilling to depose the seasoned politician out of fear o f public backlash
and Tudeh violence. He had already attempted to oust the premier in July, 1952,
when Musaddiq had attempted to take control o f the army, which was
traditionally the Shah’s bastion. The monarch succeeded in appointing Qavam to
the premiership, but after heated pro-Musaddiq demonstrations and political furor
the Shah was forced to restore him to his former position.53
By August, 1953, however, circumstances had changed.

Widespread

discontent with Iran’s economic conditions and the ongoing deadlock over oil
production prompted increased criticism o f Musaddiq’s hard-bargaining ways.
Further, there existed rather intense personal rivalries among leaders o f the
National Front and associated support groups. These rivalries helped produce
mass defections from Musaddiq’s bloc.

Among the defectors was Sayyed

Kashani, who not only disagreed with some o f Musaddiq’s modernization
policies, but who was also jealous o f the prime minister’s political position. In
addition, external powers began actively agitating for Musaddiq’s dismissal that
summer. The actions o f the British and American intelligence services during the
summer o f 1953 have been thoroughly detailed in other works, so only a synopsis
o f Musaddiq’s final days will be provided.

52 Pahlavi, p. 83.
3J M. RezaGhods, p. 186.
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Great Britain had made no secret o f its desire to hasten Musaddiq’s fail,
but was reluctant to pursue covert operations to topple Musaddiq without
American complicity. For the first 18 months o f the crisis, the U.S. government,
while increasingly estranged from him, still resisted London’s lobbying for direct
intervention. However, as the situation in Tehran deteriorated, and fears o f leftist
insurrection abounded, Washington agreed to help the British orchestrate
Musaddiq’s removal with the help o f the Shah.

The American Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain’s MI6 dubbed the project “Operation
Ajax.” The CIA’s Kim Roosevelt arrived in Iran in mid-July and immediately
initiated contact with the Shah and his loyal aide General Fazlullah Zahedi. The
operation involved the recruitment of anti-Musaddiq elements in the army, police,
religious, and political establishments, as well as the hiring o f criminal types to
instigate widespread riots and demonstrations against the government.

The

British and American agents involved found a bevy o f eager Iranian cohorts, and
the plan was set in motion.
At 1 a.m. on August 16, four tanks from the Shah’s summer residence
encircled the premier’s house, and Colonel Nematollah Nasiri, Commander o f the
Imperial Guards, delivered a letter to Musaddiq informing him o f his dismissal
and subsequent replacement by retired General Fazlullah Zahedi.

Musaddiq

responded by having Nasiri arrested by a group o f his loyalists, and when the
Shah learned o f this development, he fled to Rome. For the next three days
Tehran was plunged into chaos as American and British-sponsored street-toughs
strolled the streets, some demonstrating in favor o f the Shah and others posing as
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riotous Tudeh aggravators. In the interim, CIA agent Kim Roosevelt instructed
provincial Iranian commanders to come to Tehran to support the Shah and
overthrow the Musaddiq government. By the evening o f August 19, several key
radio stations had been occupied by pro-Shah army forces, Musaddiq was
deposed, and the coup was over!54 A crisis that had been simmering for over two
years came to an abrupt and bloody end in a matter o f days.
In the wake o f the coup, the new Shah-Zahedi government launched a
vicious counterattack against its opposition, including Musaddiq’s National Front
coalition. Indeed, Musaddiq, due to his continued popularity in many circles, was
one o f the few officials in the government not summarily executed.

On

September 5, Eisenhower presented an $45 million emergency aid program to the
reinstated, pro-American Shah.55 (This aid package had been preceded by a
$900,000 ‘gift’ from the CIA immediately after the successful coup). One month
later Great Britain reestablished diplomatic relations with Iran, and a new oil
agreement with Iran was signed in summer, 1954.

The new agreement was

patterned after earlier international consortium models, and incorporated a 50-50
division o f profits between Iran Mid the oil companies. The British did, o f course,
retain some footing in the country, though not at the same level as before. This
compact permitted AIOC, now British Petroleum, a 40% share o f oil operations; a
U.S. oil group another 40%; Royal Dutch Shell 14%; and Compagnie Fransaise
des Petroles 6%.
The oil crisis had ended, but its legacy would linger for decades.

54 Ibid., pp. 190-191.
55 Eisenhower, p. 165. Total U.S. aid for that year would eventually total $85 million.
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PART II: INTERPRETATION
6. Iranian Intransigence

At first glance, the Oil Nationalization Crisis o f 1949-1953 seems to have
simple,

well-marked

explanations.

The

Iranians

were

driven

toward

nationalization o f AIOC as a means o f attaining control over a profitable national
resource. The British feared the loss o f income vital to their war-devastated
economic infrastructure.

The Soviets, though unwilling to launch a direct

invasion o f the country, nevertheless pursued the goal o f internal leftist
subversion. The Americans intervened to block possible Communist usurpation
o f the central government, and to gain access to Iran’s petroleum reserves.
However, as Mary Ann Heiss observed in the early stages o f her own study on
Iran’s nationalization push, “the oil dispute and its ultimate resolution proved to
be more complex subjects” than first anticipated.1
Iran o f the 1940s and 1950s was a rare and complex landscape where a
potentially confusing myriad o f disparate forces met In Iran, all conceivable
political, social, religious, economic, and cultural forces were present.

These

forces, when mixed, violently convulsed the country’s socio-culturai fabric,
political institutions, and economic fortunes.
Iran o f the 1940s and 1950s was the point of impact in a collision of
historical forces.

Here, there were meetings between imperialism tod anti
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colonialism, Western modernization and Perso-Islamic tradition, liberaldemocratic reform and despotic monarchy, Westernism and Islamic conservatism,
republicanism and leftism, autocracy and peasantry, and market economy and
controlled economy.
Thus, the causes, courses, and consequences o f the Oil Nationalization
Crisis were shaped by the heat produced from the meeting o f these historical
forces. The study o f this period o f U.S.-Iranian relations is fulfilling specifically
because one rarely finds so many disparate elements combining in one area at one
time. The goal o f this portion o f the study is to examine the internal historical
forces that: 1) led to oil nationalization; 2) bolstered the intransigent position
adopted by Musaddiq’s camp during the critical years 1951-53, and; 3) led to the
erosion o f Musaddiq’s support and the overthrow o f his government in August,
1953.

The Role o f Memory
In diplomatic relations, past experiences shape the perceptions (or
misperceptions), policies, initiatives, and responses o f statesmen and nations
alike. On an individual level, a politician’s or diplomat’s cultural and/or religious
upbringing, environment, social class, familial upbringing, economic fortunes,
past experiences, and personal idiosyncrasies directly affect his or her conduct of
foreign affairs. These elements combine to form that individual’s character, and
that character may positively or negatively affect his or her performance during

1 Heiss, p. ix.
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diplomatic negotiations. Shireen T. Hunter drew a similar conclusion regarding
the nation-state:
Nations, like individuals, are largely a product o f their past.
Memories and experiences color their assessment o f present
reality, shape their vision o f the future, and form their national
ethos. Some experiences leave such a deep imprint on a nation’s
psyche that they affect its behavior for generations... Iran’s history
is replete with such traumatic experiences...2

For Iran, centuries o f foreign intrigue and attempts at politico-cultural domination
had forged a very distinct “national ethos.” Iran had a glorious 5,000-year history
before the influx o f Islam in the seventh century A.D.

After the renowned

empires of Cyrus the Great, Darius and Xerxes, Iran suffered through several
invasions from a variety o f external enemies: Greeks, Romans, Turks, Mongols,
and Ottomans.

Beginning in the late 18th century, the once-mighty Persian

Empire caught the attention of British and Russian expansionism. During the 19th
century, the British desired to draw the country into its sphere o f influence in
order to protect its colonization o f India, vis-a-vis Russia, and gain new trade
opportunities in Iran.

Tsarist Russia wanted Iran to serve as a buffer state

between its southern flank and the encroaching English, and to use the country as
a warm-weather trade and shipping route. Iran was caught in the middle of this
vicious colonial tug-of-war. In a series o f wars between Russia mid Iran between
1804-28, the Iranians lost the Trans-Caucasus region to the Russians through the
Treaties o f Gulistan (1813) and Turkimanchi (1821). In 1857, Iran signed the

2 Hunter, pp. 7-8.
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Treaty o f Paris, ceding jurisdiction over Afghanistan to the British Crown.3 In
1907, Russia and Great Britain made a formal agreement dividing Iran into three
main regions. Russia and Great Britain would maintain spheres o f influence in
the north and south, respectively, while Iran would be permitted to keep the
country’s center under its jurisdiction.
All in all, this downward spiral from prominence to subservience left
permanent scars on the heart and psyche of Iranians, as Mohammad Reza Shah
expressed in Answer to History :
From the Treaty o f Paris in 1857 until 1921 [the year Pahlavi’s
father, Reza Khan, came to power], our unfortunate country had no
government which dared to move one soldier, grant one
concession, or pass one law concerning Iranians without the
agreement, tacit or otherwise, o f either the British ambassador or
the Russian ambassador, or o f both. Our policies- if such they can
be called- were developed in the two embassies... Their diplomatic
communications were orders, which we carried out, and in the
event o f our showing any sign of recalcitrance, they became
threats.4

First, Iran’s ill treatment at the hands o f the West created intense feelings of
resentment and anger toward the European colonial powers.

Given Great

Britain’s activities in Iran in the 19th and 20thcenturies, it was inevitable that they
would bear the brunt o f this anger, and nowhere are these sentiments voiced more
passionately than in Persian literature o f the two centuries. In Mohammad Hosain
Roknzadeh-Adamiyyat’s novel, The Braves o f Tangestan (1931), the citizens of
British-occupied Iran are involved in a rebellion against their occupiers during the
First World War. One o f the heroes, Ra’is Ali, describes his European enemies:
3 Donald N. Wilber, Iran: Past and Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp.
78-81.
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In truth, the Europeans are an oppressive and
despotic people. Except for having made
advancements in industry and in making instruments
of slaughter, they are not superior to us. It is
astonishing that they consider us savages, while their
own character and behavior are far worse than that o f
African savages. Is not all this uncalled-for
bloodshed, all this meaningless slaughter, all this
injustice, aggression, and cruel-heartedness evidence
of their savagery and bloodthirstiness? What are all
these tanks, machine guns, armored ships, and poison
gases for, except to kill human beings, for quenching
their [Europeans’] greed and lust, and for other
materialistic uses?3

Iranian fury was also visited upon the Russians for their infringements
upon Persian sovereignty. Further, this ire was not the result o f some imagined
violation o f the country’s self-determination, for Russia had historically
maintained designs for its southern neighbor, as the “moderate” V.N. Lamsdorff,
foreign affairs minister under Nicholas n, candidly testified:6
The principal aim pursued by us... through various ways and
means during long years of our relations with Persia can be defined
in the following manner: to preserve the integrity and inviolability
o f the possessions o f the Shah; without seeking for ourselves
territorial acquisitions, without permitting the hegemony o f a third
power [i.e. Great Britain], gradually to subject Persia to our
dominant influence, without violating, however, the external
symbols o f her independence o f her internal regime, hi other
words, our task is to make Persia politically an obedient and
useful, i.e. a sufficiently powerful instrument in our hands.7
4 Reza Shah Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 45.
5Excerpted from M.R. Ghanoonparvar, In A Persian Mirror: Images o f the West and Westerners
in Iranian Fiction (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1993), p. 64. See also Mohammad
Hoseyn Roknzadeh-Adamiyyat, Daliran-e Tangestcmi, 7th ed. (Tehran: Entesharat-e Eqbal, 1975),
p. 108. Note the Iranian prejudice toward Africans.
Excerpted from Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The
Dynamics o f Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 58. Rubinstein, in turn, excerpted
Lansdorff s quote from Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Russia and the Middle East,” Ivo Lederer, ed.,
Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1962), p. 497.
7 Ibid.
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To the reserved LamsdorfF, though Iran was to be allowed a thin facade of
sovereignty, their ultimate design was “to make Persia politically and obedient
and useful...instrument in [Russia’s] hands.” Iran’s relations with other nations
were destined to be adversely affected by its encounters with domineering foreign
powers such as Great Britain and Russia.
Over time, Iranians became extremely suspicious o f the motives,
machinations, and actions o f foreign diplomats, advisors, business people, and
private citizens. This xenophobia, prompted by many centuries of attempts by
foreign powers to dominate the country’s culture and political systems, was an
aberration to Westerners, who were usually on the other side o f the colonial wall.
The apprehension and suspicion with which Iranian government officials
approached their foreign counterparts during the twentieth century was not
entirely comprehended by Western statesmen. Indeed, as die National Front’s
nationalization train gathered speed in late 1950 and early 1951, Western analysts
and journalists tended to label his group “nationalist,” although it would be more
accurate to dub it an anti-colonial or anti-imperial, popular movement.
To American officials in particular, such Iranian suspicion was irrational.
Having not been historically entangled in Anglo-Russo-Iranian infighting,
Washington simply could not relate to Iran’s paranoia. Yet we must remember
that Iran and the United States have had very different historical backgrounds
form their respective worldviews. History is memory, and it is our memories that
make long-lasting imprints on our hearts and minds, and subsequently mold our
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views. Since its inception, the United States has been subjected to only one
foreign invasion, this being the British infringement on U.S. territory during the
War o f 1812. In contrast, during its long history Iran has been subjected to more
wars and invasions than can be counted, Had America’s borders been violated
more often, and its politico-cultural hegemony threatened, it is likely that
American and Iranian worldviews would be more similar than divergent.

The “Persian Psyche”
What, then, has Iran’s bipolar history produced? Hunter has noted that the
country’s glorious past, followed by a humbling period o f descent, created
“contradictory tendencies” in Iran’s foreign policy:
The interaction of this dimension o f Iran’s historical legacy with its
more recent experience o f decline has created contradictory
tendencies in its external behavior. At one and the same time, Iran
wants to be neutral and disengaged from great power competition
and to be an influential regional and international actor, an impulse
which inevitably embroils it in such rivalries.8

Jahangir Amuzegar stated that the country’s proud and tortuous past has produced
rather distinct traits in the Persian character, though he issued the necessary
cautions against generalizations. To Amuzegar,
[insecurity has always been an inseparable part o f life in Iran- at
least after the fall of die old Persian Empire in the seventh century
A.D. Seven subsequent centuries of invasions by the Arabs, Turks,
Mongols, and others marked a tumultuous period of unsettled
sovereignty, ceaseless warfare, havoc, destruction, and
bloodshed... Those long centuries o f endless political feuds and

8 Hunter, p. 10.
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economic uncertainty left the Iranians with a sense o f helplessness
and fear.9
Amuzegar continued, stating that “a stereotypical Persian psyche may be said to
possess two dichotomous streaks, one positive and the other negative:”10
[Positive:]...national pride and patriotism, creativity, intellectual
curiosity, friendliness, hospitality, tolerance, generosity, warmth,
and compassion.. . 11
[Negative:]... insecurity... individualism... selfcenteredness... pessi
mism. .. egotism, ..distrust.. . 12

Amuzegar obviously did not intend this description to be an infallible racial and
cultural stereotype. He was, however, making an attempt to explain the Iranian
“assessment o f present reality,” “vision o f the future,” and “national ethos” which
Heiss addressed. Still, this interpretive framework is useful in an analysis of
Iranian attitudes toward external actors.

It is this “Persian psyche;” fearful,

untrusting, suspicious; that frequently characterized the National Front’s
perceptions o f British mid American diplomacy. While the Iranians had cause to
distrust Western officials, often this distrust passed from mere emotion to rigid
stereotype and acute paranoia. This apprehension toward Iran’s external contacts
caused deep animosity toward the British during the crisis. Musaddiq’s forces
were flint-headed: they were determined to drive the British commercial interests
from Iran forever in order that the Crown’s influence would end. Unfortunately,
this . intransigence also prevented Musaddiq’s government from making
compromises, even o f a temporal nature, which were in its best interest.

9 Jahangir Amuzegar, The Dynamics o f the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis’ Triumph and
Tragedy (Albany, NY State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 102-3. See Amuzegar’s
chapter seven, “The Persian National Psyche.”
10 Ibid., p. 100.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., pp. 100-103.
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The Foreign Office, o f course, did not fully understand the true motives
behind Musaddiq’s recalcitrance; Eden, in particular, disparaged Musaddiq in
Full Circle and viewed his counterpart as “the first real bit o f meat to come the
way o f the cartoonists since the war.”13 Eden continued his tirade against the
aged Iranian premier:
Musaddiq’s megalomania was described as verging on
mental instability. He had never been amenable to reason, and
lately it had been necessary to humour him as with a fractious
child...
In a later interview [fall, 1951]... Musaddiq remarked to
the United States Ambassador that the Iranians were not donkeys
and could no longer be deceived by professions o f friendliness.14

Any analysis o f Western statements of this type regarding either
Musaddiq’s temperament or the stereotypical Persian character must be rendered
with great caution. Historian James F. Goode astutely observes that British and
American ignorance and prejudice, such as that exhibited above by Eden,
influenced die conduct o f Western foreign policy in Iran. However, Goode fails
to accompany this assertion with heeded qualifications.

True, some Anglo-

American officials did not possess comprehensive knowledge o f Iran’s cultural,
political, economic, and social idiosyncrasies.13 Yet Mary Ann Heiss pointed out
that factors influential to diplomacy’s outcome can often be cancelled out or
minimized by other factors. In the case of American-Iranian diplomacy during
the oil nationalization crisis, other economic, political, historical forces

13 Eden, p. 219.
14 Ibid., p. 230. See also quotes from British officials in Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 15,
24, 26-27. For American Secretary o f State Acheson’s perceptions, see Present at the Creation,
pp. 503-504.
Goode, Diplomacy ofNeglect, p. viii, 7,66. See also In the Shadow o fMusaddiq, p. 12.
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overshadowed racial and cultural factors. While some U.S. officials could have
used extra schooling and an entry-level course in cultural sensitivity, it was
Musaddiq’s determination to resist British domination at whatever cost that was
deemed most provocative in the eyes o f Western diplomats. At nearly every
stage, the prime minister was unwilling to compromise.
Further, we must understand that Musaddiq’s perceived stubbornness and
“megalomania” were forged both by personal quirks and intense domestic
pressures. Though an unpopular stance in the eyes o f cultural revisionists, it must
be stated that Musaddiq, though brilliant, did suffer from medical and mental
disorders which hindered his performance. Physical and mental well-being, in
addition to religious and cultural values, can be vital determinants in a
statesman’s conduct of foreign relations.

In the case o f Musaddiq, his well-

known nervous disorder and advanced age negatively affected his judgement, just
as British foreign officers’ biases hindered their decisions.

In his cultural

analysis, Goode seems to indicate that British and American ethnocentrism
affected the crisis’ outcome in equal measure. This is incorrect. Because British
negotiators were Musaddiq’s main counterparts, their prejudice and ignorance
were more significant than that o f the Americans, who actively joined in the
dispute only after nationalization became law. Also, cultural prejudice was not
the preeminent sculptor o f the crisis’ outcome, but rather economic, political,
historical, and ideological forces.
In addition, Musaddiq’s own fiery rhetoric and truculent supporters
constrained his freedom o f movement during negotiations with AIOC and the
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British government. Acheson noted that Musaddiq seemed to be under intense
pressure throughout the oil nationalization crisis, some o f his own doing and some
the result of unbending public and political coercion:
Another o f Mosadeq’s marked characteristics was his distrust o f
his own countrymen; he would never talk with any o f them
present... Mosadeq’s self-defeating quality was that he never
paused to see that the passions he excited to support him restricted
his freedom of choice and left only extreme solutions possible.16

U.S. Policy Planning Director Paul Nitze also noted the same intense internal
duress suffered by Musaddiq:
... [H]e appeared to be under such heavy political pressures back
home that it was nearly impossible for him to make the necessary
concessions that would have led to an equitable settlement. Had he
done so, no doubt he would have risked alienating one group or
another on whose support he depended. Hence, his strategy was to
temporize in the belief that toe longer he held out, toe more
frightened we would become o f a Communist takeover and toe
more likely it would be that we would put pressure on toe British
to come forth with most o f toe concessions.1

In the end, Musaddiq’s very passion for his cause, coupled with overwhelming
domestic duress, shackled his government to intransigence. Even after many
Iranian leaders began calling for a compromise with AIOC, his government
refused to concede ground, opting instead for an all-or-nothing approach toward
London. This all-or-nothing strategy was also designed to scare toe Americans
into support for his government, support bom o f toe fear o f leftist insurrection.
This tactic later cost Musaddiq dearly.

16 Acheson, p. 504.
17Nitze, p. 132.
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Iran’s Legitimate Grievances
Although this seemed an irrational stance to British and American
officials, one must understand that the recalcitrance characteristic o f Iranian
foreign policy had rational, historical experiences that, to some extent, justified its
xenophobic nature. First, the British had abused their status as a colonial power
for the duration o f Anglo-Iranian relations- particularly with regard to a fair
division o f oil revenues. In T able 6.1 (below), the Iranian central government
received less income, 11.9% of total net, in a seventeen-year period than the
British government received in tea revenue.

Thus, in spite o f Iran’s 20%

ownership share, the country received only 14.6% o f the company’s net profits,
compared with 16% under 1903’s D’Arcy agreement.18 Musaddiq’s devotion to
the expulsion of the AIOC is understandable in light o f the political mid economic
exploitation suffered by Iran. Unfortunately, this devotion blinded him to the
problems associated with nationalisation.
T a b le 6.1 - AIOC income and expenditure: total, 1933-194919
*

Description

£ million % o f total

Net income
Taxes paid to the British government
Net profit
Capital investment, retained profits, etc.
Dividends, etc. (paid to British/non-Iranian
shareholders)
Revenues paid to the Iranian government

% o f net
profit

895
175
720
500
115

100.0
19.5
81.5
55.8
12.8

■100.0
69.4
16.0
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11.9

14.6

18Katouzian, p. 183.
19Katouzian, p. 183. Katouzian has excerpted his data from Musaddiq’s “Message to the People of
Iran,” Ittila’at, August 30,1951.
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Second, British exploitation o f Iran during the Second World War reached
a new level of rapaciousness. The effects o f Iran’s wartime occupation by Allied
forces are often under-emphasized in surveys o f Westem-Iranian relations. In
Homa Katouzian’s impeccable study o f Iran’s political economy, he commented
on the effects o f the country’s wartime occupation by Allied forces. It was an
occupation that became the last straw for many Iranians.

Katouzian also

elaborated on the method by which the Allies controlled access to Iran’s
resources, resources frequently used to supply their own troops:
The economic impact o f the occupation was devastating.
The Allies needed food, tobacco, raw materials, and so forth, both
for the use of their troops in Iran and for general use. Therefore,
they effectively forced the Iranian government to put the country’s
resources at their disposal. The operation was carried by means o f
monetary ‘policy’...
... the Iranian currency was devalued by more than 100 per
cent, from 68 to 140 rials to the pound sterling. Depending on the
circumstances, devaluation may have beneficial or damaging
effects for a given political economy. When the Iranian currency
was devalued, foreign demand for exports- i.e. the demand o f
occupation forces for Iranian goods and services- was virtually
unlimited, while the possibility o f expanding the supply o f those
goods and services was extremely limited. These two facts put
together imply that the devaluation by 100 per cent o f the Iranian
currency reduced Iran’s earnings from the sale of her goods (or
exports) to the Allies by almost half o f what they would have been
had the currency not been devalued. On the other hand, as Iranian
imports were highly specific in nature and could not be
significantly reduced now that foreign exchange (and, hence,
foreign goods) were dearer, the value of Iranian imports could not
have been much less than what they would have been without the
devaluation.
These observations together mean that the
devaluation was detrimental to Iran’s export earnings as well as to
her balance o f trade, and had a devastating inflationary effect
which further impoverished the already poor Iranian people.20

20 Katouzian, The Political Economy o f Modem Iran, p. 142. Mistreatment such as this directly
shaped Iranian perceptions of the West.
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The miserable state of Iran’s economy, and the hardships brought to bear upon the
people, served as the final spark for an angry public after the war.

Allied

devaluation o f the rial and monopolization of Iran’s goods and services drove
inflation out-of-control, decreased the buying power of Iranians, and cut the
country’s export revenues substantially.

When Musaddiq raised his cries for

nationalization, his words found welcoming ears.
Given the aforementioned characteristics and circumstances of the Iranian
people in the postwar period, it became virtually inevitable that the Musaddiq
government would adopt an intransigent position versus Great Britain. Decades
o f Russian and British domination taxed and angered many Iranians. These were
the emotions which Musaddiq tapped into during the nationalization drive, and
these were the same emotions which restricted his independence after
nationalization was ratified.

Internal Dissent
Further, internecine strife endemic to Iranian politics made his downfall
inevitable, with or without Anglo-American complicity. Simply put, Musaddiq
had many domestic enemies with whom to contend.

These enemies were

sufficient in strength and organization so as to doom both his government and
nationalization even without a British-American coup. The Western aggressors
merely organized, financed and manipulated extant political opposition to replace
Musaddiq.
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Cyrus Vakili-Zad performed an excellent short study o f the interactions
between traditional and modernist thought schools within Iran, and this study
provides the analyst with a useful framework for the measurement o f Iran’s
political spectrum.

In his analysis, Vakili-Zad divided 19th and 20th century

Iranian views on modernization into three main groups: “Inward-looking
Intellectuals,” “Outward-looking Intellectuals,” and “Social Engineers.”

The

Inward-looking group, Vakili-Zad observed, mainly discards Westem-style
modernization, technology, and ideology. This group perceives Islamic culture
and law as completely sufficient for meeting the needs o f the Iranian
sociopolitical landscape, and rejects most Western technology and ideology as
being both unnecessary and detrimental. The second group, “Outward-looking
intellectuals,” desire “the whole package.”

This group can also be dubbed

Westernizing intellectuals, for they prefer a complete importation o f Western
technology and ideology, mid retain a strong affinity for Iran’s /?re-Islamic past
The third group, “Social Engineers,” are a mixture o f the preceding groups. The
“Social Engineers,” while eager for applicable technologies and Western
ideologies, believe that many aspects o f Euro-American culture are subversive.
Thus, a reasoned rejection o f undesirable elements o f Western modernization is
wedded to an embrace of Perso-Islamic culture to produce a hybrid ideology that
includes the best of both worlds.21
Vakili-Zad’s division o f Iran’s perceptions on modernization matches well
with the groupings o f political ideologies present during the Musaddiq

21 Cyrus Vakili-Zad, “Collision of Consciousness: Modernization and Development in Iran,”
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3, Jvdy 19% (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd), p. 140-141.
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Administration. The first group, “Inward-looking Intellectuals,” correlates with
the religious-traditional crowd allied with Sayyed Abulqasim Kashani.22 This
group, which included many religious clerics and low to middle class workers,
initially supported Musaddiq’s nationalization campaign.

However, as the

country’s economy sank due to the loss o f oil revenue, and as Musaddiq’s full
political agenda became known, Kashani and his followers turned against the
premier, This withdrawal came about due, in part, to Musaddiq’s attempts to
redistribute land, a move that would hurt the traditional landowners and autocrats
who financed the religious clergy. Further, Musaddiq held views on the treatment
o f women. He favored the education and enfranchisement o f females, a policy
deemed un-Islamic by Iran’s more religious male citizenry. These irreligious
policies were destined to earn Musaddiq opposition from his more traditional
backers within the National Front, and thus erode his support base.
The second group, “Outward-looking” or Westernizing intellectuals,
matches with the Shah’s inner circle, though this categorization must be qualified.
As his moniker, the Shah-in-Shah (king-of-kings), suggested, the Shah viewed
himself as chief among the great pre-Islamic shahs o f the past. In choosing this
name, Mohammad Reza Shah egotistically labeled himself as chief among the
great Persian kings of the past. In this manner, the Shah embraced his pre-Islamic
Persian heritage. Yet the Shah also believed that only a thorough importation o f
Western technology would provide Iran with the economic, financial, industrial,
military, medical, and educational resources to assert the country’s freedom o f

22 Katouzian points out that most clerics remained silent until well into Musaddiq’s tortured
premiership. See Katouzian, p. 171.
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movement. As both Amuzegar and Hunter reminded us, Iran’s long and glorious
was followed by two centuries o f derision and decline. This downward spiral
created both extreme insecurity and an innate desire to reassert its sovereignty.
Similarly, the Shah craved a restoration of Iran to its previous place among the
great empires o f the world, yet lacked the resources to do so. In his heart, he
likely preferred nationalization i f it could be successfully carried out without
further Western technical assistance, and without drawing the ire o f needed EuroAmerican allies. These were impossibilities. He realized that Iran simply did not
possess the training and institutions to run the oil company independently, and so
opposed Musaddiq. He also opposed Musaddiq because o f the premier’s repeated
attempts to limit the monarchy’s power. Musaddiq, on the other hand, tried
repeatedly during his two-year tenure to wrest control o f the army away from the
Shah. Without control o f the army, Musaddiq surmised, the war would be lost.
in the end, it was the loyalty o f most army unite to the Shah that cemented
Musaddiq’s fall from power.
The Shah’s ability to maintain control over the armed forces also
illustrated the isolation o f Musaddiq’s government. As Katouzian observed, the
prime minister was unable to assert effective control over the entire government,
as other, deeply-entrenched, pro-Shah elements held their ground during the
National Front onslaught:
...[Musaddiq] was not in control either o f the whole apparatus of
the state, or o f the entire expanse o f Iranian lands: he was merely
the leader o f a popular (i.e. melli) political movement [the National
Front], and the head o f an independent government administration;
that is, even at the best o f times, he was in charge o f only one
organ o f the state. The rest o f the state apparatus was still in the
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hands o f despotic [pro-Shah] agents and institutions, who, in
pursuit o f their own interests, collaborated with the interested
foreign powers [Britain and America] against the Popular
Movement. The situation was an authentic example o f dual
sovereignty; and it involved a struggle between the democratic
forces led by Musaddiq, and the conservative and despotic (and
foreign) powers led by the Shah, who eventually emerged •
victors.23

The Shah’s forces proved to be the most dangerous o f Musaddiq’s internal
enemies, for they possessed established government organs and resources
necessary to execute a successful coup.

Once the British and American

intelligence services determined that the premier should be deposied, the Shah’s
forces and Kashani’s traditionalists offered their services with eagerness.
Another political party that was “Outward-looking” in ideology was the
Tudeh Party. The Tudeh Party embraced Marxist-Leninist doctrine in its entirety.
It consisted mainly o f factory and textile workers, students, and young educated
professionals.

It was initially extremely hostile toward Musaddiq and his

courtship o f American support versus the British government, but later tempered
its criticism after the U.S. government adopted a pro-British stance. During the
pivotal days o f August, 1953, the well-organized Tudeh Party withdrew its
support from Musaddiq. This was to be a feteful decision, for the Tudeh Party
was the only strong, viable ally left in Musaddiq’s camp: their apathetic response
was deeply regretted by the group after the Shah’s reassertion o f dominance.
The third major intellectual group, “Social Engineers,” spanned from the
extreme left to the center-right. Only two o f merit will be mentioned here. On
the center-left, the Toiling Masses o f fcui was a socialist party led by ex-Tudeh
23 Katouzian, p. 164.
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member Khalil Maleki and Dr. Muzaffar Baqa’i Kirmani. Although the party
leaned slightly to the left, it cannot be placed in the same category as Tudeh, for it
sought a distinctly Iranian form o f socialism.

However, Baqa’i Kirmani

eventually turned on Musaddiq, while Maleki continued his support for the
premier, and the party split into two groups. Maleki’s faction became known as
Third Force, and supported Musaddiq to the bitter end.

Synopsis
The revisionist school would have us believe that the overriding factor in
Musaddiq’s fall and the failure o f nationalization was Anglo-American opposition
to the prime minister. In such an interpretation, cultural prejudice, ignorance, and
unwarranted fears o f Communist usurpation among Western statesmen resulted in
hostility toward the well-meaning Musaddiq.
However, as this chapter indicates, this cultural interpretation, which is
frequently an integral part o f revisionist thinking, is faulty. True, many British
*

and American officials held biased views o f Iranian culture in general, and of
Musaddiq in particular. A discussion o f these prejudices will be discussed in the
following chapter. Yet the personal biases o f Western statesmen varied both in
degree and in their impact upon the nationalization drive’s final outcome. In
reality, British prejudices against Iranians were much more pronounced than those
held by their American counterparts, and because British intransigence or
cooperation determined the outcome o f Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations, it was
British obstructionism that helped derail nationalization.
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It has also been proven that the Iranians maintained legitimate grievances
against the AIOC, which had been used by the Crown as leverage against Tehran.
So long as Great Britain had control o f the company, Iran’s political and
economic independence were jeopardized and its destiny in the hands o f another.
Musaddiq’s coalition, the National Front, correctly assessed that only the
complete expulsion o f British influence from Iran would guarantee the country’s
future self-determination. This realization propelled the pro-nationalization bloc
toward an unyielding, all-or-nothing posture. This determination, coupled with
Musaddiq’s own uncompromising rhetoric, shackled his government to
truculence,

Unfortunately, these factors also restricted Musaddiq’s ability to

negotiate, for he knew that domestic political pressure to nationalize would not
permit concessions to the British.

Musaddiq’s devotion to the nationalization

principle blinded him to pragmatism, even after many supporters began calling for
compromise during the summer o f 1953. Further, the loose coalition that had
carried the nationalization banner disintegrated during 1953 due to four key
reasons. First, there was the lack o f a common, unifying ideology. Second, there
was increased opposition prompted by economic and political deterioration
Third, personal rivalries and mutual suspicion among the leadership o f the
National Front weakened the coalition. Fourth, allegiances with foreign actors
introduced additional external pressure upon Musaddiq.24

24 For instance, the Soviet Union’s sponsorship of Tudeh served to influence Tudeh’s relationship
with Musaddiq. Early in the nationalization drive, Tudeh bitterly opposed Musaddiq as an
imperialist stooge. After nationalization, the Soviet Union and Tudeh applauded the premier for
defeating British colonialism. During the two-year crisis, Tudeh supported Musaddiq for
- pragmatic reasons, perhaps hoping to usurp his government at an opportune time. Yet during the
critical days o f August, 1953, the Tudeh hesitated, depriving Musaddiq of one of his few power
bases with which to resist the coup.
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Again, it must be reiterated that even without British and American covert
intervention, it is likely that Musaddiq’s government would have fallen, and with
it, hopes for a successful nationalization o f Iran’s oil reserves, The anti-Musaddiq
bloc in Iran was strong, and increasing in strength with each passing day. The
majority o f the army was loyal to Mohammad Reza Shah, and it is unlikely that
that organ would have sided with Musaddiq in an open confrontation with the
Shah. Further, by the summer o f 1953 Musaddiq had lost substantial support
among the merchant and traditional middle class. This flight from the National
Front was also directly linked to the defection o f several prominent clerics to the
pro-Shah side. Given this erosion o f Musaddiq’s support base, his fall was not a
matter o f if, but when.

lil

7. Anglo-American Intransigence

Although

Iranian

domestic

pressures

were

instrumental

to

nationalization’s failure, and, hence, the fall o f Musaddiq’s government,
opposition from the United States and Great Britain also proved a critical factor.
American officials in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, unlike their
English counterparts, were initially reluctant to subvert actively Musaddiq’s
leadership. However, as the situation in Iran worsened, fears o f leftist subversion
mounted, and American policy came in line with the British anti-Musaddiq
stance. Before examining the motives for British and American intransigence, a
discussion o f Western prejudices and perceptions will be provided.

Anglo-American Prejudice
Western prejudice and ignorance has historically been an underlying force
directing the actions, reactions, and dispositions o f diplomats in the Near East. As
previously affirmed, a statesman’s traits and experiences mold his or her
perceptions o f reality, and, therefore, conduct-of foreign relations. Religious and
cultural background, personal experience, racial bias, mental (instability,
ideology, and physical and mental health converge in the individual to help form
the actions and reactions o f the state when that individual is serving as an agent of
the state.1

1 The obverse is also true. The individual’s character is shaped by the state (or society) in which
he or she lives.
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Nonetheless, in the case o f the Iranian oil nationalization crisis, cultural
and racial prejudice was outweighed by other influences. This said, it is still
important to provide a cultural interpretation o f Westem-Iranian relations during
the oil nationalization crisis. James F. Goode has made this sort o f cultural
interpretation a foundation o f his scholarship. Goode pointed out that, except for
a dissenting minority, most Westerners who spent time in Iran maintained fieiy
prejudices against the country and its people. In the opening chapter o f In the
Shadow o f Musaddiq, he profiled common Anglo-American biases:
Prejudice prevailed. Americans seemed unpersuaded by [minority]
arguments that ran counter to notions built up over years of
[Muslim-Christian] religious controversy. Increasing disparities in
wealth and power between East and West reinforced the belief that
the Christian, democratic, and progressive West was superior in all
respects to the Islamic, autocratic, and stagnant East...2
Iranian politics confused Westerners. Unable to fathom the
shifting alliances among the [Majlis] deputies, and within the
[Shah’s] court, they easily concluded that Iranians were
‘irrational... undisciplined, unprincipled and erratic.’ Or, as
British Ambassador Sir Reader Bullard (1941-6) opined, Iranians
were psychologically immature.
In Western chancelleries Musaddiq came to represent all
that diplomats disliked most about Iranian politics.
They
considered him old-fashioned, narrow-minded, xenophobic, and
even ‘a hysterical and demented demagogue.’
He earned
opprobrium for opposition to foreign oil concessions in the
fourteenth Majlis, and reports to Washington had little that was
good to say about him. Generally they just ignored him.3

A discrepancy in material-technological wealth and the degradation o f Islam
generally fostered feelings o f contempt toward Near Eastern Islamic culture. In
Iran’s case, this disdain for Islamic culture combined with other factors specific to
2 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 4.
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Perso-Islamic culture, such as a perceived senseless suspicion toward the West.
Yet to the Iranians, this xenophobic reaction was merely a justifiable defensive
posture, assumed to protect Perso-Islamic society from self-evident WestemChristian depredations. To many Anglo-American officials, Musaddiq was an
emotionally unstable, “demented demagogue.” He was not an honorable defender
o f Iranian self-determination. Further, the bewildering nature o f Iranian domestic
politics both irritated and mystified Western diplomats, who were blind to their
own ‘contributions’ to Iran’s chaotic internal situation.
The British and American foreign secretaries during the latter part o f the
crisis, Eden and Acheson respectively, displayed some cultural prejudices of their
own. The two diplomats also held rather demeaning opinions o f Prime Minister
Musaddiq, as shown by the following description by the American Secretary o f
State:4
From the first moment I saw him... Mosadeq became for me the
character Lob in James Barrie’s play Dear Brutus. He was small
and frail with not a shred of hair on his billiard-ball head; a thin
face protruded into a long beak o f a nose flanked by two bright,
shoe-button eyes. His whole manner and appearance was birdlike,
marked by quick, nervous movements as he seemed to jump about
on a perch.
His pixie quality showed in instantaneous
transformations...
...he was essentially a rich, reactionary, feudal-minded
Persian inspired by a fanatical hatred of the British and a desire to
expel them and all their works from the country regardless o f the
cost. He was a great actor and a great gambler...5
3 Ibid., p. 12. Goode’s information on the British perception comes from Ervand Abrahamian, Iran
Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982), p. 211, 216. For Goode’s citation on American
prejudices, see The Diplomacy o f Neglect, p. 114,138.
4 See also Eden, chapter 9, pp. 210-247. Eden remarked that “[t]he British people... had difficulty
in taking Musaddiq seriously,” p. 219.
3 Acheson, pp. 503-504. One should not think, however, that every American official hefd low
opinions of Musaddiq. Paul Nitze, Director of Policy Planning under Eisenhower, maintained a
positive perception of the Iranian premier. In fact, Nitze believed Musaddiq to be “far preferable
to the shah and his retinue.” “I expected to meet a weeping lunatic,” Nitze reminisced, “[but] [hje
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To Acheson, the Iranian premier seemed an edgy “actor,” an unworthy man for
the lofty position he held.
Yet to many Iranians, Musaddiq was a hero. Iranians have long valued
passion, creativity, steadfastness, and wit as enviable characteristics. Musaddiq
often exhibited these characteristics in the course of diplomatic and commercial
negotiations- characteristics that were, to him,

a display o f Persian

gamesmanship. He also carried in his heart his mother’s mantra, that a man’s
suffering for his people is commensurate to his greatness.

In this manner,

Musaddiq viewed himself as expendable: a would-be martyr standing firm against
imperialism. Unfortunately, Musaddiq also suffered from sudden mood swings
and acute anxiety, which further amplified the premier’s own personal and
cultural traits.

Western cultural bias against Musaddiq’s Persian character

combined with his own idiosyncrasies and weaknesses to paint a distorted portrait
o f the premier. These traits were then aggravated by Musaddiq’s implacability
and withering domestic pressures.

The result was an erratic and unyielding

Musaddiq who negotiated with equally recalcitrant Western officials, such as
Eden, Acheson, Churchill, and Eisenhower.
Nonetheless, these aforementioned prejudices were not the strong
sculptors o f the crisis that a misapplied cultural interpretation would have us
believe. It was British, not American prejudice that more directly shaped the
outcome of the crisis.

Remember that the crisis began as an Anglo-hzm m

turned out to be nothing of the kind. On the contrary, I found him to be a totally rational and sane
individual, in control of himself at all times...Mossadegh was also well informed as to the
intricacies of the oil business...[a] tough negotiator.” (Nitze, pp. 130-132). McGhee also was
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conflict, and that the United States became involved later due to the stalemate
between the two parties, and to fears that the crisis provided an opportunity for a
Communist coup. Given these political dynamics, it was British bigotry that more
directly formed the course and aftermath o f the crisis. This bigotry combined
with other, non-cultural factors to form the British position.

During the

immediate postwar period, and even during the crisis, British officials frequently
dismissed nationalization as the result o f characteristic Persian hot-headedness.
Believing that Iranian emotionalism was a storm, their strategy was to weather
this storm until rationality returned to the country.

If the Crown dealt with

Musaddiq firmly, as a parent disciplines a child, then the Iranian government
would back down and a normal relationship restored.
The Americans, though also given to stereotypes, were driven more by a
desire to keep Tehran out o f Communist hands.

Goode tends to generalize

Western prejudice, and thus fails to evaluate separately the differing impacts of
British and American bigotry. Further, he fails to draw clear lines from prejudice
to policy in the oil nationalization crisis. He proves beyond doubt that such
ethnocentrism was extant, yet does not show how bias directly shaped British and
American policies. Nor are there adequate analyses o f other powerful economic,
political, ideological, and geostrategic influences. These other influences had
greater affect on diplomacy between the main three participants.

A strong

cultural interpretation cannot be given to emotionalism or vindictiveness, but

amicable toward Musaddiq, but stated that “his attitude probably doomed from the start our efforts
to facilitate an agreement with the British.” (McGhee, pp. 390-391).
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must calmly measure ethnocentrism’s effects in relation to other, non-cultural
factors.

Britain’s Setting Sun
A more crucial influence upon British policy was the Crown’s tenuous
position after the Second World War, which served to stiffen English opposition
to Musaddiq’s nationalization program. Two devastating 20th century wars had
severely sapped the strength o f the powerful British Empire.

In the years

following the war. Great Britain lost several colonial possessions, including her
jewel, India, and public opinion was set against a further deterioration o f the
Crown’s position among the world’s great powers. The loss o f these colonies,
coupled with the war’s exorbitant cost in resources and finances, pushed the
British government toward an intransigent stance both before and after
Musaddiq’s nationalization.

After the Conservative Party’s victory in the

October, 1951 elections, Prime Minister Winston Churchill described the
country’s economic condition during this period, a condition that would be further
compromised by the permanent loss of Iranian oil and revenue:
The latest estimates show that in 1952, on present trends and
policies and without making any allowance for further speculative
losses, the United Kingdom would have a deficit on its general
balance o f overseas payments o f between £500 million and £600
million... These figures mean, in short, that we are buying much
more than we can afford to pay for from current earnings, and this
can only in time lead to national bankruptcy. The position has
been made worse by the loss of confidence in sterling and by the
additional strain o f the loss ofPersian oil supplies...6
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This quote also illustrates the differing perceptions held by London and
Washington regarding Iran’s situation.

For outgoing Labour Prime Minister

Clement Attlee, the crisis “illustrated the kind o f problem that arises when
insurgent nationalism comes into conflict with old-established commercial
interests.”7 The British were acutely aware o f the financial stakes involved in a
potentially irrevocable loss o f Iranian oil, tax revenue, and profits. In contrast, the
Americans finally opted to support a joint Anglo-American operation to depose
Musaddiq due to their fears that continued internal chaos could lead to a Tudeh
coup. The British had favored such a covert operation for two years prior to the
August, 1953 coup, but for quite different reasons, Whitehall was less fearful o f
Communist usurpation, and believed that the Musaddiq government could be
supplanted by another, wo«-Communist regime more conducive to a favorable oil
agreement. Great Britain’s main foreign policy goal, as Attlee hinted, was to
retain valued Iranian commercial assets, and thus protect British strategic,
commercial, and military interests.

Whitehall’s aim was to persuade the

American government not to mediate the oil dispute, but rather to cooperate in its
plans both to oppose nationalization and topple Musaddiq.
After the Conservative Party’s usurpation o f power in October, 1951,
incoming Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden also expressed concerns that the
Iranian situation, if not dealt with firmly by London, could hasten the spread o f
similar nationalization attempts throughout the Near East. In spite of the Crown’s
reduced resources and manpower in the wake o f the war, Eden still hoped that
6 Parliamentary Debates, 1951-1952, November 6, 1951, 493 H.C. deb. 5s, pp. 76-77
[Italics added].
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some possessions or commercial interests could be retained, so long as
expenditures did not outpace potential gains.

If the British government was

unable to maintain effective control o f its Iranian holdings, Eden surmised, other
Near Eastern peoples may be encouraged to pursue similar actions, having been
prompted by the bold Iranian move:
Now, as a result o f events in Iran, Egypt became ebullient. The
troubles fomented on the Shatt al Arab, festered on the Nile. There
were riotings and shootings and attacks upon our troops. In
October, the Labour government, as one o f its last acts, increased
the garrison of Egypt by two brigades.
This was the lowering prospect I contemplated on the day I
took over at the Foreign Office. We were out of Iran; we had lost
Abadan; our authority throughout the Middle East had been
violently shaken; the outbreaks in Egypt foreshadowed further
upheavals,..8

The incoming Conservative government was also recalcitrant for more basic,
political reasons. During the 1951 election campaign, Churchill criticized the
Labour Party for its soft policy toward Iran’s nationalization. If elected, the
Conservatives promised to assume a tougher line toward Musaddiq.

British

interests and prestige were at stake, they claimed, and these had to be protected.
Once in office, the Conservatives felt obligated to make good on their campaign
rhetoric, and opposed nationalization (and Musaddiq) at every opportunity.
Thus, the British and American governments held quite different views on
the Iranian oil nationalization crisis. British policy was shaped by commercial,
domestic political, and economic considerations, whereas the American position
was shaped more by geostrategic interests. During the first months o f the crisis,

7 Attlee, p. 246.
* Eden, p. 217.
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the two governments had disparate assessments o f the Iranian domestic situation,
o f the risks o f continued economic deterioration, and of the correct course o f
action to be followed. Eventually, the two allies forged a unified approach to the
crisis, and actively sought the deposition o f the courageous, but misunderstood,
Iranian premier.

It should also be pointed out that, like their American

counterparts, there was a shift in tactics after the change o f administrations. The
Labour Party, under Attlee’s leadership, had been willing to resist Musaddiq
through diplomatic, economic, and political means only.

In contrast, the

Conservatives under Churchill showed themselves more eager to settle the crisis,
and were willing to use more assertive methods to achieve their goal.

Friction.
As Truman’s July, 1951, letter to Musaddiq stated, the U.S. government
initially preferred to serve as unofficial mediator in the dispute, and sent W.
Averell Harriman to Tehran for that purpose. The Americans perceived British
obstinacy as a key reason for the stalemate that set in after nationalization, a
sentiment echoed by Acheson:
Mosadeq was aided by the unusual and persistent stupidity o f the
company and the British government in their management o f the
affair. Hope for stability and progress in Iran lay in the young
Shah, although American liberals clung to the illusion that some
other moderate leadership existed between the Tudeh Party
Communists and the feudal reactionaries and mullahs.9

Acheson’s first point, that the Crown had managed the Iranian situation poorly,
was a common critique in the State Department.
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The State Department had

already formally endorsed the 50-50 profit-sharing principle adopted by American
oil companies, believing it to be both fair and essential to muting simmering antiWestern feelings in the developing countries. In contrast, the British considered
the 50-50 principle a concession too far. When possible, Whitehall hoped to
retain its authoritative, and exploitative, position in the Near East, and so resisted
such an arrangement with Iran until mid-1951.

By this time, however, the

National Front and its supporters rejected such an agreement, and opted to
unilaterally nationalize the AIOC in its entirety.
In November, 1951, Eden and Acheson conducted a series o f meetings in
Paris to discuss Anglo-American differences and reach agreement on correct
Iranian policy.10 During the meetings, Eden outlined four major principles that he
believed essential to a settlement of the nationalization crisis:
1. There must be fair compensation for loss cause by
nationalization...
2. ...security
for
payment
of
effective
compensation...[Compensation could only be paid in the form
o f oil].
3. Iran should not by reason o f her unilateral action secure,
overall, more favourable terms than concessionary
Governments which have respected their contracts.
4. [British nationals cannot be excluded from Iran].11

In essence, Acheson was able to persuade his British counterpart to accept
nationalization in principle.

However, the British refused to accept de facto

nationalization because they still viewed the unilateral abrogation o f the 1933

9 Acheson, p. 501.
10 The two statesmen were in Paris for a meeting of the U.N. Assembly. In a period of ten days,
Eden and Acheson held five meetings.
11 Eden, pp. 219-220.
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Agreement as an illegal act.12 The Crown was also reluctant to make concessions
because doing so would reward a government that had violated a commercial
contract.
Eden and Acheson also disagreed about the politico-economic situation in
Iran. Acheson expressed American concerns o f leftist subversion in Iran, and
believed that if a mutually acceptable oil agreement was not signed, the Musaddiq
government could slip into the Communist camp. As Acheson iterated above,
many State Department officials did not believe “moderate leadership” existed in
Iran between the Tudeh party and the far right. If the politico-economic situation
continued to deteriorate, Acheson pined, Musaddiq would either turn to the Soviet
Union for assistance, or succumb to a Tudeh coup.

Foreign Secretary Eden

disagreed:
Our reading o f the situation was different. I did not accept the
argument that the only alternative to Musaddiq was Communist
rule. I thought that if Musaddiq fell, his place might well be taken
by a more reasonable Government with which it should be possible
to conclude a satisfactory agreement.13

The two diplomats also differed on the proper role o f the American
government in the crisis. Eden, of course, tried to persuade the Americans to
oppose Musaddiq by rejecting the premier’s requests for economic aid to stabilize
the Iranian central government. At this time Acheson preferred to remain neutral,
however, and wondered if giving financial aid to Musaddiq might buy needed
negotiating time and stymie the leftist threat

12 See Acheson, p. 505.
13 Ibid., p. 222.
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Although Eden and Acheson were unable to reach a consensus about “the
future of Iran,” they did “come closer” on another key issue.14 They agreed that
any significant economic aid to Iran should be attained from an international,
independent lending agency, not the U.S. government. The following February
Truman thus rejected yet another aid request from Musaddiq, and stated that any
financial help from the United States government had to be preceded by a new oil
agreement with Great Britain. In a State Department bulletin issued on March 20,
1952, the U.S. government justified its decision:
The United States has received several requests, both
written and oral, from the Iranian Government for loans for direct
financial assistance to ease the acute situation in which the Iranian
Government finds itself as a result o f the loss o f its oil revenues.
The United States position in response to these requests has been
that while the United States desires to be in a position to render
Iran any proper and necessary assistance, it could not justify aid of
the type requested at a time when Iran has the opportunity o f
receiving adequate revenues from its oil industry without prejudice
to its national aspirations. It has been pointed out that the United
States is bearing a heavy financial burden in its efforts to help
bring about a stable and lasting peace and that it is most difficult to
undertake additional commitments to a country which has die
immediate means o f helping itself.
The United States has not, as indicated in press reports
originating in Iran, established as a condition for granting financial
aid to Iran that the Iranian Government should accept any
particular proposals.
The United States has consistently
maintained that a settlement is possible in which the legitimate
interests of both Iran and the United Kingdom will be protected
and which will make the resumption of the oil industry operation
feasible and practicable form the economic viewpoint. We believe
that the offer o f the International Bank to assist in this matter has
provided a good opportunity to reach this objective, even though
on an interim basis. We continue to hope that a formula will be
found which will be acceptable to both parties.i;>

14 Ibid., p. 224.
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Great Britain advised the Americans to reject Musaddiq’s requests for aid in the
hope that a destabilized Musaddiq government would give way to a “more
reasonable” administration in Tehran. However, when the United States actually
rejected repeated requests for large aid packages, it did so due to the massive
expenditures incurred by the Marshall Plan and other postwar projects, and due to
the availability o f another substantial income source for the Iranian government.
The State Department also welcomed the temporary intervention o f the
International Bank to run either the oil industry on an interim basis, or provide
financial assistance to the Iranian central government.
During the Eden-Acheson meetings in Paris, the matter of American
commercial intervention was also discussed. At first, Acheson was hesitant to
bring U.S. oil companies into any consortium that would temporarily run oil
operations, for he did not want the British government to feel threatened by
American ulterior motives. In expressing such sentiments, Acheson was, perhaps,
exhibiting false humility. It was no secret that American oil companies had made
several attempts in the 1920s and 1930s to gain oil concessions from the Iranian
government.16 In fact, George McGhee, Assistant Secretary o f State for Near
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, had met with a group o f American oil

15 Clarence W. Baier and Richard P. Stebbins, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations,
1952 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 274.
16 Morgan Shuster stated in The Strangling o f Persia that the U.S. did harbor commercial hopes
for Iranian oil. Unfortunately, British predominance in Iran’s oil industry stymied private efforts
to gain an American concession. Further, during the immediate postwar period the United States
and Great Britain exchanged support on key political issues: American support for Britain’s Iran
policy in return for British support in Korea and Europe. Thus, Washington was reluctant to
sacrifice needed British assistance in Southeast Asia and Europe by opposing London’s Iran
policy.
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executives on May 14, 1951 to discuss the Anglo-Iranian r ift. 17 At the height of
the nationalization debate in the Iranian Majlis, McGhee told the American
oilmen that the AIOC should accept nationalization as a foregone conclusion.18
He then asked the oil officials for advice regarding the proper public position to
be assumed by the United States government. The executives replied by stating
that any public displeasure voiced by the State Department would only alienate
London. The State Department was not eager to risk estrangement with a needed
ally for Washington’s European and Asian policies.
initially

Thus, the oil companies

urged an- American commercial and governmental policy of

“aloofness.”19

From Truman to Eisenhower
Another reason for American hesitancy on the commercial issue was of a
legal nature. By spring, 1952, the State Department reached the conclusion that
only an international oil consortium would be able to run both Iran’s industry,
and allay Musaddiq’s fears o f British domination. As previously stated, a key
obstacle to successful negotiations had been the issue of the exclusion o f British
nationals from Iran. The National Front and its cadre were dead-set against the
17 Officials from the large oil companies, such as Caltex, ARAMCO, and Gulf, were present.
18 McGhee eventually ran afoul of the British due to the Assistant Secretary’s connections with the
American oil industry. Because of his background as an oilman, London claimed that he was a
biased player, and ill-suited to make fair judgements during the crisis. McGhee defended himself,
saying that AIOC policy amounted to “obstructionism,” and asserting that Iran (like it or not) had
the right to nationalize i f compensation was provided. (See McGhee, p. 322, 338). As the crisis
lapsed into fall, 1951, the State Department, sensing the rising tensions, replaced Ambassador-toTehran Henry F. Grady with Loy Henderson. (Both Grady and McGhee had been more
sympathetic to the Iranian side). Anthony Eden was ecstatic about Henderson’s appointment, and
remarked that the American Ambassador’s help was crucial to the 1954 settlement of the oil
dispute. (See Eden, p. 226).
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return o f British technicians and employees after it became obvious that they were
unwilling to work for the nascent NIOC. After their expulsion in fall, 1951, the
British demanded that any new agreement permit the return o f their nationals to
the Iranian oilfields. London wanted to keep its foot in the door o f Musaddiq’s
house. Musaddiq, of course, refused the demand.
When it became obvious that neither side would compromise on this key
point, the State Department’s Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson arranged a meeting
with American oil industry representatives, Attorney General James McGranery,
General Omar Bradley, and the Justice Department’s Leonard Emmerglick.
Acheson and Nitze believed that an international consortium, one that could
replace the much-maligned AIOC, was the only viable option for a mutually
acceptable oil compact. There were, however, very important legal obstacles to
the plan. According to the plan, the consortium would be comprised o f both
European and American companies.

Unfortunately, the Justice Department’s

Antitrust Division was embroiled in several legal proceedings against U.S. oil
companies for alleged monopolization practices. Before bringing the proposal to
President Truman’s desk, Acheson wanted to see if the plan would pass the
Justice Department’s legal stipulations.
At the meeting, held October 8, 1952, Emmerglick was less than
enthusiastic. He believed that the law must be impartial, and adamantly argued
against American participation in an international consortium in Iran because he
believed it to be a violation o f his department’s antitrust standards.

General

19 “Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs,”
FRUS, 1951, vol. V, p. 312.

Bradley vehemently objected, stating that the matter was one o f national security
and that the antitrust laws should be suspended in the case o f Iran. Truman
eventually sided with Bradley and Nitze on the matter, instructed the Justice
Department to overlook American participation in the consortium, and told the
State Department to proceed with the proposition.20
After these legal issues were settled, the State Department and British
Foreign Office thought there was renewed hope for a settlement. London agreed
to permit new discussions on the plan outlined by the Truman Administration, and
Musaddiq approved the proposal in January, 1953, after adding a request for a
$50 million loan from the U.S. government.21 Musaddiq then made another
abrupt reversal, and rejected the proposition!

Nitze claimed that the Iranian

premier likely rejected the plan “in the mistaken belief that he could cut a better
deal with the incoming Eisenhower administration.”22
Once again, Musaddiq had made a serious miscalculation, for the
incoming Eisenhower Administration was not in a generous mood. There were
five key justifications for Eisenhower’s immovable stance toward Musaddiq.
First, though Iran was considered o f vital strategic importance in the Near
East, particularly as a line-of-defense against southward Soviet aggression, the
20 Nitze, p. 134.
21 The loan was to come via the Defense Production Administration. Truman, like his successor,
did not place a priority on Iranian financial aid. His Mutual Security Program (announced to
Congress on May 24,1951) proposed the following expenditures (See Truman, Public Papers, p.
304):
Economic aid
Military aid
Europe
$1,650 million
$5,240 million
Asia
375
555
Middle East and North Africa
125
415
Latin America
22
40
Administration
78
:
Total
$2.25 billion
$6.25 billion
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Eisenhower Administration did not place the oil crisis at the top o f its priority list.
Both Truman and his successor believed the Korean conflict and other global
situations to be o f greater import than events in the oilfields o f southern Iran.
Second, the Marshall Plan and other postwar economic and military aid
programs were taxing government resources, in late May, 1953, Prime Minister
Musaddiq sent a request for emergency financial assistance to Eisenhower, and
claimed that if the aid was not received, there would be “serious consequences.”23
The “serious consequences” he hinted at were, of course, the threats o f both
internal leftist subversion and an external alliance, borne o f necessity, with the
Soviet Union.

Yet Eisenhower and his new Secretary o f State, John Foster

Dulles, were not swayed by Musaddiq’s sword-rattling.24

As state before,

President Eisenhower sent a reply, dated June 29, 1953, in which he contended
that a substantial economic aid package to Iran would be an unjustifiable use of
taxpayer funds.25 He continued Truman’s policy of rejecting large-scale financial
assistance to Musaddiq until a new oil agreement with Great Britain was reached.
To Eisenhower, Musaddiq had access to much-needed revenue for his
government, but the premier’s repeated rejections o f British and American
proposals were the main source o f Iran’s“ troubles.”26 The expensive rebuilding
programs underway in Western Europe, postwar aid programs in Turkey and

22 Nitze, p. 135.
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 161.
24 A few U.S. officials, including George McGhee and Henry Grady, had been more eager to
provide economic assistance. In fall, 1950, for example, U.S. Ambassador-to-Iran Grady urgently
requested a $100 million for Iran. The State Department turned the request down because both the
Department and American lending institutions believed Iran to be a high-risk in the absence of an
oil agreement. See Acheson, pp. 501-503.
25 Ibid., p. 162.
26 Ibid.
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Greece, and Eisenhower’s determination to reach a settlement in Korea, combined
to render the idea o f increased expenditures in Iran unpalatable. Further, that
Eisenhower’s response came one month after Musaddiq’s request is indicative o f
the low priority given to the oil nationalization crisis.
Third, even if the American government could have afforded the large
economic aid packages requested by Musaddiq, it is improbable that Eisenhower
would have given his approval. Marshall Plan money did help turn the tide in
Greece’s war with leftist insurrectionists. Yet substantial resource expenditures in
China did not have the same result, and in 1949, China was “lost” to the
Communists. If the U.S. government opted to grant Musaddiq financial aid, with
or without a new Anglo-Iranian oil agreement in hand, it would not guarantee
victory over growing leftist activity in Iran. It must also be iterated that, as
Katouzian asserted, Musaddiq was in control o f only one bloc o f the central
government. Pro-Shah and traditionalist forces, many o f them known for their
corruption, still controlled other departments within the government, and
Eisenhower could not justify dumping aid into a government legendary for its
criminal elements.27
Fourth, by the time Eisenhower took office in January, 1953, international
oil companies had successfully closed the production gap left by the loss o f
Iranian oil exports. From 1947 to 1954, Iranian oil production dropped from
424,000 barrels per day to only 59,000. In contrast, Saudi Arabian production
increased during the same period, from 246,000 barrels to 953,000 barrels per
day. Kuwait likewise expanded oil production from 45,000 to 952,000 barrels per
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day.28 This successful ‘bridging o f the gap’ contrasted sharply with a 1951
prediction that the forfeiture o f Iranian oil would cause devastating effects.29
Musaddiq’s prediction that the world, especially the Western world, could not do
without Persian oil, was wrong. Eisenhower and Churchill, while eager to resume
full production in Iran, could afford to play the waiting game because British,
American, European, and international oil producers had closed ranks.
Fifth, the Tudeh Party’s increased benevolence toward Musaddiq’s
government, coupled with Musaddiq’s own veiled threats o f a leftist courtship,
convinced Eisenhower and Dulles that opposition to the premier was increasingly
necessary. Eisenhower stated that Musaddiq was “moving closer and closer to the
Communists,” and it was this concern that pushed the American government to
embrace the long-standing British plan to actively machinate Musaddiq’s
overthrow.30 During the summer o f 1953, Eisenhower grew wary o f Musaddiq’s
tolerance o f Tudeh support, and worried that a repeat o f Czechoslovakia’s loss to
leftism was in the offing:
For the shah, the time had come to check that course...
Mossadegh, the shah thought, believed that he could form an
alliance with the Tudeh party and then outwit it; but in doing so,
the Shah recognized, Dr. Mossadegh would become to Iran what
the ill-feted Dr. Benes had been in Czechoslovakia- a leader whom
the Communists, having gained power, would eventually destroy.31

For Eisenhower and Dulles, the fear o f leftist subversion was the final, fateful
factor in their decision to join MI6 in an operation to bring Musaddiq down and
27 See also Pahlavi, p. 82.
28 Ibid., p. 160.
29 “Interest of the United States in the Development of the Petroleum Resources Of the Near and
Middle East,” January 8 , 1951,NIE-14, FRUS, 1951, vol. V, p. 269.
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supplant him with the more amicable Mohammad Reza Shah.32 The Truman and
Eisenhower governments were virtually identical in their motives and perceptions
during the oil nationalization crisis. Both administrations were reluctant to grant
substantive financial aid given Musaddiq’s intransigence, the bevy of other
pressing foreign policy matters, the availability o f oil revenue to Iran, and the
risks o f lending to an unstable government. Yet Eisenhower and Dulles were
faced with the growing possibility of a leftist coup in Iran, and the slippage of
Tehran into the Communist camp.

Eisenhower was willing to avert this

catastrophe //the expenditure of resources was limited.

A Diplomacy o f Priority, Revisited
This determination to limit both expenditure and involvement in Iran
strongly supports the assertion that American policy constituted a diplomacy o f
priority, and not a diplomacy o f neglect.

U.S. officials, both in the State

Department and in the Truman and Eisenhower governments, did not ignore the
postwar Iranian oil dispute. Rather, they carefully examined the Iranian situation,
placed it in its global context, and determined that the crisis did not warrant top
priority. Although they believed that Iran should remain in the Western camp,
they nonetheless could not justify any drastic increase in resource allocation to the

30 Eisenhower, Mandatefo r Change, pp. 162-163.
31 Ibid., p. 163.
32 After Dulles’ appointment, Paul Nitze urged Dulles to carry on discussions with Musaddiq.
Dulles initially believed that the U.S. government had been ‘too harsh’ toward Musaddiq. Dulles
also believed that Egypt’s Gemal Abdel Naser should be the “wheelhorse of [America’s] Middle
East policy.” (See Nitze, p. 135). However, as 1953 progressed, Dulles and brother Allen of the
CIA had changes o f heart. Hoping to avoid a leftist coup in Iran, they opted to help topple
Musaddiq.
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country given the other problems facing the United States.

There were four

significant factors that reduced the relative importance o f the Iranian crisis.
First, the Office o f Near Eastern Affairs, which handled most diplomatic
contacts with Iran, was only one o f four offices working under the leadership of
the Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs o f the State Department.33 In addition
to these four offices, there were twenty geographic divisions. In addition to the
Political Affairs group, there were three other departments on the same tier:
Administration, Public Affairs, and Economic Affairs. Each o f these groups had
more subdivisions: twenty, nine, Mid, thirteen, respectively. Not only was the
Near Eastern Affairs Division competing with other geographic areas for monies
and attention, such as the European and Far Eastern Affairs Divisions, but there
was also competition within its own branches! Given that the postwar period
witnessed the formation o f Israel, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, leftist agitation in
Greece, instability in Turkey, and growing anti-colonialism in Egypt, it should be
no surprise to revisionists that the U.S. government placed Iran lower on their
diplomatic priority list. These were, furthermore, Near and Middle Eastern crises.
Other global situations encountered in the postwar period were: the fall of China
in 1949; the 1948 Berlin crisis; the occupation o f Japan; the invasion o f South
Korea in June, 1950; and the births of the U.N. and NATO. The decision to
relegate Iran to lesser priority was, therefore, a conscious decision- not a
development bome entirely out o f ineptitude and neglect

33 Graham H. Stuart, The Department o f State: A History o f Its Organization, Procedure, and
Personnel (New York: MacMillan, 1949), pp. 454-455.
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Second, Eisenhower, as Robert A. Divine observed, was a Europeoriented executive:
He shared the Eastern establishment’s foreign policy view that
American security rested on a stable and friendly Europe, and he
had little patience for those Republicans who were oriented toward
A sia.34

Granted, Eisenhower was serious about his campaign vow to travel to Korea and
reach a peace agreement with China and North Korea.

However, his

administration remained firmly Europe-centered throughout his tenure, for Europe
was Caucasian America’s forefather.

The American ruling majority had no

cultural, religious, ethnic, or historical affinity with Iran. Given the fact that
Europe was perceived to still under direct or indirect Communist threats, it was
inevitable that American officials placed greater emphasis upon European
economic, political, and military stability.
Third, Eisenhower’s leadership style did not foster an environment of
diplomatic neglect, but rather attentiveness. True, Eisenhower delegated much
authority to his subordinates, and expected consensus on issues to be reached by
his subordinates before they reached his desk.

However, Secretary o f State

Dulles, Sherman Adams, and other members o f the staff were also eager for input
from Eisenhower, particularly given his wealth o f foreign policy experience and

34 Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.
10. Truman also believed Europe central to America’s security needs: “The heart of our common
defense effort is the North Atlantic community. The defense o f Europe is the basis fo r the defense
o f the whole free world- ourselves included. Next to the United States, Europe is the largest
workshop in the world. It is also a homeland of the great religious beliefs shared by many of our
citizens- beliefs which are now threatened by the tide of atheistic communism.” (Italics added].
See Harry S. Truman, Public Papers o f the Presidents, 1951 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1965), p. 9.
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international contacts. He was not, as Fred I. Greenstein asserted, a roi faineant,
but an “activist” who carefully balanced his ultimate sovereignty with a
delegation of duties to trusted advisers.35 In the case o f Iran, just as in other
foreign policy crises, Eisenhower was never aloof but rather involved.
Fourth, both the Truman and Eisenhower governments had determined
that a direct Soviet invasion of Iran, though not impossible, was implausible. The
National Security Council had studied the situation and drew the following
conclusions:
Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective in the Soviet
program o f expansion...36 Although the U.S.S.R. will continue to
apply strong political and psychological pressures against Iran...
(T]t is considered unlikely that the Soviet Union would be willing
to resort to direct armed intervention...37

This assessment proved crucial to American strategy in Iran, for without the threat
o f direct Soviet intervention, the dispute’s severity was lessened significantly, and
more focus placed upon other hotspots. To the Americans, it appeared that Stalin
was unwilling to risk his goals in Eastern Europe and East Asia in order to make
gains in Iran. This was a correct assessment. If the Soviets were content to
subvert Tehran via a third force, the Tudeh Party, then the Americans were
willing to employ the same tactic through the Shah.

Soviet policy in Iran

followed similar reasoning, as the following chapter will testify.

35 Fred I. Greenstein, “Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence,” Political
Science Quarterly, vol. 94, no. 1, Winter 1979-1980, pp. 575-599.
36 Undated S/P - NSC files, NSC 107 Series (Top Secret), FRUS. 1951-1954, vol. X,
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), p. 11.
Ibid., p. 15.
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All in all, American policy toward Musaddiq and his nationalization of
British oil assets was, in essence, rather pragmatic.

Neither Truman nor

Eisenhower embraced Musaddiq and oil nationalization.

Yet the Truman

Administration was willing to wait for Musaddiq’s demise, while the Eisenhower
Administration opted to intervene directly in order to hasten the premier’s fall and
attain stability in Iran. Though American attitudes toward Musaddiq did not
change, tactics and objectives did change. This change o f administrations and,
hence, policy goals, was also reflected in the transition from Henry Grady to Loy
Henderson as ambassador to Iran. Grady was more sympathetic to the Iranian
came than his successor.

In fact, Henderson was praised by the British

government for his empathy for the British position, and his usefulness during and
after the 1953 coup.
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8. Cold War Dynamics

In James F. Goode’s Diplomacy o f Neglect, he surmises that one o f the
sculptors o f oil nationalization’s outcome, the Cold War, need not have been the
powerful factor that it was during the crisis. He states that the United States was
“consumed” by the Cold War, and thus followed a “misguided policy bom o f
ignorance and anticommunist ideology.”1 It is easy to render such assessments at
the end o f the Cold War. Yet at the time, the policies formulated by British,
American, and Soviet diplomats seemed reasonable.

The Bane o f Historical Revisionism
The fault o f this strain o f historical revisionism is that it takes a backward
look in history, and downplays the strong historical forces at work at the time a
crisis is in motion. Gaddis observed this tendency in his aforementioned article
on the Cold War. In the case o f Iran, it is easy for criticism to be leveled against
American policy in Iran during the nationalization period because the 1979
Revolution granted us a sobriety only history can provide:
As the observer looks back over events in Iran in the years after
1945 he has a feeling that with more wisdom, or at least with more
knowledge o f Iranian conditions and especially o f Iranian
tendencies, the United States government could have helped
prevent the descent into chaos in 1978.2

1 Goode, Diplomacy o f Neglect, p. viii.
2 Ibid., p. 7.

136

Of course, an emotive, revisionist argument is easier to render than a
reasoned assessment because the bitter fruits of past miscalculations have been
harvested. Katouzian, in a discussion o f the Constitutional Revolution, observes
that this inclination can be very damaging to a well-structured historiography:
[A]t its best, this is a flight of fancy in reading history backwardsthat is, interpreting past reality in the light o f later experience; and,
at its worst, shows a complete disregard for the effects o f social
forces and human consciousness in historical situations.3

A revisionist approach, though able to uncover some previously overlooked
causes, can also lead to erroneous conclusions. Different interpretive approaches
under the revisionist umbrella can illuminate past historical events by revealing
previously veiled determinants of those events’ outcomes.

However,

revisionism’s fallacy is that it sometimes relies too heavily on contemporary
perceptions of past events, rather than rendering an accurate perception o f those
events through the eyes o f history’s participants. In the case o f the Iranian oil
nationalization crisis, the effects o f Cold War ideological, political, economic, and
military rivalry upon the outcome are too often downplayed by a revisionist
approach. Let us, then, examine the perceptions and policies o f the Soviet and
American governments through their eyes.

Soviet Polity in Iran
First, it must be understood that Soviet-Iranian relations in the 19th and
20th centuries have been characterized not by variation, but by continuity. The

3 Katouzian, p. 59.
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Bolshevik Revolution provided only a brief lull in Russia’s southward push, as
Firuz Kazemzadeh noted:4
The Soviet Union has had as its ultimate goal a Persia under a (
government controlled from Moscow; but in pursuit o f this goal it
has not been prepared for major political sacrifices, let alone war.
Iran, on its part, has been trying to use every available means to
stay outside the sphere o f Russian domination...
Soviet pressure on Iran has been unremitting, though its
intensity has varied with circumstances. In resisting such pressure
Iran has had to exercise extreme care lest she commit herself to
Russia’s antagonists to such an extent that she would lose her
freedom of maneuver.3 [Italics added]

What is fascinating about this consistent Tsarist Russian/Soviet policy is its
pragmatism. Russia has historically desired warm-water transport routes, namely
through the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean and through the Trans-Caucasus
region to the Persian Gulf. However, Russian and Soviet foreign policies have
been, as a whole, more consumed with safeguarding and/or advancing the western
border due to the number and strength o f countless invasions from that direction.
Western Russia’s flat topography has historically invited invasion, making the
quest for an Iranian sphere o f influence secondary to the country’s western
concerns. After the close o f the Second World War, the Soviet policy was shaped
by fresh memories o f Axis infringement o f its Western border, and o f the 20 to 30
million Russians killed during the conflict. Foreign Commissar V.M. Molotov
stressed Soviet apprehensions o f German resurgence at a conference o f foreign

4 See Rubinstein, pp. 57-62.
3 Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Soviet-Iranian Relations: A Quarter-Century Of Freeze and Thaw,” The
Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S.
Vucinich, eds.(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 55.
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ministers at Paris in July, 1946. At this conference, plans for the demilitarization
o f Nazi Germany were being discussed:
The Soviet Government reaffirms that the disarmament and long
term demilitarization o f Germany are absolutely essential. The
Soviet Government holds that Germany should be kept disarmed
and demilitarized not for twenty-five years, as suggested in the
draft, but for at least forty years.

Thus, in the postwar period, Stalin’s attention was riveted on regions other than
Iran. Soviet foreign policy focused on attaining a sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe to serve as a buffer between liberal-democratic, capitalist aggressors and
die Soviet state.

Likewise, after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Soviet

diplomats busied themselves in that theater. Iran was, therefore, not the first item
on Moscow’s global expansion agenda.

While its oil resources, warm-water

access, and geo-strategic values were coveted, the Soviet Union was decidedly
pragmatic in its pursuit o f policy. If expenditures or risks outweighed any possible
gains, Soviet officials were content to maintain neutral relations with Tehran. If a
situation presented itself that could be turned to Soviet Russia’s advantage, as in
the chaotic two-year nationalization period, then Moscow would seek to
manipulate that situation and so advance Soviet goals.
A second intriguing aspect o f Soviet foreign policy in Iran concerns the
relationship between Communist ideology and its application.

George

Lenczowski recognized that revisions o f dogmatic Marxism by Lenin and Stalin
provided the Soviet Union with greater flexibility in its relations with capitalist
and colonized nations. In its initial form, Lenczowski stated, Marxist history
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adhered to six “quite neatly-delineated periods:” primitive, slave-holding, feudal,
capitalist, socialist, and Communist.7 Thus, in this doctrinal approach, transition
from one period to another will inevitably lead to class struggle, revolution, and
warfare as each dominated class seeks to usurp its antecedent-dominator. In this
rigid formula, Marx left no room for peaceable relations between capitalist and
leftist entities. In essence, war was inevitable.
However, Lenin significantly modified this strict doctrine, so much so that
it could be labeled a “virtual repudiation” o f Communist orthodoxy.8 Lenin
contended that as competition for material resources between capitalist nations
increased, socialist revolutions would occur due to the resultant chaos. Lenin also
argued that if a leftist revolution were successful, the new state would quickly
draw the fury o f the capitalist nations. Given such dire circumstances, Lenin
surmised, it could be necessary to establish temporary alliances or agreements
with capitalist elements both to ensure survival and, simultaneously, to agitate for
leftist rebellion. Peaceful coexistence now joined the certainty o f war as foreign
policy paradigms. As a result, an ideological justification was discovered to
support independence of movement:
This conceptual dualism, combining the inevitability of war and
the possibility o f coexistence, has permitted subsequent Soviet
leaders to interpret Lenin virtually at their will, choosing that part
o f his theory which at the moment best suited them.9

6 V.M. Molotov, Problems o f Foreign Policy (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1949), p. 55.
7 George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington, DC: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971), p. 5.
8 Ibid., p. 6.
9 Ibid., p. 8.
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When applied to Soviet-Iranian relations during the Musaddiq period, clarity is
given to an otherwise clouded picture.

The Soviet Union was neither

extraordinarily helpful, nor particularly hurtful, to Musaddiq.

True, they

continued to lend assistance to leftist elements in Iran- deemed an antagonistic
action by the Americans. However, despite fears by a few American officials o f a
repeat of Azerbaijan, the Soviets did not intend to intervene directly in Iranian
internal affairs, so long as there was no significant Western military presence in
Iran. (The CIA and NSC eventually reached this same conclusion). Rather, the
Soviets preferred to coexist with Musaddiq, likely in the hope that his National
Front coalition could be employed as a vehicle to bring the Tudeh to power.
Moscow did not actively support Musaddiq due to his past complicity in defeating
the postwar Soviet oil concession. The Soviets seemed willing to employ covert,
subversive methods, but did not want to jeopardize recent gains in Eastern Europe
and the Far East for a lesser prize in Iran. Kazemzadeh noted this tendency in an
analysis o f Stalin’s decision to withdraw Red Army troops from Iran in 1946:
Stalin was not prepared for the sake o f achieving all his aims in
Persia to jeopardize his European goals. His hold on East
Germany, Poland, and the rest o f Eastern Europe had not yet been
consolidated. Czechoslovakia was still governed by a coalition o f
“bourgeois” politicians. Eduard Benes was still president and Jan
Masaryk was alive. Rumania had not yet been rid o f the king and
the non-communist politicians, and in Bulgaria the struggle for
control had not yet ended with the arrest and execution o f Nikola
Petkov. Stalin mast have weighed opportunities and risks and
decided that, having already achieved so much in Iran, he should
not needlessly endanger his position...10 (Italics added]

10 Kazemzadeh, p. 62.
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Moscow was unwilling to continue an armed occupation o f the country if doing
so risked gains elsewhere. It seemed that the Soviet Union was only willing to
expand its southern sphere of influence through indirect means, such as its
support o f the Tudeh Party. The Soviets, like their American adversaries, would
only consider direct armed intervention in the event o f a U.S. or British
invasion.11
When the Soviets did place diplomatic pressure on Musaddiq, they did so
only in an effort to force a withdrawal o f American military aid. Washington
refused to grant substantial economic aid, but agreed to resume military assistance
to Iran in April, 1952.

In a threatening diplomatic note, Moscow protested

Musaddiq’s acceptance o f the American offer:
The Soviet Government deems it necessary to call the
attention o f the Iranian Government to the fact that, in agreeing to
accept American so-called aid Mid, in this connection, assuming
definite commitments of a military nature toward the United States
o f America, the Iranian Government is in feet setting out on the
path o f helping the United States Government to carry out its
aggressive plans directed against the Soviet Union.12

Musaddiq and the Tudeh Party
Despite the improbability o f direct Soviet intervention in Iran, the
Americans were nonetheless deeply concerned by the oil dispute and the potential
defection o f the Iranian government to the Soviet camp. Before describing the

11 State Department, Undated S/P - NSC Files, “NSC-107,” FRUS, 1951-1954, vol. X
(Washington, DC. Government Printing Office) p. 11-13.
12 Kazemzadeh, p. 67. Kazemzadeh excerpted this quote from Royal Institute of International
Relations, Documents on International Affairs: 1952 (London, 1955), pp. 334-335.
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American response to perceived Soviet-Tudeh subversion in Iran, it is necessary
to provide a brief outline of Musddiq’s relationship to the left.
In the study o f history, one must often be cautious in the use o f primary
source material, that material provided by the participants in a historical event or
period, because each actor maintains distinct biases. These biases, often the result
o f the actor’s own misperceptions and personal political agenda, can skew our
scholarship.

Therefore, it is often necessary to exhibit restraint and good

judgement in our use o f their first-person accounts.
The question o f the Tudeh Party’s true position during the months
preceding Musaddiq’s fall provides us with such an instance.

The Shah, of

course, vigorously accused Musaddiq of complicity with the leftists (both before
and after the August coup), no doubt with the design o f courting American
support for his monarchy.

Musaddiq, in his Memoirs, cited the Shah’s

accusations o f corruption during the referendum to keep Musaddiq in power:
And for the referendum, Musaddiq, the great champion o f free
elections, arranged that those in favour o f dissolution and those
against it should vote in separate plainly-marked booths!
Everyone understood that if a man had the courage to vote against
dissolution he would probably be beaten up by Musaddiq’s toughs
or by those o f the Tudeh- actually the two groups by this time were
almost indistinguishable. The results were all that Musaddiq- or
Hitler before him-could have desired...13

Musaddiq retorted that the “disciplined organisation” o f the Tudeh Party projected
a strength not commensurate with its small membership. He downplayed the
Tudeh’s interference during the referendum, saying that

13 Musaddiq, p 291. See also the Shah’s Mission for My Country, p. 96; and Musaddiq, p. 277.
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the Tudeh party had some following in certain northern parts of the
country as well as the capital, which, due to its disciplined
organisation, looked impressive; but even if it did have some
support elsewhere it was negligible. It is unworthy of the shah-inshah to ignore 20 million people o f this country, mid, in order to
disregard everything that well-meaning and patriotic people do,
believe or pretend them to be the propaganda effect o f a small
group known as Tudeh [m ass]...14

Musaddiq also minimized the support he had received from the Tudeh Party in the
months leading up to the 1953 coup. He also claimed that his alleged association
with the Tudeh Party was a “mere pretext” used by the Shah to stage the coup.13
Musaddiq’s Memoirs will be quoted here at length:
The left-wing [i.e. Tudeh party] propaganda [for the declaration of
a ‘democratic republic’] after the 15-16 August coup was used as a
mere pretext for the overthrow of my government, and the looting
o f my house and my papers and documents. I say this, because the
decision to topple the government had been already taken before
the 28 February conspiracy, and until 1.00 a.m. on 16 August,
when the royal notice for my dismissal was delivered to me, no
individual, left-wing or otherwise, had said a word about the
declaration o f a democratic or any other republic...16

Reality lay somewhere between the two views. In truth, Musaddiq had received
key support from the Tudeh, support he was not willing to reject given his
tenuous position in the months preceding the coup. Remember that it was the
Shah, not Musaddiq, who maintained the overall loyalty o f the army. The army
14 Ibid., pp. 291-292. In truth, Musaddiq did use questionable tactics during the August 3
referendum. Knowing that he lacked support in the rural districts, Musaddiq set a short deadline
for the vote in order to prevent rural voters from making it to the polls. Doing so permitted urban
voters, (more of whom supported the premier), to vote for Musaddiq. He also arranged for the use
of marked booths. All in all, the prime minister’s unscrupulous methods were used as a
justification by the Shah for his coup.
15 Ibid., p. 285 for evidence of Musaddiq’s ‘distance’ from the Tudeh Party: “Between 16-19
August, I received a report that the Tudeh party had stuck certain leaflets on the walls, and I
ordered all of them to be removed and destroyed. This was done, and no other disorder was
observed which they could use as a pretext for the coup.”
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was an instrument Musaddiq tried repeatedly to convert to his cause. Because
Musaddiq received support from the extreme left, and because he exhibited a
reluctance to curb their activities, some U.S. State Department officials
mislabeled him a leftist. However, most officials were aware that Musaddiq was
neither pro-British, nor pro-Soviet in his politics. He was, in their estimation,
susceptible to a Communist-sponsored coup.

American Policy in Iran
For the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, the memories o f Chiang
Kai-shek and Bene§ made them wary of a repeat performance in Iran. This was
not a new fear, but one that had grown significantly since Stalin’s stubborn refusal
to withdraw his troops from Azerbaijan after the war. It was a fear that increased
as the oil dispute lapsed into its second year, for American policy-makers viewed
politico-economic chaos as fertile ground for leftism.

“World communism,”

George Kennan argued, “[was] like [a] malignant parasite which [fed] only on
diseased tissue.”17 To the State Department, Iran was becoming increasingly
susceptible to Soviet machinations. Heiss summarized American consternation in
Empire and Nationhood:
If the Soviets could dominate Iran... the Soviets could also control
the oil-rich areas o f Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The United States and
its allies would be cut off from a resource deemed essential to
victory in a modem war. For this reason alone the Soviets had to

16 Ibid., p. 319.
17 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), p. 559. In
commenting on Soviet intentions during the immediate postwar period, Kennan stated the
following: “Where individual governments stand in the path of Soviet purposes pressure will be
brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet
foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran)...” (Kennan, p. 556.
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be denied even a modicum o f influence in Iran, lest they use it to
attack Western interests there and throughout the Middle East.
to

It seems that the revisionist school has had difficulty reconciling this type o f
statement, one that highlights Iran’s strategic significance, with U.S. rejections of
Musaddiq’s aid requests mid lack o f significant resource expenditures in Iran in
the immediate postwar period. However, if one keeps in mind that the State
Department anticipated no immediate, direct Soviet intervention, American
actions are understandable. Again, the U.S. government believed that an invasion
o f Iran from the north was unlikely given the Soviet (and American) focus on
European and Asian affairs.

Because the U.S. government still anticipated

continued leftist internal subversion, the Eisenhower Administration decided to
oppose Soviet policy through their own third party, the anti-Musaddiq and/or proShah forces inside Iran.
Thus, Soviet and American conduct in Iran exhibited, not differences, but
striking similarities in policy, tactics, and perceptions between the two estranged
superpowers. The Tudeh Party, though initially hostile to Musaddiq, later threw
its support to the premier because o f his anti-British, and hence, anti-imperialist,
sentiments.

However, the Soviet Union was unwilling to jeopardize more

important gains elsewhere for the sake o f a small jewel: a leftist, pro-Moscow
government in Tehran.

This pragmatism, though borne o f postwar historical

context, had as its underlying ideological justification Leninist and Stalinist
modifications o f a formerly rigid Marxist interpretation o f historical process.

18 Heiss, p. 9.
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American foreign policy toward Iran in 1953 displayed a similar
pragmatism. For the United States, direct military intervention was only a viable
option in the event o f Soviet armed aggression. Since, according to intelligence
reports, this was improbable, the Eisenhower government decided to join the
British in an operation to topple Musaddiq, for Musaddiq’s deteriorating position
heightened fears o f a leftist coup. Further, American pragmatism had its own
practical factors and doctrinal justifications. In the summer o f 1953, Eisenhower
was reassessing American policy toward the Soviet Union.

Previous to the

Korean War, the United States had relied rather heavily on the deterring effects of
nuclear superiority to ward off Soviet expansionism. Unfortunately, the Korean
conflict exposed the fallacies o f relying on this strategy, for both Truman and
Eisenhower (unlike MacArthur) did not view a limited nuclear strike on Korea or
China as wise.

Doing so, they correctly surmised, would not defeat the

Communists, but would only expand the war and warrant nuclear retribution.
Eisenhower, after using rollback rhetoric to help win the 1952 election,
decided that a reevaluation of containment policy was necessary.

The result,

dubbed the “New Look,” involved a combination o f nuclear and conventional
forces, and diminished reliance solely on nuclear retaliation as a deterrent for
Communist aggression. Thus, the new American strategy would be to rely upon
other, economic, propaganda, and political methods to oppose the Communist
Bloc. This provided the State Department and Eisenhower Administration with
more options to resist Soviet aggression, options that included the use o f third
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parties, such as political groups, governments, and rebel movements, to stymie
leftist expansion.
John Lewis Gaddis pointed out that containment doctrine, originally
developed by George Kennan, underwent many transformations, and was subject
to various interpretations as to its proper execution. He observed that two strands
o f thought evolved out o f Kennan’s initial postwar commentary, Universalist and
Particularist
The Universalist approach to containment tended toward abstraction.
Universalism called for national security to be attained through a reshaping of the
globe in America’s image: an ideological and systematic harmonization o f
America’s external world with republicanism.
interpretation contained significant dangers.

Yet as Gaddis asserted, this

First, it assumed that peace and

security could be maintained by the assimilation o f disparate nations into a
common liberal-democratic framework.

If a large bloc o f states held similar

ideological views, maintained similar governmental structures, and were unified
by contempt for a common enemy, the Soviet Union, then harmony would be
reached and external security established. Of course, this interpretation assumed
too much, for even when a group o f nation-states have had common religious,
political, and ideological elements, these have not guaranteed stability and peace.
(Europe o f the 18th and 19th centuries is a case-in-point).

Second, Gaddis

reminded us that this policy required immense expenditures in money, equipment,
raw materials, military aid, and political support. Despite its significant resource
wealth, such expenditures were bound to tax the U.S. economy and political

148

infrastructure without a guarantee o f success. Further, one had to wonder if some
countries, given the expenditures required to draw them into the American orbit,
were worth saving. At the time o f the Iranian dispute, U.S. policy-makers had,
consciously or unconsciously, employed Universalist reasoning in their decision
to intervene directly in Korea. Technically, Korea was outside the American
defense perimeter.

Yet a theoretical interpretation o f containment doctrine

demanded direct U.S. intervention because a loss in Korea threatened American
security elsewhere in Southeast Asia; By intervening on South Korea’s behalf,
therefore, the United States hoped to salvage a liberal-democratic victory and stop
the domino effect. In essence, America sought to reshape the Korean peninsula in
its own image, and thus protect its interests.
The Particularist implementation o f containment doctrine was more
pragmatic, and did not seek to reshape the world because of the inevitability of
divergent ideologies, policies, and goals amongst nations.

Instead, this

interpretation emphasized more traditional balance-of-power methodology.
Whereas Universalism tended to be moralistic, Particularism emphasized selfpreservation and the advancement o f national interest as
considerations in charting foreign policy.

preeminent

Morals were, therefore, virtually

irrelevant. Victory over Communism and sustentation o f the American republic
were priorities; methodology and ideology were secondary to these penultimate
goals. Particularism also set limits on interference in the internal affairs o f other
nation-states, for intervention in any and every crisis could tax the resources and
manpower of the government.

Thus, this interpretation allowed for a more
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selective, utilitarian approach to the containment o f Soviet expansion. The U.S.
government could ally with any nation, so long as that nation was friendly to
American/Western interests and hostile toward leftism.

The structure and

ideology of allied governments was less important than their usefulness in
opposing Communism and advancing American foreign policy goals.
U.S. policy during the Iranian oil nationalization crisis was fatefully
shaped by this Particularist interpretation. Bome o f postwar experience, not mere
theory, this approach permitted the United States the same freedom o f movement
as that guaranteed by the Soviet embrace o f Leninist and Stalinist alterations to
Marxism. To both superpowers, a Tehran regime hostile toward the other party
was the ultimate purpose o f Iranian policy.

Other considerations, including

ideological and ethical concerns, were secondary in the minds o f Soviet and
American diplomats. While one must appreciate, to some extent, the revisionist
criticisms o f American policy during this period, one cannot wholeheartedly
accept them. Remember that in the eyes o f American diplomats, the leftist threat
in Iran was real and immediate. Remember also that the Soviet Union did have
designs for a friendly government in Tehran, Though both superpowers were
unwilling to intervene directly, they were willing to fight the nascent Cold War
through third parties. While this is distasteful, and shackled the Iranian dream o f
self-determination, it was the perhaps unavoidable result of Cold War dynamics.
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9. A Most Machiavellian Affair

What is History?
In the preceding study, it has been my goal to strike as closely as possible
at the foundational truths o f American-Iranian diplomacy during the Iranian oil
nationalization crisis of 1949-1953. Yet such an attempt was inevitably harried
by dangers at every turn, for history, as Bernard Bailyn pointed out, is
simultaneously a “craft” and a science.1 Each historian brings his or her own
techniques, perceptions, biases, and passions to historiography.

This can be

beneficial, for in many cases previously overlooked causes o f historical events are
uncovered and past inaccuracies revised.
However, in our zeal to rewrite history and illuminate past grievances we
can project our own contemporary, emotive judgements on the subjects o f our
studies. Revisionist surveys of American-Iranian foreign relations often possess
this error.

One integral portion o f this revisionist school is the cultural

interpretation o f history.
While long a characteristic o f Westem-Iranian relations, prejudice and
ignorance did not play the role during this crisis apportioned them by the
revisionist school.

Unfortunately, contemporary historical revisionism often

misapplies the cultural approach, giving it inordinate emphasis in many histories.
Cultural revisionism seeks to name the bigoted parties in intercultural conflicts,

1 Bernard Bailyn, On the Teaching and Writing o f History, Edward Connery Lathem, ed.
(Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), pp. 49-50.
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and then attributes blame for these conflicts solely to prejudice.

Cultural

revisionists must understand that this paradigm does not apply in equal measure to
every historical event. While an obvious factor in international and intercultural
relations, there can sometimes be other factors that more powerfully shape an
event’s outcome. A reasoned, patient, and fair approach to historiography is
required- an approach that, while passionate, is not mastered by emotionalism,
moralistic vengeance, or an unwillingness to admit fundamental truths. Bailyn,
while admitting that history is “an art form,” also argued that “good history”
should hit close to its target, which is truth:2
The word “history” has, I think, two meanings. One is
simply what happened; that is, the events, developments,
circumstances, and thoughts o f the past, as they actually occurred.
The other is history as knowledge o f what happened, the record or
expression o f what occurred.
One needs to understand the relationship between the
reality of what happened- the totality o f past events and
developments, past circumstances Mid thoughts- and what, in
historical writings and compilations, people represent them to have
been. That relationship, it seems to me, is crucial to all historical
study and knowledge.
The accuracy and adequacy o f
representations o f what is written about them, remain the measure,
in the end, o f good history- this despite all the fashionable doubts
that are raised about the attainment o f absolute or perfect
objectivity and accuracy (which no one pretends to, anyway).3

The frequent bane of historical revisionism is its frequent /wOTepresentahon o f
past historical events. In the case o f the Iranian oil crisis, it has often been
asserted that the preeminent influences in both Musaddiq’s fall and die failure of
nationalization were, in essence, Anglo-American prejudice and cultural
ignorance.
2 Ibid., p. 49.
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In reality, these intercultural factors, while prevalent amongst many o f the
players involved, were not the potent sculptors of the crisis’ outcome that
revisionists would have us believe.

Rather, Iranian intransigence, Anglo-

American recalcitrance, and Cold War dynamics were more powerful factors in
Musaddiq’s fell and nationalization’s defeat than long-standing cultural
antagonisms and stereotypes. Each actor involved, though influenced by their
respective (mis)perceptions and animosities, was motivated by more basic
considerations.
Of all the significant factors, the Soviet-American rivalry was by far the
greatest sculptor o f the crisis’ outcome.

In essence, it was not prejudice or

ignorance that prompted American opposition to Musaddiq.

Rather, Iranian

internal instability and subsequent fears o f a Communist coup were the two
preeminent shapers o f U.S. policy.

What, then, have we learned?
At its core, the outcome o f the crisis was shaped most by the selfishness
and pragmatism o f the participants, and by the reactions o f states to the actions o f
other internal and external actors. Goode would have us believe that pure-hearted
altruism should have been the cornerstone o f American foreign policy in Iran.
While a noble sentiment, this thesis does not match with the realities o f postwar
Soviet-American competition, nor does it match with the underlying character Of
American conduct during the period.

In spite o f its Cold War republican

blustering, U.S. policy was coldly pragmatic. The United States was willing to
3 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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support ‘freedom-loving’ peoples, but only i f American interests were either
advanced or protected.
In essence, U.S. diplomacy with regard to Iran did not veer far from
Niccolo Machiavelli’s time-tested observations in The Prince. Machiavelli, like
his later American counterparts, hoped that morality, fairness, and integrity could
all be elements o f a prince’s conduct o f international relations. Unfortunately,
such altruism was likely to be reciprocated by malevolence on the part o f other
actors, making a more selfish approach necessary for survival:
P]t has seemed wiser to me to follow the real truth o f the matter
than what we imagine it to be... for how we live is so different
from how we ought to live that he who studies what ought to be
done rather than what is done will learn the way to his downfall
rather than to his preservation. A man striving in every way to be
good will meet his ruin among the great number who are not good.
Hence it is necessary for a prince, if he wishes to remain in power,
to learn how not to be good and to use his knowledge or refrain
from using it as he may need.4

In quoting thus, I am by no means condoning such conduct, but rather
condemning it.

What is unfortunate about the conduct o f relations between

nations is its consistently selfish character. Individual human nature tends toward
self-preservation, and this tendency is inherently projected on relations between
groups.
America’s diplomacy o f priority during the oil nationalization crisis was
an example of such selfishness, and while not condoning U.S. conduct, I must
point out that the State Department’s behavior symbolized a prevalent weakness
in human nature. Until we, as individuals, alter our tendencies toward self-

154

preservation and amorality, our conduct as n a tio n s will not appreciably change.
In truth, we;, often base" our decisions on our own, personal, diplomacies o f
priority.

4 Niecoid Machiaveili, Wm Prime, TG. Bergin, <xL {New ¥ « fc Appieton-Ceimuy-Crofts, 1947),
p. 44.

Appendices
A p p e n d ix A - Text o f Nine Point Law [Bill], April 30, 19511

By the grace o f Almighty God
We
Pahlavi Shahinshah o f Persia
Hereby command, by virtue of article 27 o f the Supplementary Constitutional
Law that:
Article 1. With a view to arranging the enforcement of the Law o f 24 and
29 Isfand 1329 (15th and 20th March, 1951) concerning the nationalisation of the
oil industry throughout Persia, a mixed Board composed o f five Senators and five
Deputies elected by each o f the two Houses and o f the Minister of Finance or his
Deputy shall be formed.
Article 2. The Government is bound to dispossess at once the former
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company under the supervision o f the mixed Board. If the
Company refuses to hand over at once on the grounds o f existing claims on the
Government, the Government can, by mutual agreement, deposit in the Bank
Milli Iran or in any other bank up to 25 per cent o f current revenue from the oil
after deduction o f exploitation expenses in order to meet the probable claims of
the Company.
Article 3. The Government is bound to examine the rightful claims o f the
Government as well as the rightful claims o f the Company under the supervision
o f the mixed Board and to submit its suggestions to the two Houses o f Parliament
in order that the same may be implemented after approval by the two Houses.
Article 4. Whereas, with effect from 29th Isfand 1329 (20thMarch, 1951),
when nationalisation o f the oil industry was sanctioned also by the Senate, the
entire revenue was derived from oil and its products is indisputably due to the
Persian nation, die Government is bound to audit the Company’s accounts under
the supervision o f the mixed Board which must also closely supervise exploitation
as from the date of the implementation of this law until the appointment of an
executive body.
Article 5. The mixed Board must draw up, as soon as possible, the statute
o f the National Oil Company in which provision is to be made for the setting up
o f an executive body and a supervisory body o f experts, and must submit the
same to the two Houses for approval.
Article 6. For the gradual replacement o f foreign experts by Persian
experts the mixed Board is bound to draw up regulations for sending, after
competitive examinations a number of students each year to foreign countries to
undertake study in the various branches o f required knowledge and gain
experience in oil industries, the said regulations to be carried out by the Ministry
1Parliamentary Debates, 1950-1951, June 11,1951, H.C.488, deb. 5s, pp. 1665-1666.
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o f Education, after the approval o f the Council o f Ministers. The expenses
connected with the study o f such students shall be met out o f oil revenues.
Article 7. All purchasers o f products derived from the wells taken back
from the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company can, in future, buy annually the same
quantity of oil they used to buy annually from the Company from the beginning of
the Christian year 1948 up to 29th Isfand 1329 (20th March 1951) at reasonable
international price. For any surplus quantity they shall have priority in the event
o f equal terms o f purchase being offered.
Article 8. All proposals formulated by the mixed Board for the approval
o f the Majlis and submission to the Majlis must be sent to the Oil Committee.
Article 9. The mixed Board must finish its work within three months as
from the date o f approval o f this law and must submit the report o f its activities to
the Majlis in accordance with article 8. In the event o f requiring an extension it
must apply giving valid reasons for such extension. Whilst, however, the
extension is before the two Houses for approval, the mixed Board can continue its
functions.

A ppendix B - American Secretaries o f State, 1933-1959

Cordell Hull
Edward R. Stettinius
James F. Byrnes
Dean G. Acheson (Interim)
George C. Marshall
Robert A. Lovett (Interim)
Dean G. Acheson
John Foster Dulles

1933-1944
1944-1945
1945-1947
1947
1947-1949
1949
1949-1953
1953-1959

A ppen d ix C - American Ambassadors to Iran, 1933-1954

William H. Homibrook
Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr.
Leland B. Morris
Wallace Murray
George V. Allen
John C. Wiley
Henry F. Grady
Loy W. Henderson
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1933-1936
1939-1943
1944-1945
1945-1946
1946-1948
1948-1950
1950-1951
1951-1954
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